Chairman Tierney, Congressman Shays, Members of the Subcommittee: thank you for the opportunity to testify on the U.S. government’s efforts to train and equip the Afghan National Police and enhance the Afghan justice system. The long-term prospects of the broader reconstruction effort in Afghanistan are dependant, to a large extent, on progress in these areas. My comments will focus on Afghan National Police (ANP) development, as the Defense Department’s equities lie principally in this mission. I’m pleased to be joined by my colleagues from the Departments of State and Justice, who will speak in greater detail about their respective organizations’ specific programs.

ANP development is part of the broader effort to develop the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which include the Afghan National Army (ANA). The purpose of the ANSF development program is to grow a professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic, and sustainable ANSF, with competent ministries, staffs, and sustaining institutions, which are capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training, and supporting the ANSF. Specifically, the ANP are being trained and equipped to uphold the rule of law and control movement across Afghanistan’s borders.

The end-state for the ANP was articulated in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact as follows: “By the end of 2010 a fully constituted, professional, functional, and ethnically
balanced Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police with a combined force of up to 62,000 will be able to meet the security ends of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable.” In May 2007, the fifth meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an expansion of the ANP to 82,000 personnel, at the request of the Ministry of Interior.

In recognition of a lack of resources and unity of effort within the international community, the United States’ assumed a more expansive role in ANP development in mid-2005. The Department of Defense, through the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and in coordination with the State Department, leads the effort to support the Afghan government in ANP development. Strategic direction for U.S. efforts to support the ANP development program is developed by the U.S. interagency. A Strategic Review, agreed upon in November 2006, concluded that there was a need to accelerate the development of the ANSF, particularly the ANP. To this end, in 2007 more than $2.5 billion in Defense Department Afghan Security Forces Funds (ASFF) were appropriated for ANP development. This is in addition to more than $1.3 billion in ASFF that had been appropriated between fiscal years 2002 and 2006.

As the security situation in Afghanistan has evolved in the previous two years, and we now face a resilient insurgency, the need for an effective and professional ANP could not be greater. Police are the most visible expression to the Afghan populace of the central government’s writ and strength. The insurgents recognize this fact – and it is no surprise that they increasingly are targeting the ANP. Indeed, the ANP are taking casualties at a higher rate than the ANA. Throughout 2007, ANP combat losses were
roughly three times higher than those of the ANA. Importantly, despite this statistic, the ANP are in most cases remaining in the fight.

The roles of the various components of the ANP span a wide spectrum of functions. The ANP consists of the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan National Civil Order Police, the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, and the Afghan Border Police. Other specialized police are responsible for criminal investigation and counterterrorism. Additionally, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) supplements the uniformed police as a bridging force at the local level. The ANAP, however, will be dissolved by the end of 2008; though some ANAP personnel will be eligible to transition to the uniformed police.

Currently, the ANP has fielded approximately 97% of its forces – over 79,900 assigned out of 82,000 authorized. However, the ANP continues to lag behind the ANA in capability. This is due in part to the fact that the United States did not become significantly involved in police development until 2003 – and the Defense Department did not begin to expand its role until 2005. Moreover, the majority of funding (the 2007 supplemental) was not available until July 2007, with equipment deliveries now underway. ANP development also has been hindered by endemic corruption, and an insufficient number of trainers and mentors, among other things – our interagency efforts are focused on addressing these shortcomings.

Critical to our efforts is ensuring that ANP personnel have the training they need to accomplish their mission. There currently are eight State Department-run training centers throughout Afghanistan – one central training center in Kabul, and seven regional
training centers throughout the country. Additionally, there is a national training center in Herat, and one being planned for Wardak province. The objective we are working towards for ANP training is a minimum of Initial Entry Training (IET) for all new recruits, which covers topics such as Afghan law, human rights, patrolling and investigative procedures, as well as firearms and other tactical training. More advanced courses also are available to provide training in areas such as special weapons, crime scene investigation, professional standards, customs, domestic violence, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics.

CSTC-A, in conjunction with the State Department, mentors police at all levels, although the current program does not reach all locations. The objective is to provide a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) to each police district, and provincial and regional headquarters. PMTs are 8-14 member teams comprised of civilian police professionals, military personnel, and linguists, to assist, coach, and mentor the ANP. There currently are some 540 civilian police advisors and 900 military police mentors in Afghanistan. Because mentoring must occur locally in all of Afghanistan’s 364 districts, CSTC-A is currently unable to cover the majority of ANP units and organizations.

In an effort to maximize the effects of limited resources on overall ANP development, the Afghan Ministry of Interior in November 2007, with support from CSTC-A, launched the Focused District Development (FDD) program to concentrate training, equipment, and mentoring in priority districts. FDD consists of phases, which include: assessing the status of police in a given district; withdrawing the police for eight weeks of training, equipping, and leadership changes as necessary – during this phase the
police are temporarily replaced by elite Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) – and finally, returning the police to the district with intensive follow-on monitoring and mentoring. FDD is planned to reform more than 50 priority districts by the end of this year. The total number of districts that will take part in FDD will depend on a number of factors – for example, the availability of additional police mentors, and the number of trained ANCOP units (currently a growing program). Given ongoing police development efforts, including FDD, we currently project that the majority of Afghan Uniformed Police units will be capable of performing their missions – with only limited external support – by December 2012. While the FDD program is still relatively new, initial perceptions are favorable. Importantly, FDD could act as a catalyst for similar programs that might benefit other governmental branches.

In addition to efforts to develop the ANP, we are also working to develop capacity within the Ministry of Interior. The Departments of Defense and State have embedded more than 60 mentors within the Ministry to assist them with systems management – for example, recruiting, training, doctrine, and finance. These mentoring efforts are crucial to reducing levels of corruption with the Ministry, and institutionalizing professional, transparent practices.

As the ANP continues to develop, it is essential that we are able to measure their performance. CSTC-A has in place a system that assesses ANP units’ ability to perform their mission. Units are assessed in one of four Capabilities Milestones. At Capability Milestone (CM) 4, the police unit, staff function, or installation is formed but not yet capable of conducting basic law and order operations, or management and leadership
functions, without significant external assistance from the international community. At CM1, the unit, staff function, or installation is able to accomplish these roles – though external assistance may be required for specific operations. At present, 12 ANP units – six ANCOP battalions and six district uniformed police units – are assessed as being CM2, which indicates that they still require occasional external assistance.

Ensuring the ANP has the necessary equipment to perform its mission is critical to the broader ANP development program. The ANP “basic kit” includes a sidearm and rifle, a uniform, body armor, and a short-range radio. Units at the squad level are equipped with tactical vehicles, first aid supplies, machine guns, and a grenade launcher. A Stock Record Account (SRA) is used to maintain oversight of ANP equipment. The SRA has been used since 2006, and provides details of all munitions, vehicles, clothing, and individual equipment items.

Pay and rank reform also is a key element of the ANP development program. The Ministry of Interior is taking substantial steps toward establishing fair and equitable compensation and recognition in the ANP. Rank reform looks at over 17,000 top officers within a top-heavy structure and – through extensive testing and review, and an international vetting process – reducing the officer corps by more than 9,000 personnel. The Ministry of Interior also is developing comprehensive promotion and recognition programs. Additionally, pay parity is being implemented to provide police with salaries comparable to the ANA. Under this system, for instance, a police major who previously earned about $80 per month would now earn $300 per month – compared to army major whose salary is $330 per month. Efforts also are underway to improve the overall
payment process such as verifying police rosters, and establishing electronic pay systems and funds transfers – by the end of May, 19 provinces had implemented electronic fund transfers for police to be paid directly.

Steps are being taken to enhance accountability within the ANP. These include an identification card program, which will permit tracking of police personnel from accession to attrition using a record management system. The ID card program will enhance the ability to maintain accurate ANP strength numbers, and ensure that police personnel receive their full pay. The Ministry of Interior also is developing new disciplinary and personnel regulations, and has commissioned a legislative drafting committee to revise outdated police personnel laws to provide for the administrative separation of corrupt or inept police personnel.

It is important to note that efforts to train and equip the ANP are not solely U.S. bilateral contributions. Other nations and international organizations also contribute in meaningful ways. The European Union, for instance, established a police reform mission in June 2007, which focuses on police strategy and institutional development in the Ministry of Interior. The EU mission currently is planned for about 230 personnel (of which, about 150 are on the ground) – however, these personnel do not deploy to the districts, where help is most needed. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has decided to consider ways to engage with Afghanistan, with a particular focus on training, counternarcotics, border security, and customs. Provincial Reconstruction Teams play a role in police reform through their interaction with local police personnel and Ministry of Interior officials. The United
Nations manages the Law and Order Trust for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which reimburses funds dispensed by the Ministry of Interior in support of ANP salaries and rations. Lastly, the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) is the principal forum for Afghan and international coordination on police reform and support. The IPCB, which meets approximately every month, is chaired by the Minister of Interior, and is supported by a secretariat with representatives of CSTC-A, EUPOL, and other contributors to the police development effort.

To conclude, I believe we are implementing the programs and policies, and making the necessary investments and adjustments, to realize a significant improvement in the Afghan National Police in the coming years. Yet much will depend on our ability to expand the number of personnel assigned to the crucial mentoring mission, as well as the Ministry of Interior’s own ability to implement internal reforms to enhance the professionalism and integrity of its personnel.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.