STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL TIMOTHY J. KEATING, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

11 March 08
INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), thank you for this opportunity to testify regarding the posture of our command and security in the Asia-Pacific.

The region is secure and stable. This year, I have had the opportunity to visit 21 regional nations – more than one-half the total in our area of responsibility (AOR). I also hosted 23 National Chiefs of Defense in Hawaii this past November. From these first-hand experiences, I gained the sense that my counterparts see a secure and prosperous future for the region, particularly if we choose to approach security issues with a collaborative mindset. I share their optimism and a desire to seek multilateral solutions when possible.

2007 was a year of considerable change in the region. Positive economic trends continued for most of Asia, which has three of the world’s top 10 economies (Japan, China, and India). The region played a greater role on the global diplomatic stage. Many Asia-Pacific nations improved, and some expanded, their military capabilities as well. All these trends are impacting how nations interact with each other and the U.S. This dynamism and interplay offer more opportunity than challenge but will require our continued, confident leadership and a commitment of resources commensurate with the importance of this vibrant region to our Nation.
Working in this constantly evolving arena, USPACOM forces conducted meaningful military-to-military engagement with regional partners and realized progress in a number of security areas. We improved multilateral information sharing with partners and held the first-ever conference among Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs; enhanced the capacity of our regional partners to counter transnational crime and terrorism; changed attitudes in populations at risk for terrorist exploitation; advanced U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense capabilities; and, mitigated human suffering in the wake of natural disasters. Our military accomplished all of these things, and significantly, they did so in full cooperation with our embassy country teams, allies, and partners.

Outside our AOR, Pacific-based forces continue to serve with surpassing distinction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Next year, we expect to sustain about 30,000 USPACOM-assigned personnel in the USCENTCOM AOR. Many Asia-Pacific nations have made and are still making significant contributions to our efforts in the Middle East, including Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Fiji, Mongolia, Tonga, and New Zealand. Having visited our people and partners in Iraq, I assure you USPACOM forces on the ground are confident, believe in their mission, and see progress being made. I could not be more proud of them and their families.

Based on my first-hand observations, there are several key assessments that merit upfront consideration. In the main, they convey the progress and challenge of the past year.
We welcomed new, democratically-elected leaders in several allied nations - Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand. From USPACOM perspective, elections reaffirm the strength of these governments and our alliances. While we build new relationships on a personal level, we retain policy alignment with our allies.

In Northeast Asia, our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea remain indispensable to peace and security. Resolute action by both allies kept Six-Party talks on track and the goal of a denuclearized peninsula within the realm of the possible. Military transformation and realignment in Japan and the Republic of Korea continue on planned timelines. The allies also made major contributions to the protection of our people and resources with upgrades to missile defense capabilities.

This year demonstrated that our military-to-military relationship with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not to the level we desire. Progress was decidedly uneven. We saw positive outcomes from senior-level visits but also experienced the perplexing cancellation of some routine activities. Nevertheless, improving the interaction between USPACOM and the PLA is critically important – in terms of maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait and in assuring regional nations. For our part, we will continue to pursue a mature, constructive relationship with Chinese counterparts. We view the effort as the best means to reduce the chance of miscalculation, increase our mutual understanding, and encourage cooperation on areas of common concern.
That said, I remain concerned about Chinese double-digit growth in annual defense spending and investment in systems which threaten Taiwan and our own capabilities. Consistent with U.S. policy and legislation, USPACOM is encouraging Taiwan to improve its self-defense capabilities and thereby deter potential PRC aggression.

Southeast Asia remains the central front against terrorism in the Pacific. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) sustained its momentum against terrorism in the southern Philippines. Of special note, civic action-type activities by the AFP reinvigorated a healthy relationship with the local populace. This bond between the people and security forces has created a southern Philippines far less susceptible to extremist influences.

USPACOM interaction with the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) remains positive and encouraging. We see no surer sign of Indonesian commitment to professionalize its military than their request for U.S. assistance to improve TNI Enlisted and Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) training. Of global significance, Indonesia, in partnership with Singapore and Malaysia, and most recently Thailand, is markedly improving maritime domain awareness and law enforcement capabilities in the strategically vital Strait of Malacca.

U.S. – India military-to-military activities continued on an upward vector this year. From my discussions with Indian leaders, it is clear we share many of the same security concerns in South Asia and the broader Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean region. We agreed to work toward more mature interaction in the areas of maritime security, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance.
Political conditions in Fiji and Burma are unsatisfactory. In the case of Fiji, with a return to a democratically-elected government, USPACOM would welcome a quick renewal of our previously strong military-to-military ties.

These impressions highlight the security landscape of the Asia-Pacific. We have in place key elements to enhance regional stability and advance U.S. security interests – healthy alliances, opportunities for new partnerships, combat ready and agile forces, and committed Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to lead our efforts. As we move forward, our initiatives are organized across four priorities – Warfighting Readiness, Presence and Force Posture, Regional Engagement, and Quality of Life.

**Warfighting Readiness**

First and foremost, USPACOM is a warfighting command committed to maintaining preeminence across the full spectrum of operations. We are ready to fight and win, and to dominate in any scenario, in all environments, without exception.

**War on Terror in the Pacific.** We will win the current War on Terror. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, and our U.S. Ambassadors, we continue to work with and through our regional partners to combat violent extremism and transform at-risk environments. We are making progress in the War on Terror, particularly in the Philippines.
Through **OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM – PHILIPPINES (OEF-P)**, USPACOM forces, predominantly from Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), advised and trained Philippine allies in counterterrorism operations and activities. Our efforts have served to both enhance Philippine ability to conduct sustained direct action against terrorists and to build their civic action capacity to mitigate terrorist support within the community. In 2007, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with U.S. support, conducted continuous counterterrorism/civic action operations for eight months. In addition to killing or capturing several high-value individuals and their followers, the AFP rebuilt a cooperative market; constructed new schools, clinics, and community centers; and brought solar-powered electricity to multiple locations in the Sulu Province. As a complement to OEF-P, USPACOM has increased levels of Civil Military Operations activity in BALIKATAN, our major annual exercise in the Philippines.

With assistance from our allies, especially Australia, Japan, and South Korea, OEF-P future operations will continue to build AFP capacity while setting conditions for expanded operations in Central Mindanao. We will also continue to encourage multilateral cooperation, in particular among the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, to disrupt terrorist activities and transit in the shared maritime space of the Celebes and Sulu Seas.

In **Indonesia**, we witnessed no significant increase in terrorist activity. We are encouraged by the success of the Indonesian National Police in countering Jemaah Islamiyah operations, to include the arrest of Abu Dujana.
Our partners in the WOT benefit greatly from continued U.S. military assistance to improve the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations. With continued congressional support, assistance will take the form of Theater Security Cooperation activities, Security Assistance, Defense Security Cooperation Agency-led Philippine Defense Reform, and capacity building authorities.

**NDAA Section 1207.** The Department of State, led by our embassy country team in the Philippines, seamlessly integrated with USPACOM efforts through the Southeast Asia Tri-border Initiative (SATI). Enabled by section 1207 authority, $16.9M toward SATI will considerably expand economic development in the region as well as improve responsiveness of regional military and law enforcement forces, a tremendous complement to ongoing regional efforts to combat terrorism and transnational crime.

**NDAA Section 1206.** With congressional 1206 authority, USPACOM also contributed more than $64M in FY07 toward increasing maritime security capacity in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka. In FY08, we intend to build upon these initiatives by enhancing capabilities of partner nations to monitor and control areas in and around borders that may be used to transport, shelter, supply, or finance terrorist organizations.

Sections 1207 and 1206 authorities, executed in full cooperation with the Department of State and our regional Ambassadors, are highly effective tools to build regional capacity and
undermine terrorism in Southeast Asia. USPACOM thanks the Congress for supporting these authorities and recommends making them permanent.

**Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF West)** counterdrug operations support War on Terror objectives. Importantly, JIATF West, with a focus on the global drug threat, is able to achieve a high degree of law enforcement cooperation with regional partners, a level of cooperation that would not be possible with a singular counterterrorism agenda. Enhanced law enforcement cooperation has proved beneficial in countering all transnational threats, including terrorism. The command successfully applied NDAA Section 1022 authority to support counterterrorism law enforcement by providing training for bomb blast investigations and evidence collection in Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively. JIATF West was the only entity to apply this provisional authority, and we would welcome continued authority in the future.

The warfighting landscape today also includes significant nontraditional, transnational security threats. Drug trafficking is a key concern in the Asia-Pacific, as a threat to the human condition and as enabler for other security threats. In 2007, JIATF West, in cooperation with our embassies and partners, achieved important successes. Focus remained on areas where crime-terror linkages exist or are likely to emerge: the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. The Interagency Fusion Center program – a key element of our assistance portfolio – played an integral role in a recent high-profile case. Last October, the Indonesian National Police used the Jakarta Interagency Counterdrug Operations Center to support raids and post-seizure analysis on a large crystal methamphetamine laboratory, estimated to be the world’s fifth largest, and its
support facilities on the island of Batam, located at the southern entrance to the Strait of Malacca. This capability will prove increasingly beneficial to partner nations as they combat all aspects of transnational crime and terror networks.

JIATF West successes to date highlight the benefits of expanded but targeted congressional authority. As a logical and important next step, USPACOM advocates for NDAA Section 1033 authority, which would allow JIATF West to equip security forces, in key countries of concern – the Philippines and Indonesia.

While USPACOM forces will continue to be called on to execute a full-range of military missions, security and stability in the region depend on our readiness to dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat any adversary who chooses to operate on the high end of the spectrum of conflict. We must continue to posture forces forward, backed up by ready and agile forces in the continental U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets must be sufficient to maintain situational awareness. Our maritime, air, and ground forces must have the capability and capacity to prevail in a warfighting environment in which potential adversaries are rapidly closing the technological gap. Ensuring the survivability of our networks, both military and those commercial networks that support military operations, is becoming increasingly critical in a battlespace sure to place additional emphasis on the domains of space and cyberspace.

USPACOM requires pervasive and persistent surveillance to understand adversary plans and intended actions. The size of our theater and scarcity of available assets hampers opportunities to shape the environment. To improve this situation, USPACOM would welcome
new resources – new sensors to increase dwell and access to potential adversary territory and communications and more human intelligence. These capabilities are critical to preventing strategic or tactical surprise.

Implementation of Joint Intelligence Operation Centers (JIOCs) has become key to synchronizing operational requirements with national and service intelligence providers, particularly those requirements that support indications and warnings analysis.

**Communications System.** USPACOM requires reliable, secure, and interoperable communications systems to provide the foundation for command and control. Robust information networks enable information sharing and collaborative planning across the full spectrum of joint and multinational operations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. We must invest appropriately to preserve critical communication capability and capacity. USPACOM concentrates its effort on sustaining required levels of communication assurance despite existing limitations. However, long-term success depends on collective action by the Department of Defense and the Congress.

Satellite failures as well as funding cuts and delays in follow-on SATCOM systems have reduced availability of Military SATCOM. USPACOM is engaged with the national satellite community to ensure satellite and terminal programs are synchronized and address this availability gap.
The DOD communications infrastructure continues to be vulnerable to cyber exploitation and attack. USPACOM works daily with Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations to defend the Global Information Grid against cyber threats. Critical C2 networks must be proactively defended to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the information. The mitigation of computer network vulnerabilities is a top priority.

Expanding coalition communication networks is essential to support USPACOM missions. USPACOM fully supports the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration and the Joint Staff implementation of a Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) program. The goal of this program is to build and sustain a single network that supports multinational information sharing requirements.

**Undersea Superiority.** Continued improvement of air, surface, subsurface, C4I systems and acoustic modeling and navigation charts through oceanographic surveys, and cooperative training and operations with partners and allies will enhance our ability to operate effectively in the maritime domain. However, in the face of fast-paced PLA-N modernization and their ever-expanding area of operations, anti-submarine warfare remains a challenge and is the number one priority for U.S. Pacific Fleet. Maintaining an operational advantage also requires rigorous training at sea, before deployment in the AOR. Without the exemption recently granted by the President, the restrictions placed on use of active SONAR in the waters of Southern California would have presented a significant training challenge for our maritime forces preparing for deployment in the Western Pacific.
Continuing to balance the risk between today’s fight against terror and the need to maintain the readiness of our forces to dissuade, deter, and if necessary, defeat potential high-end adversaries is perhaps the single greatest military challenge faced by our nation’s leaders. USPACOM is achieving an acceptable balance in this regard but we must work at it, constantly mitigating shortfalls by making adjustments with our resources or in coordination with other geographic combatant commanders.

**Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction** capability in the Asia-Pacific is another warfighting priority. Along with allies and partners, the centerpiece for our activity remains the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which aims to build global capacity to disrupt weapons of mass destruction proliferation among states, and between states and terrorist organizations. Eleven nations within the AOR endorse the PSI (Australia, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, the Philippines, Brunei, Cambodia, Mongolia, the Marshall Islands, Sri Lanka, Papua New Guinea). We continue work to expand participation during our regional military-to-military engagements.

While a common commitment to counterproliferation is important, we also made gains with the essential next step – exercising counterproliferation capabilities. In October 2007, Pacific Command forces participated in a Japan-hosted PSI exercise that included units from Australia, New Zealand, France, Singapore, and U.K, as well as observers from some 30 additional countries. Japan’s exercise demonstrated a full range of counterproliferation actions, from law enforcement and customs actions to maritime interdiction. On the domestic front, Pacific Command participated in the Homeland Security Department’s Exercise TOPOFF 4 and tested and refined our full range of existing procedures for managing a domestic terrorist WMD
event. In September 2008, USPACOM will participate in another PSI exercise, the New Zealand-hosted exercise MARU.

**Pandemic Influenza (PI).** Pandemics can be difficult to predict. Should a PI contingency develop, USPACOM has a robust plan in support of our national strategy for a pandemic influenza (PI) response and is prepared to support lead agencies (Department of Homeland Security, and Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of State) at a national level. This past year, in addition to an internal, no-notice planning and response exercise, we conducted our most comprehensive PI exercise to date, with participation from all USPACOM Service components and representatives from the State of Hawaii, U.S. interagency, and international humanitarian communities. The exercise, TEMPEST EXPRESS 13, tested strategic and operational level civil-military coordination mechanisms. We also collaborated with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to hold “Laboratory and Rapid Response” train-the-trainer workshops with participants from Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.

**FORCE PRESENCE AND POSTURE**

U.S. force presence and posture – in Japan, Korea, and across the Asia-Pacific AOR – has long been a guarantor of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. We will continue to position our forces in theater to optimize agility and flexibility, ensure rapid response to crises, and provide the force presence that both assures allies and partners and dissuades and deters threats to security. We will remain a force ready and a force present.
The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), launched by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense with their Japanese counterparts in December 2002, serves as the framework to manage U.S.-Japan alliance transformation and posture realignment. Major elements of DPRI include plans to relocate the functions of two U.S. air bases from urbanized to rural areas; relocate over 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam; co-locate U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploy U.S. missile defense capabilities in Japan, in conjunction with Japan’s own deployments; and improve operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. These activities will strengthen capabilities and maintain deterrence in the region while reducing impacts of U.S. presence on local communities in Japan.

Since implementation details were agreed to in May 2006, progress has been made in all priority areas. Most notably this past year, the Japanese Diet approved a comprehensive legislative package that provides financial incentives to local communities and authorizes financing to build housing on Guam for Marines relocating from Okinawa. Additionally, the Government of Japan initiated the environmental assessment so that construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) on Okinawa can progress. The completion of this facility is critical to finalizing our force posture changes in Guam by 2014. Currently, we are on schedule to meet construction timelines on this and other major DPRI-related facilities throughout Japan.

USMC Relocation to Guam. The rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam remains a vital component of USPACOM engagement with the GOJ and a
cornerstone of continued US force projection capability. This action will return desirable land to Japan while enhancing the flexibility of the forward-based Marine presence in the USPACOM AOR. The Joint Guam Program Office, led by the Department of the Navy, is managing all aspects for this relocation effort. Rebasing beddown alternatives have been finalized, and we seek to begin upgrades to the military infrastructure, housing, and training facilities on Guam in 2010. The Japanese have reaffirmed their commitment to bear approximately $6 billion of the cost for facilities and infrastructure. USPACOM advocates for similar resolve within the Department of Defense and the Congress in shouldering the approximately $4 billion U.S. share for the Guam posture change. The relocation will be a monumental undertaking requiring maximum involvement from all branches of the military and active participation from numerous federal agencies and territorial governments.

**U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Transformation.** On the Korean peninsula, with the full support of the Republic of Korea (ROK) government, we are reducing and consolidating our footprint into two hubs south of the Han River. To increase readiness and boost the quality of life for our Korea-based force, we are considering longer, accompanied tours for our service members.

Over the last year, we have also made strides in formalizing the path to transfer warfighting operational control from U.S. to Republic of Korea responsibility in 2012. With the disestablishment of the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command (CFC), U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK) will become a U.S. joint warfighting headquarters, provisionally-described as U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), supporting the ROK armed forces during armistice and in war. In order
to succeed, USFK will require significant transformation of the command force structure, logistics architecture, and a robust training and exercise program. We will execute new theater-level exercises, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN and KEY RESOLVE, to maintain CFC readiness, as well as train, certify, and validate the alliance’s new command construct.

Prepositioned Stocks /Preferred Munitions. Due to the time-distance challenges in this theater, USPACOM forces require readily available and properly maintained prepositioned stocks and preferred munitions at the outset of any conflict. During this past spring, the Army downloaded APS-3 afloat equipment sets to support Iraq-bound Army units. This event, in addition to existing shortages in the remaining prepositioned programs, creates a need for close monitoring of the replenishment of equipment and stocks throughout the USPACOM AOR. Also, achieving the appropriate mix and inventory levels of key munitions, particularly GPS-aided and laser-guided weapons, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, Patriot (PAC-3) missiles, Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) version C-7, and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, is imperative.

Missile Defense. To defend U.S. forces, interests, and allies from short and medium range ballistic missiles, USPACOM seeks a forward-deployed, layered, and integrated air and missile defense system that is capable of intercepting threat missiles throughout the entire time of flight. USPACOM has established an initial missile defense capability by forward deploying the Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) aboard U.S. Navy AEGIS ships, integrating a forward-based X-band radar into the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) architecture, conducting BMD exercises and training with key partners, and refining the tactics, techniques, and procedures required for
coordination with USNORTHCOM and other Geographic Combatant Commands during the employment of the missile defense system in defense of the U.S. Increased inventories of both PATRIOT PAC-3 and SM-3 interceptors, forward basing of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense fire unit in Guam, and accelerated development of sea-based terminal and kinetic boost phase interceptor capabilities would effectively build on the initial missile defense capability already deployed in the USPACOM AOR.

As the Government of Japan fields their own national BMD capability with PATRIOT PAC-3 Fire Units and AEGIS SM-3 capable ships, USPACOM will continue to work closely with them to maximize the combined efforts and achieve the most effective capability. As we grow the overall BMD architecture, interoperability will play an even greater role. It is vital to mission success to have communication systems that can not only integrate across the joint spectrum, but also with our partner nations.

**Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs)** enhance interoperability and readiness, and provide a cost effective mechanism for mutual logistics support between U.S. and allied or partner military forces. ACSAs have been particularly helpful in the conduct of WOT operations. For example, we have made extensive use of the current agreement with the Republic of the Philippines to support the Armed Forces of the Philippines operations against terrorist cells in that country. USPACOM has twelve ACSAs in place. We signed an agreement with Sri Lanka in March 2007 and both the Philippines and Tonga renewed their ACSAs during 2007. Agreements with Fiji and Australia are both up for renewal in 2008. Additionally, we are currently negotiating an agreement with Indonesia and hope interest by Timor-Leste and Brunei
will yield results. We view these agreements as vital in maximizing our interoperability and helping increase the readiness of coalition partners in the Pacific region.

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Our Theater Security Cooperation Plan serves as the primary blueprint to enhance U.S. relationships and military capacities of allies and regional partners. The plan is fully coordinated with our embassy country teams and integrates security assistance, military-to-military exchanges, exercises, cooperative technology development, and outreach programs into a coherent, mutually supportive set of activities for each country, whether ally, partner, or cooperating state.

These security cooperation activities are essential to the success of U.S. national security strategy. For relatively low cost, we have an opportunity to make progress in each of the USPACOM priorities, and facilitate situations in which future security challenges can be met through regional collaboration and capacity.

Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance is a cornerstone for maintaining a secure and stable Asia-Pacific. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel are stationed in Japan, along with an additional 14,000 forward-deployed personnel. Japan also provides over $4 billion in host nation support—the most generous of any U.S. ally – and remains steadfast in supporting its share of the costs of alliance transformation.
Transformation of the U.S.-Japanese alliance continues on its positive, steady pace. From the USPACOM perspective, significant changes within the defense organization – a new Joint Staff in 2006 and a ministerial-level defense department in 2007 – strengthen Japan Self-Defense Force ability to defend Japan and demonstrate a desire to enhance cooperation with the U.S. and other regional partners to ensure peace and stability in the region. USPACOM is encouraging more trilateral cooperation between Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the U.S. militaries, particularly in the areas of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. Increased cooperation in these areas would be beneficial regionally and internationally, much as ongoing Japanese support of the War on Terror continues to be.

Japan continues its full commitment to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). During the past year, Japan has fielded its own PAC-3 missiles to defend Tokyo, and has tested SM-3 missiles which will soon be operational in the waters off the coast of Japan, providing additional BMD capability.

**Republic of Korea.** The U.S.-ROK Alliance remains strong and critically important to stability on the Korean Peninsula. Despite warranted optimism from progress in the Six-Party Talks and Inter-Korea Summit, the alliance remains focused on the most immediate security threat, North Korea. We do not foresee a near-term, overt challenge by North Korea. However, North Korea retains a significant conventional capability with massed forces near the demilitarized zone and a potent missile arsenal. We remain convinced that the strong U.S.-ROK alliance is the key to deterring North Korea.
In recognition of growing military capabilities of our forces, the U.S.-ROK alliance continues to transform to better meet security challenges, both on and off the peninsula. All on-peninsula transformational goals are on track. Regionally, we seek increased partnering with the ROK in counter-proliferation, maritime security, and disaster relief, as well as trilateral military cooperation between the U.S., Republic of Korea, and Japan. This is particularly relevant since our three nations have the financial resources, logistical capability, and planning ability to handle complex contingencies throughout the region. The relevancy of our alliance grows globally as well, demonstrated by ROK contributions to the War on Terror in Iraq and Afghanistan and by the deployment of ROK forces to Lebanon in support of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission.

**Australia** is our most steadfast ally, committed to enhancing security, regionally and globally. Australian leadership in the Pacific was noteworthy in 2007. For example, this past year Australia continued to lead the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. The Australia Defence Force also worked with USPACOM on building regional security capacity, particularly in the area of maritime security.

As a sure sign of the enduring nature of our alliance, Australia places major emphasis on advancing interoperability with the U.S. through well coordinated acquisition and training programs. They are a Joint Strike Fighter level three partner and have made great progress in implementing Strategic Level and Operational Level Review recommendations to enhance U.S.-Australia interoperability. Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2007, our premier high-end combined
warfighting exercise with Australia, was highly successful and validated the U.S.-Australia Joint Combined Training Capability. We are now improving that bilateral capability by increasing the fidelity and numbers of virtual and constructive forces that can be integrated into exercise and training environments. In accordance with the Presidential agreement announced at the last APEC Summit, we are also enhancing cooperation with Australia on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and on regional Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief response.

**Republic of Philippines.** Our partnership with the Republic of the Philippines is central to success in meeting our War on Terror goals in Southeast Asia. With U.S. advice, training, and monetary support, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have had remarkable success against terrorists in the southern Philippines. The Philippine government and its security forces are increasingly assuming a regional leadership role against terrorism and transnational crime. Most noteworthy is the Maritime Security effort in the Tri-border Region (an area shared with Indonesia and Malaysia) to bring security to the Sulu and Celebes Seas and improve economic viability.

Philippine Defense Reform (PDR), an innovative and highly effective approach to building partner capacity, continues to strengthen civilian control over the military, inject transparency into Philippine Department of National Defense processes, and increase the overall professionalism and capability of the armed forces. It is a blueprint by which other nations in the region can model and implement similar efforts.

**Thailand.** The December 2007 elections and certification of a democratically-elected government has allowed us to move forward – at an appropriate pace – with restoration of our
military relations with Thailand, a major regional ally. For 2008, we place emphasis on completing a fully robust, Thailand-hosted COBRA GOLD, the premier USPACOM multilateral exercise. This annual exercise is a centerpiece for building regional competencies to respond to a wide range of transnational security threats and humanitarian relief contingencies. We appreciate Thailand’s important global security contributions in the War on Terror, counter-narcotics efforts, and peacekeeping operations, including an 800-troop contingent to the UN mission in Sudan.

**India.** Delay with the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative has not adversely affected interaction between USPACOM and Indian military counterparts. Collectively, we see our militaries building a constructive relationship. We foresee great potential for cooperation in areas of counter-terrorism, maritime security, and disaster relief.

During my visit to India in August 2007, the Indian Foreign Secretary, Defence Secretary, and all three Service Chiefs expressed support for our military-to-military cooperation and a desire to increase the quality and complexity of these events in the future. The U.S.-Indian naval exercise, MALABAR 07, which also involved participants from Singapore, Australia, and Japan, is indicative of the kind of progress we seek with our relationship.

**Singapore** continues to be one of our strongest security partners in Asia and a key coalition partner in the War on Terror. Beyond providing strategic access to ports and airfields for transiting U.S. forces, Singapore cooperates with us on shared maritime security, counterterrorism, and command and control initiatives. In 2007, Singapore broke ground on a
multinational Command and Control Center at Changi Naval Base, which will facilitate information sharing among regional nations and enhance maritime security in the Malacca Strait. Their decisions to purchase U.S. platforms such as F-15 aircraft and Seahawk helicopters strengthen our level of cooperation. Singapore has provided niche capabilities to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Indonesia.** Since the normalization of our military relationship with Indonesia in 2005, we have moved deliberately to upgrade our ties with the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Sitting astride key sea lanes, Indonesia is the largest nation in Southeast Asia and the world’s third-largest democracy. We and the Indonesians have a broad range of shared interests, and it is important that our security relationship matures to reflect these shared interests. USPACOM conducted significant military-to-military engagement activity with the TNI in 2007. Two events were particularly noteworthy: a peacekeeping-focused, brigade-level Command Post exercise, GARUDA SHIELD, and the multilateral intra-agency Southeast Asia Disaster Management Conference, which exercised the Indonesian government’s ability to respond to disasters at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In both evolutions, interaction between the TNI and U.S. military – at all levels – was strongly positive, professional, and marked by a desire to improve peacekeeping and disaster relief skills. Consistent with this view, Indonesia has deployed a second set of troops to support peacekeeping operations (PKO) in Lebanon, recently completed its first PKO course through the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative program, and is developing its own PKO center.
In 2008, we anticipate greater Indonesian leadership within our theater security cooperation activities. For example, Indonesia has already agreed to co-host this year’s Pacific Armies Management Seminar and the Chiefs of Defense Conference. TNI will also host the fourth maritime trilateral exchange with Malaysia and the Philippines, an effort to improve greater cooperation and security in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas.

People’s Republic of China. Our dealings with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan are guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint U.S.-PRC communiqués (1972, 1979, 1982), and the one-China policy. We abide by restrictions stipulated in the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act.

Our military-to-military interaction with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fell short of expectations this year. We achieved some success with several high-level visits to the PRC, including the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Naval Operations, and two Commander, USPACOM visits. In each case, PLA hosts provided access to platforms and facilities not visited before, and discussions with their senior military leaders were candid and open. However, we saw little change in PRC willingness to conduct port visits, simple exercises at sea, mid-level officer exchanges, or pragmatic interaction like the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks – the activities USPACOM views as most useful in reducing the potential for miscalculation and misunderstanding between our forces. The growing PLA military capability remains a concern, and our understanding of PLA intentions is limited.
USPACOM will continue to pursue military-to-military activity with the PLA, with the clear purpose to reduce chances of miscalculation, increase understanding, and create opportunities for cooperation. We seek – in the long term – a mature relationship with the PLA.

**Cross-Strait Assessment.** Sustaining stability across the Taiwan Strait is a top priority. Vital to preserving this current stability is a credible Taiwan self-defense capability. In accordance with legislation and policy, we make available to Taiwan advice, training, and equipment necessary for a sufficient self-defense capability. Through regular engagement, we have advocated to Taiwan military leaders a variety of defensive measures such as increased joint training, critical infrastructure protection, and capability acquisitions. The Taiwan military has improved its self-defense capabilities considerably.

Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, USPACOM will also continue to maintain its own capabilities to defend against any potential military aggression in the region.

**Mongolia.** Mongolia is an enthusiastic U.S. partner and supports major U.S. security efforts, including the War on Terror and President Bush’s Global Peace Operations Initiative. USPACOM remains primarily focused on helping Mongolia transform its military into a rapidly deployable, elite peacekeeping force that is interoperable with U.N. and coalition forces. Our high-tempo interaction in 2007 included strategic dialogue, bilateral and multilateral exercises, security operations exchanges, defense reform, and NCO development. We foresee the Mongolian Armed Forces continuing to participate in international peacekeeping operations and increasingly assisting with Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief efforts.
**Russia.** USPACOM coordinates all its security cooperation activities with the Russian Far East Military District with USEUCOM, ensuring the efforts of both geographic combatant commands are mutually supportive. Our direct interaction with the Russians this year was positive and helpful, with USPACOM hosting the Far East District Commander’s first visit to Hawaii in ten years.

This year we also witnessed a more assertive Russia, particularly in the form of increased and more visible Russian bomber activity in the USPACOM AOR. We do not assess Russian action as a threat, but we prefer to deal with Russia more openly and directly to prevent any misinterpretation. To that end, we encourage Russia to restart the “flight announcement” process. My first trip to Russia is scheduled for summer 2008.

**Sri Lanka.** We support the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) efforts to defend themselves against terrorist attacks by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) but are concerned about GSL withdrawal from the 2002 cease fire, increased levels of violence, and allegations of human rights abuses. USPACOM security cooperation programs focus on institutionalizing respect for human rights, enhancing the Sri Lankan armed forces ability to deter renewed violence, and improving their maritime security capabilities through Section 1206 capacity building authority. We also continuously stress that GSL seek a suitable resolution to the conflict – a solution that meets the needs of the Sinhalese, Tamil, and other communities. Additionally, we are now working with the Sri Lankan military to enhance their nation building and disaster relief capabilities.
Sri Lanka continues to demonstrate support for the War on Terror by providing blanket over-flight and landing rights in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Nepal.** The uncertainty of the political situation in Nepal caused by delays in the national elections and contentious differences between the ruling party and the Maoists has affected our military-to-military engagement with Nepal. Until the political situation is resolved, USPACOM security cooperation will continue to focus on non-lethal assistance with the emphasis on professional military education, peacekeeping training, and respect for human rights.

**People’s Republic of Bangladesh.** Bangladesh continues to make progress in countering their internal extremist threat. Over the past year, they have brought to justice numerous leaders of various Muslim extremist organizations. Assisting the Bangladesh government to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities is the focus of our bilateral cooperation. USPACOM further seeks to enhance Bangladesh ability to conduct international peacekeeping and to increase capacity to conduct domestic humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, which will improve national response in the wake of events like the November 2007 cyclone crisis.

Since the declaration of Emergency Rule in January 2007, USPACOM has remained watchful of the role of the military within the Caretaker Government. We initiated defense sector
reform programs that focused on maintaining a professional military that adheres to human rights and is respectful of civilian control of the military.

**Malaysia.** Defense ties with Malaysia are strong and improving, best exemplified by a five-fold increase in our ship visit program, acceptance of high-level visits, and Malaysia’s partnering with us in numerous multilateral venues. In the last eighteen months Malaysia has co-hosted three high-level major multilateral conferences, including the first ever Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference. This strong relationship is important as Malaysia influences the evolution of ASEAN, demonstrates strong leadership in maritime security, and actively participates in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Malaysia also continues to lead the peace monitoring mission in southern Philippines and has renewed its contribution of peacekeeping troops to Lebanon.

**Vietnam.** Our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam has made positive strides in recent months, most significantly in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. A beneficiary of the USS PELELIU humanitarian mission, Vietnam also contributed directly to the mission success regionally, providing a medical team on board the ship. During my December trip, I encouraged Vietnam to continue to grow its capabilities in the humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping mission areas. USPACOM also agreed to sustain information exchanges that allow the Vietnamese to better prepare for and respond to severe typhoons. This year we continued our support of the Presidential Emergency Program for AIDS Relief, with the DOD contribution exceeding $5 million. With this incremental progress, we look forward to increased military cooperation with the Vietnamese, both bilaterally and multilaterally.
**Cambodia.** Our military relationship with the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) continues to progress steadily. They have shown increased willingness to cooperate closely on counterterrorism, peacekeeping, disaster response, and medical and health related activities. After a 2006 assessment of RCAF requirements, the U.S. delivered 49 laptop computers in 2007 and will deliver 30 2.5-ton trucks in Spring 2008, all from excess defense articles. Reinforcing the positive outcome from last year’s first ship visit to Cambodia since the Vietnam War, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted a second visit in 2007 with the USS ESSEX. The sailors were well-received and completed a robust schedule of medical and dental civic action programs with their Cambodian counterparts. Cambodia was also a recipient of peacekeeping training through the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative and sent a platoon to Mongolia for the region’s premier peacekeeping exercise, KHAAN QUEST. Cambodia is playing a lead role in the region by conducting Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS 14 to test and refine national, regional, and broader international mechanisms for disaster and emergency response.

**Laos.** We are slowly building security-related activities with Laos beyond traditional personnel recovery and humanitarian assistance cooperation. The Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic (PDR) leadership is receptive to increased military engagement, as evidenced by their decision to accept the exchange of Defense Attachés. Engagement activities will be focused initially on English language training for mid-level and senior officers, medical training and avian influenza (AI) preparedness, military cooperation on unexploded ordnance detection and removal, and increased Lao participation in regional conferences and activities. USPACOM remains mindful of the poor past performance of the Lao PDR regarding human rights and reinforces international standards of behavior in all engagement activities.
New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns about terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems and cooperates closely with us. They are an active and positive force in Pacific Islands security initiatives, including support to stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. While the 1987 legislative declaration of New Zealand as a nuclear free zone remains an impediment to bilateral military-to-military relations, we support New Zealand Defence Force participation in approved multilateral events that advance our mutual security interests.

New Zealand remains supportive of coalition efforts in the War on Terror and has extended its lead of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan through at least September 2008. New Zealand also continues to provide excellent support to Operation DEEP FREEZE missions supporting U.S. scientific exploration in Antarctica.

Compact Nations. USPACOM enjoys a special relationship with the three Compact Nations - the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. We fully support their initiatives to expand capacity and operations to protect their valuable economic exclusion zone resources. The U.S. Army Pacific Joint Task Force for Homeland Defense leads our partnership with these nations to ensure our mutual defense, as set forth in the Compacts of Free Association. We are grateful for the extraordinary support from the citizens of these nations, particularly those who serve with great distinction in the U.S. military and Coast Guard. The Marshall Islands host the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, integral to the development of our missile defense programs and conduct of space operations.
**Timor-Leste.** The recent attempted assassinations of President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao highlight the continued political unrest in Timor-Leste. However, there are several reasons to remain optimistic about the future of this fledgling democracy. This past year, Timor-Leste successfully held its first democratic presidential and parliamentary elections. The Timor-Leste civil-military defense establishment is in place, and their Defense Forces operate under the rule of law. With international support, Timor-Leste is again experiencing the relative stability necessary to begin critical institutional development. Regarding USPACOM interaction, our U.S. security assistance program with Timor-Leste is focused on English language training. We have also recently completed a highly successful port visit and look forward to increasing our engagement opportunities with the Timor-Leste Defense Forces this year.

**Tonga.** With a military of 600 personnel, Tonga remains an extraordinarily committed U.S. partner in the War on Terror and is a regional leader in peacekeeping operations. Royal Tongan Marines returned to Iraq in September 2007 for two six-month rotations with the possibility of providing additional troop rotations in the future. These efforts and their other regional peacekeeping commitments mean that one-third of deployment-eligible Tongan soldiers are engaged in peacekeeping missions, world-wide. USPACOM security cooperation with Tonga supports their efforts to strengthen and refine the peacekeeping capacity of the Tongan Defence Service through our annual Marine-led exercise, Exercise TAFAKULA and our Global Peace Operations Initiative capstone exercise.
Burma. The policies and practices of the Burmese government undermine regional security through violent suppression of peaceful protests (as observed as recently as September 2007), human rights violations, particularly against ethnic minority civilians, and narcotics trafficking. USPACOM fully supports U.S. policy to increase pressure on the military junta to engage in a credible transition to democracy. Our military-to-military engagement with Burma is limited to coordination of the recovery of missing U.S. personnel, the last activity having occurred in 2004.

Security Assistance. One of the most important features of PACOM theater security cooperation is the security assistance effort we execute in partnership with the Department of State and our embassy country teams. Powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing countries include International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). IMET advances U.S. interests by educating participants in essential principles of a professional military force. IMET is of life-long value to the participants and the respective regional nations. The program also develops personal relationships among nations in the Asia-Pacific. FMF continues to prove its value in equipping and training regional partners to more effectively contribute toward common security goals. FMF is vital to supporting US coalition partners in the War on Terror, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Mongolia. USPACOM countries typically receive less than one percent of the annual worldwide allocation of FMF. Because modest investments in security assistance foster a more secure and stable region, increased funding in this area merits consideration.
Enlisted Leader Development. We place a premium on developing the enlisted leaders of partner nations in the Asia-Pacific. To that end, we are assisting selected countries as they work to create a professionally-committed, competent, and empowered enlisted force. Growing these leaders will contribute directly to a partner nation success across the full gamut of security interests, from the War on Terror to maritime security initiatives.

Joint Exercise Program (JEP). USPACOM joint exercises are tangible and productive elements of our theater engagement strategy and joint training program. Our exercises develop and sustain habitual relationships that promote overall operational effectiveness among USPACOM forces and with the armed forces of other nations and civilian organizations. Exercises also are the primary vehicle we use to improve, demonstrate, and certify the readiness of USPACOM forces and our joint command and control headquarters.

To maximize opportunities for training, we continue to leverage the capabilities of live, virtual, and constructive simulations in all of our training and exercises. These simulations bring greater fidelity and realism to our exercises while preventing increased operational and personnel OPTEMPO. Validation of the Joint and Combined Training Capability, JCTC, program with Australia during exercise TALISMAN SABER was a milestone achievement and showed how effective the integration of live, virtual, and constructive environments can be.

The establishment of the Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement account, CE2, this year, is a significant and welcome improvement. The CE2 account allows the Department of Defense to efficiently and effectively support joint training and exercises. It provides flexibility
to focus support when and where it is needed to meet USPACOM and national security requirements. We appreciate Congress’ leadership in establishing this account. Your continued support for the Joint Exercise Program plays a critical part in maintaining security and stability in the Pacific.

**Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)** is a Presidential and G-8 initiative to build competent and professional peacekeepers worldwide. Within the Asia-Pacific region, USPACOM GPOI program continues to leverage existing host nation programs, institutions, policies, and exercises. Our continued emphasis is on encouraging long-term sustainment of qualified peace support operations forces through a train-the-trainer focus, and ensuring standardization and interoperability by taking a regional approach, and by working within the framework of United Nations Guidelines. This program is one of our key components for fostering military-to-military relationships and in meeting security cooperation objectives among nations within the Asia-Pacific region. USPACOM successes include producing over 1,116 tactical peacekeepers, 272 qualified staff officers, and 145 Trainers available for immediate deployment world-wide. In late 2007, the Philippines and Tonga were added as GPOI participating nations.

In 2008, the USPACOM GPOI program will be fully implemented in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Tonga. We expect to train 5,000 peacekeepers. USPACOM, in conjunction with Bangladesh, will host the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone exercise conducted in the Asia Pacific region in April 2008 with all the current regional GPOI partner nations.
Other key programs in USPACOM contribute more broadly to security cooperation by addressing transnational concerns. The periodic deployment of humanitarian missions and outreach organizations like the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE) and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) provide expertise and establish enduring relationships between nations of the region. Additionally, the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, through the conduct of their important mission, serves as a powerful tool in our efforts to improve relationships in the region, particularly in Southeast Asia, but also in China.

**USS PELELIU** deployed to the Western Pacific for 120 days from June to September 2007 to perform a humanitarian assistance and theater security cooperation mission, reinforcing relationships and goodwill established during USNS MERCY missions in 2005 and 2006. The Pacific Partnership team of regional partners, NGOs, military engineers, doctors, dentists, and veterinarians provided support to the governments of the Philippines, Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Peleliu Island, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. Together they treated 31,684 medical patients, 4,242 dental patients, 2,614 veterinary patients and completed 42 engineering civic-action projects for the betterment of the host nation populace.

This past summer USPACOM also leveraged the Pacific Air Forces International Health Services to conduct **PACIFIC ANGEL**, a C-17 based humanitarian assistance mission, to the island nations of Kiribati, Nauru, and Vanuatu. In less than nine days, this 50 person team of talented dentists, nurses, surgeons, and engineers cared for over 1800 patients and rehabilitated
three clinics. We will continue similar missions this year, using the unique capability of the C-17 to bring assistance to remote, generally inaccessible Asia-Pacific areas.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (COE), a direct reporting unit to USPACOM, offers a unique tool in our continuing efforts to promote stability and human security in the Asia-Pacific region. COE educational programs in humanitarian response, peacekeeping, stability operations, and public health engage non-traditional partners from the civilian community and help maintain critical key relationships with our civilian disaster relief partners such as the United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, and civilian authorities in partner nations. COE activities also build indigenous capacity and promote consensus on strategies to improve our collective security against the emerging threats of climate change, urbanization, and potential pandemics.

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) provides regular executive education to key regional security-practitioner leaders. APCSS has broadened its audience beyond traditional defense practitioners to encompass whole-of-government, non-governmental, and international organizations in order to address complex security issues more comprehensively. During FY07, APCSS held security-related workshops in Cambodia, Nepal, Japan, Bangladesh, and Brunei. Feedback from the region indicates that APCSS Alumni are routinely leveraging the knowledge, skills, and relationships gained at APCSS to make progressive change in specific security cooperation areas.
Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command. USPACOM has no more important and honorable mission than achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from our nation’s conflicts. Our Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) successfully accomplished more than fifty missions globally last year. Additionally, JPAC Central Identification Laboratory identified 62 unaccounted individuals from the Vietnam War, Korean War, and World War II. In conducting its mission, JPAC relied upon cooperation from Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Pacific Islands, and several countries in Europe.

We anticipate similar results in the coming year. JPAC has also received tentative approval to conduct a recovery mission in the People’s Republic of China and to engage Government of India officials regarding potential recovery missions in Northeast India. Operations in North Korea remain suspended, but JPAC is prepared to resume operation once conditions in North Korea are again appropriate.

This year, with the support of the Department, USPACOM will complete the design for a new JPAC headquarters at Hickam AFB. In FY10, we will seek congressional authority and military construction funds for this $105 million project.

QUALITY OF LIFE

We thank the Congress for the extraordinary support you give our people – our most valuable asset. We are grateful for consistent pay raises, improved housing, enhanced medical
and dental services, exemplary education programs, enriching family and deployment support programs, and other new quality of life initiatives for our families.

With regards to education for our children, the number one priority for our families, your support allowed a new high school to open in Guam and construction to begin on the elementary/middle school. In Daegu, Korea an addition to the high school was completed, offering Junior Reserve Officer Training (JROTC) facilities, a music wing, gym and counseling center.

**SUMMARY STATEMENT**

USPACOM long-term priorities emphasize a region that is stable, secure and at peace. We are engaged extensively throughout the AOR to advance theater security goals. We are committed – along with our allies and partners – to turn the promise of a stable and secure region into reality and convert challenges into opportunities that strengthen regional relationships and cooperation. We are fortunate to have traditional allies and partners, as well as emerging partners, who are willing to help set conditions for security and stability and work together for the common good of the people of the Asia-Pacific. We appreciate the staunch support of the Congress and American people. I am proud and honored to represent the men and women of U.S. Pacific Command. On their behalf, thank you for your support, and thank you for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture in the USPACOM Area of Responsibility.