STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Servicemembers and their Families who serve in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines, I thank you for your unwavering support which allows us to promote prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia and ensure security on the Korean peninsula. I appreciate this opportunity to present my updated assessment of the command and our plan for continued transformation and strengthening of the United States–Republic of Korea Alliance.

As you know, our Alliance was forged in blood when our countries fought side-by-side during the Korean War, and was formalized by the signing of our Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953. This treaty has since served both nations well, while continually assuring the Republic of Korea and its citizens that the United States is a committed ally. Our Mutual Defense Treaty with Korea is a model of foresight, strategic thinking, and global understanding. Behind the shield of our alliance, the Republic of Korea has rebuilt from the devastation of war and is now a thoroughly modern nation with a vibrant democracy and a flourishing trade-based economy. South Korea now showcases the 11th largest economy in the world. For the past 55 years, our bilateral military alliance has provided the stability and security that is essential for preserving peace, promoting democracy, and fostering prosperity for the citizens of the Republic of Korea.
The Alliance still serves its original purpose of deterrence against north Korea. However, it is in our best interest to cultivate and expand the Alliance into one that more fully serves our two nations by contributing to a broader strategy for the promotion and enhancement of regional security. Regardless of the outcome of ongoing negotiations with north Korea and the possibility that a future peace treaty might further contribute to regional security, our Alliance with the Republic of Korea along with a meaningful U.S. force presence should be maintained throughout the 21st Century and beyond.

The previous administration of President Roh put a high priority on developing cooperative relations between north and South Korea in an effort to lay the foundations for a peaceful and prosperous peninsula. Inter-Korean dialogue was highlighted by the second north–South Korean Presidential Summit in October 2007. Newly inaugurated President Lee, Myung-bak has articulated a policy of continued engagement and cooperation with north Korea, but has noted that any such engagement should occur in parallel with further progress toward complete denuclearization. The U.S. is supportive of inter-Korean dialogue and there is reason for optimism that bilateral north-South engagement could bolster the Six-Party Talks effort to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula while advancing the path to peace. However, the strategic rationale for a future U.S. force presence in Korea far transcends the important, yet one-dimensional north Korea issue.

Historically, security interests have been the initial basis for long-term U.S. defense alliances. Security and stability underpin opportunities for peace,
economic growth, and social development. To remain healthy, an alliance can and should change and expand over time. As an example, after the fall of the former Soviet Union many believed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would become obsolete due to the perception that it existed only to deter Soviet aggression during the Cold War. However, instead of disbanding after the fall of the Iron Curtain, NATO has evolved into a multi-dimensional alliance whose members share the fundamental values of democratic principles, individual freedom, and free market enterprise. Indeed in the post-Cold War era, NATO has blossomed from sixteen to twenty six nations, including Eastern European countries. Further expansion is possible.

Nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War, we can clearly see that the members of NATO demonstrated exceptional strategic courage and foresight, transforming the alliance into one committed beyond its single dimension of military security in Europe, into an alliance with global impact in support of democracy and increasing prosperity for all its members. In the United States, there was never any thought that we should disband NATO after the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States led the effort to expand NATO, while refocusing and redefining its purpose. Today, the foresight of twenty years ago appears remarkably wise, as the Trans-Atlantic Alliance engages with an increasingly complex European, Central Asian and Global environment.

Similarly, it is time for Washington to reexamine its Defense Treaty with Seoul and look beyond the narrow scope of the DMZ threat, and solidify the Alliance as a pillar of stability and cooperation that will be an example for all the
nations of Northeast Asia and the world. Today, Northeast Asia is changing and its nations are engaging across a broad range of activities. Located on the Asian mainland, Korea is situated at the regional nexus of an emerging China, a resurgent Russia and a prosperous Japan. Indeed, Seoul is geographically closer to Beijing than it is to Tokyo. Keeping in mind this central position of Korea in the region, it is important for America to fully appreciate that Northeast Asia is home to four of our nine largest trading partners. The region accounts for 24 percent of all U.S. trade as well as a $191 billion U.S. direct investment position in 2006. With nearly a quarter of the world’s population (1.5 billion people) and four of the world’s 16 largest economies, having a combined 2006 gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately $16.4 trillion (25 percent of the global GDP), Northeast Asia is crucial to the world’s expanding free trade system and is certain to remain an area absolutely critical to U.S. national interests.

Within the Northeast Asia region, the Republic of Korea plays a vital role in sustaining U.S. prosperity. With expanding markets, the prospect of a mutually beneficial free trade agreement with the United States, and as one of the most technologically and scientifically advanced countries in the world, the Republic of Korea is a first-class economic power and a major business, banking and commerce center. South Korea is already the world’s largest shipbuilder, the 3rd largest steel producer, and the 5th largest car manufacturing nation. As a major U.S. economic partner, South Korea ranks as our seventh largest trading partner and seventh largest export market. South Korea’s economic strength will continue to develop under the newly elected ROK president.
While the region generates much of the world’s commerce, it is also highly vulnerable to flashpoints which can threaten stability. Notwithstanding progress toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula borne from the Six-Party Talks process and the ongoing disablement of north Korea’s nuclear facilities, we remain concerned about north Korea’s proliferation of military equipment and ballistic missiles along with missile-related technologies. Beyond the north Korean threat, the presence of five of the world’s six largest militaries and three proven nuclear powers, heightened nationalism, historical animosities, territorial disputes, resource competition, and historical struggles for regional hegemony all come together to pose long-term regional security challenges in this area which is so critical to our economy and other national interests.

In view of U.S. economic and security interests in the ROK and the region, it is my most considered judgment that the U.S. should set a cooperative policy based on shared interests and values with the Republic of Korea to maintain a meaningful American troop presence on the Korean Peninsula throughout the 21st Century and beyond, even subsequent to a peace treaty with north Korea, should that come about. Peace, stability and prosperity in this region of the world have not been attained for the past 55 years by accident or good luck. They are a function of a reliable and credible long-term U.S. presence in Korea, Japan and the Pacific Rim.

Korea-based U.S. forces are the only U.S. forces present on the East Asian mainland. In considering our future engagement, opportunities and influence in East Asia, we should take counsel of history and recall stated
policies for the area following World War II. Many argue that America's perceived policy of retrenchment from the Asian mainland, highlighted by Secretary of State Acheson's "Perimeter" speech to the National Press Club in 1950, set conditions for instability and emboldened north Korean aggression, supported by outside influences. Now is the time for the United States to reaffirm the tenets of our Mutual Defense Treaty Alliance with Korea and set our course for cooperative engagement on the Asian mainland throughout the 21st Century. A stated long-term commitment to our South Korean Ally on the Asian mainland which is independent of a peace treaty with north Korea is the most cost-effective approach to long-term peace and stability in East Asia.

In considering our long-term interests, the United States will be best served by balancing the ongoing on-peninsular transformation of today’s Alliance with an additional and fundamental change in our troop stationing policies in the Republic of Korea. I am convinced that we have an historic opportunity to end our outdated and debilitating legacy system of one year family unaccompanied short tour rotations, and replace it with normal three year family accompanied tours of duty. Recall that at the height of the Cold War and with U.S. Army divisions facing numerically superior Russian and Warsaw Pact divisions armed with modern equipment and tactical nuclear weapons, we still welcomed our families to Europe and fully offered three year family accompanied tours to our married Servicemembers. Not only did this policy provide a solid measure of stability and eliminate family separations for our post-Vietnam volunteer military,
it also sent a powerful message to our friends and adversaries alike that America was fully committed to our NATO Alliance for the long-term.

With a force in Korea less than 10% the size of our commitment to the Cold War in Europe, we can easily afford and should, in coordination with our Korean ally, initiate a policy now to begin the implementation of a ten year program to transition to family accompanied tours in Korea. Such a policy will eliminate a significant added source of family separations in a military already extraordinarily stretched by repeated unaccompanied short tour combat rotations to Afghanistan and Iraq. Furthermore, with major burden sharing financial support from our Korean Ally, including anticipated increases, the financial burden to the United States will be comparatively low, particularly given the return on investment in long-term security and stability in the region. Last, a family accompanied policy will bring our stationing practices in line with the same practices we have set for our forces in both Europe and Japan—policies that have enjoyed long-term Congressional support.

With family accompanied Servicemember tour normalization implemented over a ten year transition period and in close coordination with our Korean Ally as provided for in our current bilateral Strategic Flexibility Agreement, the United States will be in a position to consider selected levels of worldwide deployment of our Korean based force, not unlike the way our forces deploy from and return to their bases in Europe and Japan. Deployment from and return to our Korean Main Operating Bases (MOBs) where our families would be located would be a function of any continued threat from north Korea, and U.S. global force
generation requirements. In all decision making related to our alliance with Korea, the U.S. would be obligated to continue to ensure we meet our security responsibilities with the Republic of Korea, without ever sending a message of reduced commitment or weakness to any and all potential adversaries, including north Korea.

I. The United States – Republic of Korea Alliance

While established to deter the north Korean threat, the U.S.-ROK Alliance is maturing from a single purpose military relationship to a broader partnership committed to expanding prosperity and regional stability which should be continued and reinforced. It is in our national interest to do so. The presence of U.S forces and the strength of the Alliance form a cornerstone of continued regional peace and stability, essential for stable global markets, expansion of prosperity through free trade, and promotion of freedom and democracy. The United States and the Republic of Korea have agreed to transition from the U.S.-led Alliance warfighting Combined Forces Command, to an arrangement where U.S. forces are in a doctrinally supporting role to the ROK military. The ROK military will assume responsibility for commanding and controlling the warfighting readiness and operations of their own forces in wartime for the first time since the end of the Korean War. Towards this end, the U.S. military will form an independent U.S. Headquarters to command U.S. forces serving in Korea during wartime, while the Koreans will form a Korean national warfighting headquarters referred to by them provisionally as the ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC). This transition is referred to by many as "OPCON Transfer" and will take place on 17
April 2012. The current U.S. led combined warfighting command, Combined Forces Command, will be disestablished. The transition will convey a strong message to all regional actors of continuing solidarity with our Korean ally, while providing us an opportunity to strengthen our close and cooperative relationship with the Republic of Korea. With OPCON transition, one of the long standing perceived infringements on ROK sovereignty and self determination will be removed along with a lightning rod for political dissent and anti-American sentiment. This move is healthy, long overdue, and in the best interest of both the United States and the Republic of Korea.

**The Republic of Korea Today**

Over the course of the Alliance’s half-century of security cooperation, the Republic of Korea has flourished while becoming a leader in the 21st century global community, and the envy of many nations throughout the world. Within this vibrant democracy, South Korean citizens have achieved an incredible standard of living, a modern transportation infrastructure, and world-class universities and hospitals. As the 11th largest economy in the world, the Republic of Korea is a hub of economic activity within Northeast Asia, and an integral player in the global trading system. It is a true testament to the South Korean people that within a single lifetime they have realized the joy and pride of rebuilding their country from the ashes of war to prosperity and leading-power status.
U.S.-ROK Alliance Partnership

Since the end of the Korean War, each generation has dreamed of achieving a true and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. With the north-South Korean Presidential Summit in late 2007 and the on-going Six-Party Talks process, there is reason for hope and optimism. However, optimism must be tempered with caution due to north Korea's unpredictability. The U.S.-ROK Alliance provides diplomatic leaders with a mechanism to develop options for confidence building measures that can assist in the overall effort to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and promote dialogue between the north and South with the purpose of eventually realizing a peace treaty between the two Koreas. The Alliance fully supports this process. Until peace becomes reality, the U.S.-ROK Alliance must remain vigilant and capable of deterring north Korean aggression.

To ensure future viability, the ROK and the U.S. agreed to embark on the most profound defense transformation on the peninsula since the end of the Korean War. For the past 58 years, the United States has led the warfighting command responsible for the defense of the Republic of Korea. Today, it is both prudent and the Republic of Korea's sovereign right to assume the primary responsibility for the lead role in its defense, given its advanced military and economic capabilities. The transition to a ROK-led national defense will be a success story for both the United States and the Republic of Korea and is the cornerstone to future regional stability.
Transition of Wartime Operational Control

In September 2006, the Presidents of the United States and the Republic of Korea agreed that South Korea should assume the lead for its own defense. In early 2007, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense determined that South Korea will assume wartime operational control of its forces on April 17, 2012. U.S. Forces Korea will transform into a new joint warfighting command, provisionally described as Korea Command (KORCOM). KORCOM will be a fully capable and resourced complementary U.S. joint warfighting command in a doctrinally supporting role to the ROK JFC. The United States views this effort as an affirmation of the tremendous success of the Alliance since the end of the Korean War. U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders have been discussing wartime OPCON transition for nearly two decades as part of the normal progression of the Alliance. Transitioning the Alliance to a new ROK-led military command and control structure in 2012, with U.S. and UN forces in doctrinally supporting roles, will enhance relationships that best serve both nations' interests and are well suited for the long-term. In the future, ROK Army ground forces will leverage quick reacting and readily available U.S. air and naval capabilities to counter initial north Korean provocations or aggression. Though transitioning to a doctrinally supporting military relationship, the Commander of the new KORCOM will still maintain uninterrupted national command over all U.S. forces.
ROK Defense Initiatives

Since assuming peacetime operational control of its armed forces in 1994, the Republic of Korea has made great strides in readiness through upgrading equipment and force training. Since 1998, the ROK Army has fielded 13 modern mechanized brigades including approximately 1000 K-1 tanks, South Korea’s main battle tank similar to the U.S. M-1 Abrams. In addition, there are 11 field artillery battalions, two multiple launch rocket system battalions, and an extremely capable special operations force. The ROK Marine Corps is highly trained and in the midst of fielding a modern battle command and control system, and the Navy is emerging as a blue-water force, having commissioned its first amphibious assault ship in 2007, a vessel similar to a U.S. Navy Landing Helicopter Assault ship. In 2007, the ROK Navy also launched its first of three KDX-III class Aegis radar equipped destroyers. Finally, the ROK Air Force is modernizing with the acquisition of F-15K fighters and precision-guided munitions to enhance deep strike and core facility protection capabilities.

Under its ambitious Defense Reform 2020 plan, the ROK military strives to be a more modern and agile fighting force. Its goal is to develop a self-reliant, technology-oriented, qualitative defense force. As a result of its emphasis on technology under this plan, the ROK plans to reduce its total (active and reserve) Army ground forces by approximately 45% over the next 12 years leading up to its target date of 2020. The overall active and reserve forces will be reduced from about 3.7 million to about 2 million. It is my assessment that the ROK military is well on its way to achieving a military force capability that as the ROK
Ministry of National Defense puts it, “sees farther, moves faster, and strikes more precisely.” Nonetheless, as the Combined Forces Command Commander responsible to both the Presidents of Korea and the United States for deterrence and for executing a warfight with north Korea, I do believe that planned drawdowns of the ROK Army should be executed commensurate with similar drawdowns by the north Korean Army.

**Republic of Korea’s Support to Global and Regional Security**

The Republic of Korea is a committed U.S. ally and active defender of freedom around the world having previously committed troops to Vietnam, Desert Storm, Somalia, and East Timor. Reflecting its greater political, economic and military capacity, the ROK continues to demonstrate a larger international role with deployments into Iraq, Afghanistan, and most recently, a peacekeeping battalion to Lebanon supporting United Nations operations. In December 2007, the Republic of Korea’s National Assembly approved a fourth, one-year extension of its commitments in Iraq through 2008, although their force has been reduced by approximately 600 soldiers. In Afghanistan, the ROK’s support included medical and engineer construction units and other military assistance worth millions of dollars. Though the ROK Government recently redeployed the majority of its troops from Afghanistan and will replace them with a small civilian-led medical team, I am confident that this redeployment will not lessen either the South Korean commitment to the U.S.-ROK Alliance, or its commitment to peace and stability around the world.
II. North Korea Challenges Regional and Global Security

North Korea remains the primary threat to security in Northeast Asia. Notwithstanding progress in the ongoing Six-Party Talks and the ongoing disablement of its Yongbyon nuclear reactor facility, North Korea’s historical opposition to meaningful reform and its long-term pattern of provocative behavior and proliferation present significant challenges to achieving lasting regional and global stability. In addition to North Korea’s nuclear threat, its missile program, coupled with its aging but still lethal and forward positioned conventional force, continues to present significant challenges.

**North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Developments**

Progress in the Six-Party Talks notwithstanding, North Korea continues to use its nuclear program and suspected stockpile as both a deterrent and leverage in negotiations, as highlighted by the recent failure to meet the 31 December 2007 nuclear declaration deadline as agreed in the Six-Party Talks process. Currently, the intelligence community assesses that North Korea extracted plutonium at its Yongbyon nuclear facility and possesses weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for several nuclear devices.

North Korea is also believed to have pursued a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) development program that if fully developed could provide an alternative method of nuclear weapons development independent of North Korea’s plutonium production facility at Yongbyon. Regardless of the fact that the Yongbyon reactor was shut down in July 2007 with physical disablement beginning in November, the nuclear threat will remain until full implementation of
north Korea's commitment under the September 2005 Joint Statement to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.

North Korea views its ballistic missile program as a source of international power and prestige, a strategic deterrent, and a source of hard currency derived from exports. As a leading supplier of missile-related technologies with known export programs to Syria, Iran and other nations of concern, north Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range, lethality and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800 missiles for its defense and external sales. With its recent intercontinental missile test conducted in July 2006, and preparations underway to field a new intermediate range missile capable of striking Okinawa, Guam and Alaska, north Korea’s missile development and export program present a threat which can not be ignored.

**North Korean Armed Forces**

Despite chronic economic hardship, North Korea retains the fourth largest armed force in the world with 1.2 million active duty and 5 million reserves, devoting up to one third of its available resources to sustain its conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. Though aging and unsophisticated by U.S. standards, its military arsenal, which includes 1,700 aircraft, 800 naval vessels, and over 13,000 artillery systems, still constitutes a substantial threat. Seventy percent of north Korea's ground forces are located within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone, with up to 250 long range artillery systems capable of striking the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area, a thriving urban area of over 20 million inhabitants. While I do not assess that its military is capable of sustained
offensive maneuver that could successfully defeat the combined military power of
the Republic of Korea and United States, north Korea still has the capacity to
inflict major destruction and significant military and civilian casualties in South
Korea, with little to no warning.

Supplementing its conventional forces, north Korea also maintains the
world's largest special operations force (SOF), with over 80,000 in its ranks.
Tough, well trained, and profoundly loyal, these forces are capable of conducting
strategic reconnaissance and asymmetric attacks against a range of critical
civilian and military targets. Among the best resourced in its military, north
Korean special operations forces provide an asymmetric enabler to north Korea
in crisis, provocation, or war. Given the dense South Korean civilian population
which is heavily dependent on sophisticated infrastructure, fuels, utilities, and
transportation, north Korean SOF poses a major threat to the Alliance's ability to
effectively protect and defend South Korea.

North Korean Threat Outlook

North Korea will remain a major destabilizing force in our efforts to
maintain security in Northeast Asia and globally until we have achieved the
complete implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement of Principles.
With little tolerance for economic reform, and an infrastructure, agricultural and
industrial sector incapable of meeting the needs of its populace, north Korea’s
long-term approach to maintaining its "military first" policy will remain a major
challenge for the north. My assessment is that while aware of the depths of its
economic crisis and the dangers of its significant dependence on foreign aid to
meet basic sustenance requirements, north Korea will continue to resist fundamental change, focusing its international engagement, strategic dialogue and military readiness to ensure its long-term survival.

III. Ensuring Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

As Commander of Combined Forces Command, United Nations Command, and United States Forces Korea, force readiness is my first priority. Readiness can only be maintained by training and executing all key tasks and responsibilities to standard in conditions approximating those expected to be encountered in wartime. We must ensure that our training facilities and training opportunities fully support the transformation of our U.S. military forces stationed in Korea. Since my last testimony to Congress in April 2007, measurable progress has been made in improving training range and airspace availability for our ground and air forces in Korea, but we must still make additional progress with our Korean ally to put ourselves in a position to achieve the highest levels of readiness. USFK still requires increased access to modern and instrumented air to ground bombing ranges in the ROK, with the requisite training schedule required to maintain readiness levels. The ROK military is working hard in coordination with civilian ministries to provide the required training ranges and airspace, and we appreciate their efforts. We look forward to continued progress in this area throughout the remaining FY 2008 and into FY 2009.

Continued Congressional support for force capability enhancements is also critical to readiness. USFK has continued to make meaningful progress in several key focus areas for modernization: joint command, control,
communications, and computers (C4); intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); theater missile defense (TMD); pre-positioned equipment and logistics; and counter-fire and precision munitions. I ask for your support and help to ensure our necessary upgrades and our transformational requirements are met evenly and predictably.

**C4 and ISR**

Modernization of C4 and ISR capabilities is a top command priority, and crucial to transforming the U.S.-ROK Alliance. As we prepare to transition command of Korean forces in wartime to the ROK military in 2012, combined intelligence interoperability will be paramount to establishing a seamless command and control capability, to maintain Alliance access to U.S. capabilities, and to leverage the increasing capabilities of the ROK intelligence community. Major C4 and ISR initiatives which are important include the integration of ROK intelligence systems through Project Morning Calm, the expansion of our combined intelligence networks, the establishment of an Intelligence Fusion Center, and support for U.S. National Multi-Intelligence Support Elements at the ROK defense intelligence centers.

Congressional support is essential to sustain and improve C4 and ISR during this critical period of Alliance transformation. Validated U.S. requirements for Global Hawk, Predator, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, along with improved signals and human intelligence capabilities continue to exist. Support for our intelligence requirements ensures that we
close the most critical gaps, support diligent ongoing daily operations, and
improve the overall long-term intelligence posture in the region.

**Theater Missile Defense**

North Korea's missile tests in 2006 highlighted the importance of an active
theater missile defense system for South Korea. The Republic of Korea must
field its own TMD system, capable of full integration with the U.S. system, in the
near term. It recently approved the purchase of eight Configuration-2 German
Patriot fire units. When fielded in 2008 and 2009, these firing units will possess a
U.S. PAC-2 equivalent theater ballistic missile defensive capability. The regional
missile threat from north Korea requires the Republic of Korea to develop its own
missile defense to protect its critical civilian and military command capabilities,
critical infrastructure and population centers. As of now, these Korean military
and civilian facilities are highly vulnerable to north Korean missile attacks.

PAC-3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have
significantly enhanced our posture to protect critical United States facilities in
Korea. There remains, however, a significant shortage of PAC-3 missiles
currently positioned on the Peninsula to counter north Korea’s missile inventory.
Continued production of PAC-3 missiles in the near-term, followed by continued
development of the Theater High Altitude Air Defense, Airborne Laser, and Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense will provide the layered missile defense capability we
require for the future. Your continued support remains essential to these and
other Service component programs that protect our forces on the peninsula, and
sustain our ability to reinforce South Korea in the event of a crisis.
Theater Logistics, War Reserve Materiel and Strategic Transportation

An integral aspect of USFK transformation is developing the necessary logistics structures and resources to enhance our ability to respond to contingencies. The proximity of the north Korean threat coupled with the long distances from U.S. sustainment bases in the Pacific and continental United States requires a robust and responsive logistics capability. The capability enhancements currently planned will significantly improve our core logistics functions through pre-positioned equipment upgrades, responsive strategic transportation, and modern logistics tracking systems.

Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS)-4, which includes critical equipment, weapon systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and essential supplies, is vital for rapid combat power projection to the Korean theater. Critical combat systems are currently at 100% fill and the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) equipment set is 97% Fully Mission Capable. During the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) exercise in 2007, Task Force Blackhorse, from the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Irwin, California, drew selected APS-4 HBCT combat vehicles and conducted a road march that culminated in a live-fire exercise. The task force certified the equipment as fully mission capable, remarking that the combat systems—Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and Paladin self-propelled howitzers—were the best that they had seen.

Clearly, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) is making great strides in maintaining the pre-positioned stocks in Korea. However, sustainment shortages
still exist and can only be overcome through the commitment of additional funding while increasing the priority of fill for Army pre-positioned stocks. For example, we have less than 5 percent of our full authorization of up-armored HMMWVs or trucks in our Army operational and pre-positioned fleets. This is a significant shortfall and is a major risk.

Responsive strategic transportation platforms, such as cargo aircraft and maritime prepositioning ships, remain essential to our ability to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and sustain U.S. forces in the event of crisis. Our critical strategic airlift capability was recently tested in February 2008 during the FOAL EAGLE exercise. U.S. Air Force C-17 aircraft transported a combat-ready platoon of Army Stryker vehicles from Alaska to the Korean Peninsula, where the unit conducted gunnery and maneuver live-fire exercises. During the same exercise, a battalion from the 7th Marine Regiment conducted a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) offload of combat equipment at Chinhae, followed by a combined live fire exercise with the 2nd ROK Marine Division. These types of strategic deployments will continue to be a part of future FOAL EAGLE exercises, and exemplify the command’s requirement for expeditionary capability and responsive strategic lift.

Equally important is the ability to maintain in-transit visibility of supplies and equipment with a modernized joint logistics C4 and information system. Past experience has shown that relatively small investments in asset tracking systems and theater distribution yield significant efficiencies and improve overall effectiveness of our logistics systems. Your continued support for modern pre-
positioned equipment, responsive transit requirements, and logistics tracking systems will ensure that U.S. forces have the right equipment and supplies at the right time.

**Precision Strike and Preferred Munitions**

Precision strike engagement capabilities are critical requirements for our contingency plans that allow us to change the dynamics of a conflict and rapidly achieve campaign objectives. Increasing the forward stocks of preferred munitions is also vital to operational success in the Korean theater. Our priority ordnance requirements include: the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System with extended range capability; a ground-launched, extended range, all weather capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs); precision guided munitions; and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. Your continued support to these programs provides the overmatching capabilities to deter aggression.

**War Reserve Stocks Allies – Korea**

Legislation signed in December 2005 permits the U.S. to offer, for sale or concession, surplus ammunition and military equipment to the ROK. Negotiations for the War Reserve Stocks Allies-Korea (WRSA-K) program began in 2007. By successfully transferring these stocks to the ROK, the U.S. will avoid up to $1.2 billion in transportation and demilitarization costs, reduce its storage footprint, and increase ROK readiness.
IV. Combined Forces Command

The Republic of Korea and the United States established the Combined Forces Command (CFC) on November 7, 1978, and it has proven to be the most advanced, capable, bilateral warfighting command in our nation’s history. Led by a U.S. four star Commander, CFC has effectively deterred aggression and provided a peaceful and stable setting for the citizens of the Republic of Korea and the region for nearly 30 years.

With the end of the Cold War and significant downturn in external conventional military support to the north Koreans, coupled with continued major enhancements to the ROK military, the Republic of Korea and United States have frequently discussed and negotiated changes to the Alliance's military command and control mechanisms. In fact since the Korean War and until 1994, a U.S. four star Commander operationally controlled the ROK military in peacetime, as well as in potential wartime. On conclusion of negotiations in 1994, peacetime operational control (OPCON) of the Republic of Korea military was transferred from the U.S. led Combined Forces Command, to the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS). Since 1994, the Republic of Korea and the United States have discussed and negotiated the next logical step in Alliance command arrangements, the full transfer of wartime operational control of ROK military forces from the U.S. led Combined Forces Command to a new ROK Joint Forces Command (JFC). Final negotiations to set a date for this transition were agreed to in 2007, with a ROK military OPCON transition from CFC to the ROK JFC date set for 17 April 2012.
To achieve realignment of responsibilities in the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012, the ROK and U.S. militaries completed a transition road map—the Strategic Transition Plan (STP)—signed in 2007, identifying requirements and milestones for the next five years. Prior to the ROK assuming wartime operational control of its own forces in 2012, U.S. and ROK planners will develop new terms of reference, crisis action standard operating procedures, wartime command and control procedures, and operational plans through formal alliance consultative processes, such as the bi-monthly Security Policy Initiative and the annual Security Consultative and Military Committee Meetings.

This is all made possible by the enormously successful economic and military development of the Republic of Korea. Celebrating the 11th largest economy in the world, the ROK is a solid democratic nation, with a world-class, highly competent and professional military dedicated to the preservation of its republic and clearly poised, with U.S. continued support, to assume responsibility for wartime operational command of its forces.

Through the OPCON transition path to April 2012 and as part of the STP, the Alliance has initiated two major simulation-driven exercises each year. ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN will focus on training and certifying the 2012 and beyond future command structure, and KEY RESOLVE / FOAL EAGLE (KR/FE) will ensure CFC readiness until 2012, while visibly demonstrating the strength of the Alliance. We just completed our first KR/FE Exercise under this new paradigm, and I am extremely confident that CFC remains highly capable of
deterring aggression, and should deterrence fail, defeating a north Korean attack quickly and decisively.

Lessons learned from each exercise will help to eliminate shortfalls in combined capabilities in order to maintain a strong and credible deterrent during the transition period. The culmination of the Strategic Transition Plan will be marked with a certification exercise in March 2012, followed shortly thereafter by the disestablishment of CFC and the simultaneous establishment of separate and complementary U.S. and South Korean national military commands, with the U.S. in a doctrinally supporting role to the ROK warfighting Joint Forces Command. Our intent is to achieve initial operational capability for the doctrinally supporting KORCOM and its Service components, followed by full operational capability prior to the final certification exercise in March 2012.

V. United Nations Command

As the longest standing peace enforcement coalition in the history of the United Nations, the United Nations Command represents the international community’s enduring commitment to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. With fifteen current member nations and the ROK, the United Nations Command provides a unified and prompt international response mechanism to preserve the security of the ROK if there is a north Korean attack. Furthermore, the UNC actively supervises compliance with the terms of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement fulfilling the members’ mutual pledge to “fully and faithfully carry out the terms” of the Armistice. With responsibility south of the Military Demarcation Line for the maintenance of the Armistice Agreement, the UNC
meets with the Korean People’s Army (KPA) representatives, inspects South Korean units positioned along the DMZ, and conducts investigations into alleged Armistice violations to prevent minor incidents from escalating into destabilizing crises.

As we progress towards the transition of wartime OPCON in 2012, the UNC will continue to be a vital component of our deterrent and warfighting capabilities in the Republic of Korea. The ROK and the U.S. are addressing current disconnects in UNC authorities and responsibilities, which will become untenable with the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK JFC in 2012. In the current arrangement, the UNC Commander, the U.S. Forces Korea four-star general, is ultimately responsible for Armistice maintenance, crisis management and resolving Armistice violations, even though he has no peacetime authority to posture or position ROK military forces in response to provocations or violations along the Demilitarized Zone. Today, these responsibility-authority mismatches are mitigated through the U.S. Commander’s dual-hat as CFC commander. Once the transition of wartime OPCON is complete, the U.S. commander, and thus the UNC commander, will no longer have any chain of command access or direct authority over ROK forces—the very forces that are arrayed along the DMZ—in peacetime, crisis escalation, or war.

In accordance with the Strategic Transition Plan, both countries are jointly studying future arrangements for Armistice maintenance responsibilities, as well as the enduring role and authorities of the UNC. It is our goal to transfer or delegate appropriate armistice authorities and responsibilities to the Republic of
Korea, while ensuring that the United Nations Command remains a critical component in deterring aggression and supporting combat operations should conflict erupt on the peninsula. Through the United Nations Command we must also maintain the United Nations–Japan Status of Forces Agreement, which provides throughput access to critical Japanese air and naval bases for U.S. and UN forces during crisis.

VI. United States Forces Korea

Under the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), signed by the U.S. and ROK in 2004, U.S. joint force elements operating in the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul will relocate to our MOB at Garrison Humphreys, near Pyongtaek, approximately 40 miles southwest of Seoul. The relocation of the Second Infantry Division is also part of a separate U.S.–ROK realignment plan, the Land Partnership Plan, which, when complete, will enable United States Army forces to assume a more efficient and less intrusive footprint within two sanctuary main operating base locations south of Seoul. It will remove our forces from the traditional military operational avenues between Seoul and the DMZ, thus putting U.S. forces in ground force and artillery sanctuary locations well south of the nation’s capital. Relocation will also significantly improve the quality of life of our Servicemembers, while returning valuable land to the citizens of the Republic of Korea.

For four of the past five years, the relocation of U.S. forces has frequently been contentious between the ROK and U.S. governments. The central issue has been the application of the bilaterally negotiated Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) procedures to return vacated U.S. base camps to the Republic of Korea.
However over the past year, the ROK Minister of National Defense has led an inspired effort which has largely resolved the disagreements and friction. We are confident that the new government will continue to negotiate in good faith with the United States regarding this most important issue.

In 2007, we returned an additional five installations and expect to return two installations and seven other SOFA granted facilities in 2008. To date, we have closed 37 installations encompassing over 17,208 acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 million and returned 35 installations to the Republic of Korea. Along with these camps and in accordance with our SOFA, we have transferred free of cost to the Republic of Korea the full range of buildings, capital assets, and improvements found on these camps, many built with U.S. appropriated military construction funds. It remains our goal to close a total of 63 facilities and areas—two thirds of all land granted under the SOFA, totaling more than 38,000 acres. Given the recently established cooperative effort as noted above, we are hopeful that this process will proceed smoothly to the mutual benefit of both nations in accordance with the U.S.-ROK SOFA.

In exchange for the return of the majority of our dispersed camps, the Republic of Korea, per our agreements, has purchased 2,800 acres of land required to expand Garrison Humphreys and the Air Force’s Osan Air Base.

**Allied Burden Sharing**

At the end of 2006, the Republic of Korea and the United States concluded talks on a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) regarding ROK cost sharing support for USFK in 2007-2008. The resulting ROK SMA burden
sharing contribution represented approximately 41% of U.S. Non-Personnel Stationing Costs (NPSC) over this two year period—725.5 Billion Won ($770M) for 2007 and a Consumer Price Index (CPI) adjusted increase in 2008 to 741.5 Billion Won ($787M). This is an improvement from the 2006 SMA contribution of 680.4 Billion Won ($722M) representing 38% of NPSC.

Defense burden sharing is advantageous to both Alliance partners. For the United States, the Republic of Korea’s willingness to equitably share appropriate defense costs is a clear indicator that United States forces in Korea are welcome and wanted. Host nation funded construction satisfies critical infrastructure requirements that would otherwise be borne by U.S. taxpayers. In the past year ROK SMA contributions funded the construction of an $8.5M Vehicle Maintenance Facility at Camp Mujuk and an $8.3M upgrade of 22 Hardened Aircraft Shelters at Osan Air Base. We also authorized the design and construction of a $36.6M U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery Brigade headquarters facility at Osan Air Base, and began construction of a $41.8M barracks complex for enlisted personnel at Kunsan Air Base. We are in the process of approving the construction of a $35M humidity controlled warehouse to support Army Pre-positioned Stocks at U.S. Army Garrison Carroll and a $39.4M joint senior Non-Commissioned Officer dormitory at Osan Air Base.

For the Republic of Korea, nearly all ROK SMA burden sharing funds are expended directly into the Korean economy by paying the salaries of Korean local national employees, Korean contractors and service agents, and Korean construction firms. In 2007 the Republic of Korea contributed 295.4 Billion Won
($314M) toward Korean local national employee wages, funding the majority of the cost of this absolutely necessary workforce on U.S. bases. Republic of Korea SMA contributions also offset 132.5 Billion Won ($141M) of U.S. logistics requirements last year, through contracts with Korean companies in critical warfighting functions such as equipment repair, maintenance, and munitions storage.

In principle, both sides agree to the goal of reaching an equitable level of commitment to allied cost sharing. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that to achieve equitability, the ROK should share approximately 50% of NPSC. While this year’s contribution did not meet DoD’s goal, the ROK and the U.S. will continue to negotiate and coordinate in pursuit of reaching a more equitable sharing level of USFK stationing costs.

**Upgrading and Building New Infrastructure**

Currently I assess our facilities overall in Korea to be the most dilapidated in the U.S. military, outside of active combat or peace enforcement zones. This regrettable situation is not in keeping with our stated commitment to the young men and women who selflessly serve our nation. In Korea we need to commit to recapitalizing our facilities and infrastructure. As a reliable and trusted ally, we are committed to helping defend one of the most prosperous and advanced countries in the world, yet the facilities that we subject our Servicemembers and their families to in Korea resemble something only a couple of years out of a combat zone.
Year after year our Servicemembers and their families are subjected to sub-standard and often decrepit facilities and housing here in Korea, 8000 miles from home. The war in Korea ended nearly fifty five years ago and it is time to put our personnel into facilities and infrastructure they rightfully deserve as American citizens, military volunteers and patriots. "Out of sight – out of mind" is not an acceptable facilities and infrastructure strategy for our priceless young men and women, and their families. As a nation, we simply cannot turn a blind eye to this decades long lack of capitalization and maintenance.

Our facilities and infrastructure are old, particularly Army facilities where over one-third of the buildings in the command are between 25 and 50 years old and another one-third are classified as temporary structures. In 2007, our estimates are that the Eighth United States Army was under funded by 26 percent ($28 million) in sustainment and 78 percent ($307 million) in restoration and modernization requirements. The Seventh Air Force was under funded by 40 percent ($20 million) in sustainment and 93 percent ($244 million) in restoration and modernization requirements. As a result of long-term annual shortfalls, many buildings have substantial deferred maintenance, contributing to continual deterioration. Without the investment to sustain, restore, and modernize our facilities, our Servicemembers and their families will continue to be perpetually relegated to live and work in run-down, dilapidated, patched-up facilities. Your commitment to our SRM Program requirements, supplemented by host nation financial burden sharing contributions, will allow us to begin to
effectively pursue an infrastructure renewal program to enhance our readiness and upgrade the quality of life for our personnel and their families.

In looking to the future, our realignment to two sanctuary Main Operating Bases in the ROK provides us with a unique opportunity to change the paradigm and begin to meet the needs of our Servicemembers and families, allowing us to focus on improving living and working conditions. To this end, sustained access to several different funding programs will be essential, including United States military construction, host nation-funded SMA construction, and commercial build-to-lease programs. Using these different funding streams, we have recently constructed several modern unaccompanied housing quarters and barracks for our Servicemembers. However, as time passes, the goal to achieve "to standard" facilities and infrastructure becomes more illusive. It is long since time to act.

**Family Housing, Senior Occupant Housing and other Military Construction**

As part of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) signed by the U.S. and the ROK in 2004 to move the U.S. joint force footprint from Seoul to the new MOB at Garrison Humphreys south of Seoul, the Republic of Korea agreed to provide at their expense the majority of the required buildings and infrastructure at a cost of billions of dollars. The ROK is aggressively pursuing their agreed to requirements, already spending nearly two billion dollars in pursuit of project goals. For our part, the United States agreed to provide the majority of required family housing and unaccompanied senior leader quarters for our force, at a cost
we estimate to be between one and two billion dollars. Although the number of family housing units required under the YRP is substantially less than what will be required for a future normalized stationing environment, should that be approved, meeting YRP family housing requirements provides a solid foundation for a normalized tour path over the next ten to fifteen years.

To date, we have been unable to gain Congressional support to fund our family housing commitments to meet our obligations under the 2004 YRP. The result of this situation is that the United States is telegraphing to our long time Korean Ally that we are not prepared to execute our commitments in the Yongsan Relocation Plan. My assessment is that failure to execute our obligations under this plan will result in a crisis in the Alliance, and signal a clear lack of commitment to our national interests and to our ROK Ally in this most important area of the world. This will send a chilling message to the regional players, including Japan, China and Russia.

In the past year, I have emphasized the need for a solution to meet our family housing requirements under the YRP during Congressional hearings, numerous office calls with members, and continuing correspondence in order to empower the Army to provide the necessary family housing and unaccompanied senior quarters at MOB Garrison Humphreys. After consultation and debate and in spite of our many, many pleas, we have not achieved consensus. Right now we are dead in the water.

For FY09, the Army is requesting $145 million in military construction funds. A portion of the requested funds—$20 million—will be used to construct a
much needed vehicle maintenance complex at MOB Garrison Humphreys. The majority of the funds—$125 million—is requested to build the first 216 joint force family housing units at MOB Garrison Humphreys. While this is a necessary start, and your support for these family housing apartment towers is needed and greatly appreciated, our future stationing at MOB Garrison Humphreys requires more than 2100 additional housing units. We would appreciate your support when the funding for these necessary units is requested.

Without the support and funding to procure military housing, we will remain in Seoul, which is within range of north Korean artillery, while essentially refusing to relocate from land in Seoul which we have promised to return to our Korean Ally. We have absolutely no business continuing to garrison troops in our Ally’s capital city, and it is in both our interests to execute the Yongsan Relocation Plan on time and on schedule. Until we have appropriate housing constructed that meets DoD standards for our Servicemembers just as we do in Europe and Japan, we cannot meet U.S. obligations agreed to under the YRP. Determining an immediate solution to our family housing requirements ensures the success of our historic endeavor with the ROK to both transform the current U.S.-ROK Alliance command structure, and relocate the footprint of U.S. forces to sanctuary locations in accordance with national and strategic policy level guidance. As the commander in the field, it is my most considered judgment that it is imperative that Congress support the President’s Budget request, thus authorizing the initiation of requests for proposals and construction for the initial housing units. In this way, we can begin the process of taking care of our
Servicemembers and their families in a way that all Americans will endorse, while meeting our agreements with the Republic of Korea.

Normalizing Tours for United States Forces Korea

With the momentum of our relocation into two sanctuary Main Operating Bases south of Seoul and the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK in 2012, the U.S. is uniquely positioned to execute a tour length policy change in Korea. Much like our agreements with our European and Japanese Allies, and at the invitation of our Korean Ally, it is my assessment that we should normalize U.S. Servicemember tour lengths in Korea to fully authorize three year family accompanied tours.

In 55 years, the Republic of Korea has transformed from a war ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, and democratic countries in the world. It is an economic powerhouse with modern world class medical centers and universities. Unfortunately, in a modern and vibrant Republic of Korea, the U.S. still rotates Servicemembers on one year unaccompanied assignments as though this remained an active combat zone. It is not. Indeed, during the Cold War and in the face of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact war machine, our Servicemembers were encouraged to bring their families with them to Europe. This created a stable military and sent a strong message of U.S. commitment and reliability to our European Allies. We resourced and practiced Non-Combatant Evacuation procedures to ensure that in the event of crisis we could redeploy our family members to the United States. Today, our force in Korea is less than 10% the size of our Cold War force in Europe.
With long-term operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are needlessly contributing to family separations for the U.S. military with our current rotational practices here in Korea, while continuing to send a message to our Northeast Asian partners and allies that we either expect imminent conflict, or that we are not fully committed and can withdraw our forces on a moment’s notice. Conflict is not imminent and with our force in sanctuary locations south of Seoul, our immediate no-notice vulnerability will be dramatically less than that faced by our force in the Cold War in Europe—again, a force where we welcomed family members. We should make a long-term commitment to South Korea and the other members of the Northeast Asia community by signaling that the United States has important national interests in the area and, at the invitation of the Republic of Korea, is committing to a policy of three year family accompanied tours in Korea, exactly as we have in Japan and across Europe. We could implement this policy with an infrastructure expansion plan over ten to fifteen years, with the costs being subjected to burden sharing negotiations between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

The benefits of normalizing tours are many and include improved continuity, stability, readiness and retention of regional, institutional, and cultural knowledge. Also, the end-state will result in reduced entitlement costs and an overall savings as we decrease the number of permanent change of station (PCS) moves and lower the need for entitlements resulting from family separations.
Currently, in addition to receiving a Cost of Living Allowance that ensures equitable pay for our Servicemembers who serve in Korea, the Army, Air Force, and the Navy offer their Servicemembers Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP), a program that authorizes a monthly cash incentive for Servicemembers who are willing to extend their tours in Korea. AIP has saved the Department of Defense millions upon millions of dollars in reduced PCS costs. So far, since the AIP program began in 2004, the Army and the Air Force have had over 19,000 Soldiers and Airmen volunteer for AIP. While AIP has been a major success, for our family unaccompanied Servicemembers—over 80% of our authorized force in Korea—accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in the States. Rather than providing incentives to unaccompanied personnel to stay longer in Korea, it is my assessment that we should focus on enabling Servicemembers to bring their families to Korea and establish a more family oriented environment. With three year tour normalization, we could end the Assignment Incentive Pay program.

I have submitted a formal proposal to the Department of Defense recommending an endorsement to move to a normal three year accompanied tour policy in Korea, along with the opening of negotiations with the Republic of Korea regarding their assessment, and hopefully their support. It is under consideration. Endorsement of this proposal will provide our Servicemembers a better quality of life, strengthen the U.S-ROK Alliance, and send a powerful message to the nations of the area of America’s long-term commitment to stability and security in Northeast Asia.
VII. An Alliance for the Future

The U.S.-ROK Alliance is one of the greatest bilateral success stories in modern history with many chapters ahead. In 1950, the United Nations Command was created to defend the Republic of Korea when it was attacked by north Korea. In 1957, establishment of U.S. Forces Korea provided the command structure necessary to support the Alliance. In 1978, the Alliance underwent a major evolutionary change when we created the Combined Forces Command to provide a unified ROK and U.S. command structure. The Alliance evolved once again in 1994 when peacetime OPCON of ROK forces was transferred to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the transition of wartime OPCON to the ROK Joint Force Command in 2012, the United States and the Republic of Korea will enter a new era of cooperation, an era marked by a first-world Republic of Korea with military capabilities to match its stature. In a broader context, the Alliance will be key to maintaining and advancing U.S. national interests in this strategically vital region of the world. This is a natural evolution—one whose time has come both militarily and politically. We look forward to continuing this vital partnership—one that promotes freedom, democracy, and global free trade in Northeast Asia—throughout the 21st century and beyond.

I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians serving in the Republic of Korea who selflessly support the Alliance, and because of their presence, ensure regional stability. Your continued support for our Servicemembers and the U.S.-ROK Alliance is greatly appreciated. I know
you will agree that our young men and women in uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training environment, and we should do everything feasible to provide it. Thank you.