STATEMENT OF
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BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea–United States Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK). It is my distinct honor to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and their families who serve in the Republic of Korea. On behalf of these outstanding men and women who serve our country 8,000 miles from home, I thank you for your unwavering commitment to improving the quality of life of our Servicemembers and their families. Your support allows us to contribute to ensuring security on the Korean peninsula while promoting prosperity and stability in Northeast Asia. I appreciate this opportunity to present my assessment of the command and our plan for continued transformation of the Republic of Korea–United States Alliance.

Forged in war, this Alliance has preserved the peace, promoted democracy, and provided prosperity for the citizens of the Republic of Korea, and the region, for over five decades. The ROK–U.S. Alliance is more than a military relationship; it is a comprehensive and enduring partnership that promotes freedom, prosperity and democracy in the Northeast Asia region and the world. A new generation of South Korean leaders, cognizant of their national achievements, is eager to achieve what they see as a more equitable relationship with the United States. The United States supports this and is working with the Republic of Korea to evolve the Alliance to meet the requirements of the future security environment. We are transforming the
Alliance into one that is capable of meeting 21st century challenges and respects the needs and aspirations of both nations.

Currently, in wartime all forces in the Korea Theater of Operations, including Republic of Korea forces, are commanded by the U.S. led Combined Forces Command. Over the past few years and while remaining strong supporters of the Alliance, the Government of the Republic of Korea has expressed a firm desire to assume primary responsibility for its own defense, with the U.S. in more of a supporting role. The ROK Government views the command arrangements of the U.S. led Combined Forces Command as representing a level of infringement on their national sovereignty. The ROK Government expresses this desired defense policy in terms of "ROK Self Reliance." The United States agrees that, with the application of selected bridging strategies, the ROK Government and military are capable of assuming full command responsibility for their own forces in wartime, which will move the U.S. contribution to a key but supporting role.

Recently, our governments agreed to transition wartime operational command and control (OPCON) of ROK forces to the ROK military in 2012. This will result in the inactivation of the current U.S. led Combined Forces Command, and the establishment of a U.S. independent, complementary and supporting joint command in Korea. In the future, United States forces in Korea will be more air and naval centric, while continuing to support the superb ground forces of the Republic of Korea. I assess the Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea will be ready for this transition, and I am working closely with our Ally to make it
smoothly with no degradation to ROK security, while ensuring the ROK-U.S. Security Alliance remains strong and viable.

Transferring wartime OPCON of Republic of Korea forces to the Republic of Korea will open a new and positive chapter in the long and proud history of the Alliance. It will likely occur in a challenging security environment. North Korea continues to challenge international conventions and presents a clear threat to the region and the world. Emerging security dynamics on the peninsula and in the region, and north Korea’s attempts to divide the ROK–U.S. Alliance, reinforce the need for our strong Alliance. We will remain in South Korea as a trusted and reliable ally as long as we are welcome and wanted.

I. The Northeast Asia Security Environment

Northeast Asia is a dynamic region of economic might, varied cultures, and competing interests. The United States has significant long-term interests in Northeast Asia; namely, maintaining regional stability, fulfilling our commitments to friends and allies, promoting economic cooperation and promoting free market enterprise. The region accounted for approximately 24 percent of our nation’s total international trade for 2006. Stability in Northeast Asia is essential to the vitality of global and U.S. markets.

U.S. economic integration with Northeast Asia represents a positive reinforcement toward regional stability. Our military presence remains essential in a region that includes five of the world’s six largest militaries; three of the world’s proven nuclear powers, including the United States; and north Korea, which has violated its own agreements, international security norms and
standards, and continues to pose a proliferation threat. At the 38th Security Consultative Meeting in Washington D.C., the United States and the Republic of Korea condemned, in the strongest terms, north Korea’s 2006 nuclear test and missile launches. These overt provocations are a clear threat to international peace and security as well as the stability of the Korean Peninsula. The Alliance remains committed to the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of this issue as we continue to deter aggression and stand ready to defeat north Korean aggression.

II. North Korea Challenges Regional and Global Security

North Korea remains the key destabilizer in Northeast Asia. It continues to devote disproportionate resources (around 30% of its gross domestic product) to improving its asymmetric military capabilities and maintaining a large, forward-deployed conventional force. With little notice, these forces can conduct a wide spectrum of provocative acts or launch an attack, potentially resulting in a large number of casualties and significant destruction in a matter of days.

North Korea’s Strategy and Goals

Kim Jong-il repeatedly attempts to divide the ROK–U.S. Alliance in an effort to exploit any issues that emerge between the two governments and sew doubts about Alliance cohesion. Alternating these provocations with engagement overtures, in the past Kim Jong-il has allowed carefully controlled inter-Korean social and economic exchange, garnered financial benefits for his regime and offered only vague promises for future cooperation. Often emphasizing symbolism over substance, north Korea has projected a cooperative appearance for public consumption while taking only limited steps
toward denuclearization or reducing tensions. While the 13 February agreement
in Beijing is a positive step, and the ongoing Six-Party Talks continue to offer the
best route towards resolution of north Korea’s nuclear aspirations, north Korea’s
record of non-compliance with past agreements suggests a difficult road ahead.

Domestically, Kim Jong-il ensures internal stability by maintaining absolute
power. He perpetuates confrontation with Washington and the region to justify
his “military first” societal policy. His scarce resources are diverted to support the
military and regime elite at the expense of the general population. Although
reunification of the peninsula under north Korean control remains the primary
stated objective of the regime, Kim’s pervasive system of ideological, political,
and physical control aims to ensure the population presents no threats to his rule.

**North Korean Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs**

North Korea continues to develop and hone asymmetric military
capabilities as a deterrent and force-multiplier. It furthers nuclear weapons
programs as a political instrument to deter perceived threats to Kim Jong-il’s rule,
while offering an opportunity to coerce neighboring countries. Following its early
2005 declaration of a nuclear weapons capability, north Korea conducted its first
nuclear test on October 9, 2006. The device was low yield but significantly
raised tensions and concerns over the potential for additional tests, and north
Korean nuclear proliferation. Unless the Six-Party Talks process prevails, we
expect north Korea to continue nuclear weapons research and development to
perpetuate its strategy of intimidation. If the Six-Party Talks do not produce a
lasting settlement, the north Koreans will likely conduct a second and potentially additional nuclear tests when they see it as serving their purposes.

North Korea has continued to produce plutonium from spent fuel rods obtained from its Yongbyon nuclear facility in violation of its international agreements to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. North Korea claims weapons-grade plutonium was processed from spent fuel rods produced at the reactor over the last three years, and others stored at Yongbyon since 1994. If these claims are accurate, north Korea may now possess as much as 40 – 50 kg of plutonium, enough to produce several nuclear weapons. This reactor is not used for electrical power generation, but is used primarily for plutonium production.

In addition, north Korea is reported to be pursuing a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) weapons development program as an alternative route to nuclear weapons. An HEU program could provide weapons grade material even if north Korea agrees to halt plutonium processing. Without a diplomatic settlement, Pyongyang’s plutonium production capability and its reported HEU program places it on track to become a moderate nuclear power, potentially by the end of the decade.

The regime views its ballistic missile program as a source of international power and prestige, a strategic deterrent, a means of exerting regional influence, and a source of hard currency derived from exports. As a result, north Korea continues to design, develop, produce and proliferate ballistic missiles, and may ultimately aim to develop nuclear armed missiles to threaten regional countries,
and even the U.S. For example, north Korea is developing a new solid propellant short-range ballistic missile, which it last successfully test-fired in March 2006. Once operational, this missile will be more mobile, more rapidly deployable, and more capable of being launched on shorter notice than current systems. North Korea is also developing an intermediate range ballistic missile, capable of targeting U.S. forces as far away as Guam and possibly Alaska.

From 4-5 July, 2006 north Korea successfully launched six SCUD and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles. Its launch of the Taepo Dong 2 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) failed early in flight. These launches marked the highest number of missiles ever fired by north Korea in a 24-hour period. The No Dong launches were the first in 13 years. Some were fired in the hours of darkness – a first for the north Koreans. These launches validated the operational status of north Korea’s inventory of about 800 theater ballistic missiles targeting the Republic of Korea and Japan – intending to provoke regional tension.

The Taepo Dong 2 ICBM launch demonstrated north Korea’s abandonment of its seven-year, publicly-announced moratorium on longer-range missile development. It drew unanimous condemnation by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and further isolated Pyongyang from the international community. If north Korea’s missile research and development program continues on its present course, and if they meet an objective of developing a nuclear device small enough to be mated with an ICBM, they could eventually
field missiles capable of striking targets within the United States homeland with nuclear weapons.

North Korea’s sale of missiles and related technologies generates hard currency. It has aggressively marketed missile technology to developing countries throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, including Iran. North Korea will continue to design, develop, and produce ballistic missiles. The proliferation threat is real, demonstrated, and may not remain limited to conventional weapons. Given north Korea’s ballistic missile proliferation record, Pyongyang could also decide to proliferate nuclear weapons technology, expertise, or material to anti-American countries, rogue regimes or non-state actors.

**North Korean Conventional Military Programs**

North Korea continues to emphasize its Special Operations Force (SOF) capabilities maintaining the largest force in the world with an estimated strength of over 80,000. Its personnel are chosen for political reliability, loyalty, are among the most highly trained north Korean troops, and have high priority for food and other resources. North Korea’s SOF has significant capability to infiltrate the ROK and can conduct asymmetric attacks against a variety of targets. South Korea is particularly vulnerable to these type attacks, given its heavily urbanized and dense population of 49 million citizens living vertically in large cities.

The north Korean People’s Army is the fourth largest in the world. Though their equipment is aging and unsophisticated, it is forward deployed and remains
capable of launching devastating attacks with little warning. Two hundred fifty long range artillery systems can easily fire on Seoul, a metropolitan area of over 20 million people, from their current positions. Over 60 percent of north Korean ground forces are situated within 100 miles of Seoul.

North Korean conventional forces have some significant challenges. Even with its "military first" policy and the extraordinary commitment of over 30% of the nation’s GDP to the military, economic difficulties have had a debilitating impact on training levels and conventional force readiness over the past decade. It does not enjoy the military support that it once did from either China or Russia. It is doubtful the north Korean military in its current state could sustain offensive operations against the South.

**North Korean Threat Outlook**

North Korea will continue to pose a threat to regional and global security until it changes its fundamental strategy. There is no indication the regime will curtail its efforts to split the ROK–U.S. Alliance, reduce disproportionate military spending, halt destabilizing illicit activities, or loosen its stranglehold on the north Korean people. Kim Jong-il has the option to continue to manipulate the international community by alternating provocations and engagement overtures in an attempt to shape the political and military environment to meet his objectives. It is because of this threat that during this year’s Security Consultative Meeting in Washington, the United States reaffirmed its long standing commitment to continue, among other capabilities, to extend to the Republic of Korea the security of our nuclear umbrella.
Another regional security threat is the risk of an internal north Korean domestic crisis. This is unlikely in my judgment; however, an internal crisis could trigger regime and north Korean instability or even potentially collapse. An implosion of the regime would almost certainly bring devastating consequences such as a bloody internal conflict, humanitarian crisis, mass refugees, or even loss of control over nuclear materials. Without a diplomatic breakthrough, north Korea will remain a threat to stability and security in Northeast Asia and to global security for the foreseeable future.

III. The Republic of Korea - United States Alliance

The ROK–U.S. Alliance has remained stalwart in its mutual and enduring commitment to peninsular and regional security. The Armed Forces of both nations are in the midst of an unprecedented transformation and realignment. By transferring appropriate roles and missions to the ROK military and consolidating U.S. forces into centralized hubs, we are improving our overall combined readiness and expanding the capabilities of ROK and U.S. forces to counter current and future threats.

The Republic of Korea Today

Over the course of the Alliance’s half-century of economic and security cooperation, the Republic of Korea has emerged as a vibrant democracy, first class economic power (by many measures the tenth largest economy in the world), and a major U.S. economic partner. Economic growth is fueled by global exports of innovative high technology and consumer goods. The ROK ranks as
the U.S.’s seventh-largest trading partner, seventh-largest export market, and is an important investment location for American companies.

The South Korean government views a nuclear armed north Korea as an intolerable threat, and that a catastrophic collapse in the north would have extremely adverse consequences in the South. However, ROK perceptions of the north Korean conventional threat vary, especially among younger generations. As memories of American sacrifices in the Korean War fade, Korean citizens, seeking what they see as a more equal Alliance relationship question the importance of our long-standing Alliance. Many raise the issue of ROK sovereignty, and a desire for what they characterize as more self-reliance and independence. These generations, while not necessarily anti-American, have strong political views which are increasingly expressed in national policy.

In its final year in office, the Roh administration’s approach to inter-Korean relations is guided by its “Peace and Prosperity” policy, which primarily aims to further inter-Korean rapprochement through humanitarian assistance, family reunions, tourism, and trade. Seoul promotes gradual economic integration and reconciliation to provide the catalyst for a formal peace agreement replacing the Armistice Agreement. The United States supports this approach. However, the U.S. is concerned over the potential for aid, trade and salaries to be used for purposes other than those intended. Recent north Korean missile launches and the nuclear test delivered a major blow to the Roh administration’s policies. Regardless, we do not assess that there will be a major shift in South Korean policies as a result of the upcoming 2007 Presidential election process.
**ROK–U.S. Alliance Today**

For the past several years, the United States and the Republic of Korea have been engaged in a formal process to evolve the Alliance to meet the demands of the future security environment. The Departments of Defense and State, as well as the ROK Ministries of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and Trade, are conducting an ongoing dialogue on issues related to Alliance modernization and the realignment of U.S. forces in Korea. Consultations began with the Future of the Alliance talks, were succeeded by the ROK–U.S. Security Policy Initiative, and have led to agreements on the enhancement of our combined defense, deterrent capabilities, and transfer of wartime OPCON of ROK forces from Combined Forces Command to the ROK military.

These agreements have now entered the implementation phase. To support the realignment of U.S. forces, the ROK has committed significant resources to acquiring land for the relocation of our current Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, and the 2nd Infantry Division (2ID) north of Seoul under the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). This has not been politically easy and the efforts of the ROK Government and Ministry of National Defense deserve recognition. Under the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and the LPP and in accordance with our ROK-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the U.S. returns vacated camp facilities, capital investments and land free to the Korean Government, while consolidating into two main hubs south of Seoul. When completed, we will have returned 59 camps and all their facilities and buildings to the ROK, including 109 acres in the middle of Seoul. Thus far, 30 camps have been returned. After
consolidating and transforming, our forces will be in a much better position to support ROK defense and U.S. national interests. Additionally, our Servicemembers and their families will also enjoy needed and greatly increased quality of life.

**ROK Defense Initiatives**

The Republic of Korea is committed to increasing its defense capabilities in a range of materiel, communications and computers, and weapons procurement areas. Under its Defense Reform Plan 2020, the ROK has invested over $10 billion in capabilities modernization in the past three years. The ROK military aims to develop a self-reliant, technology oriented, qualitative defense force that remains strongly allied with the United States.

The Republic of Korea’s Ministry of National Defense has requested an average defense budget increase of 11% per year until 2015 followed by an average increase of 9% until 2020. While the ROK defense budget has not met these annual goals yet (the increase in 2006 was about 9% of the desired 11%), the ROK Government is indeed effectively increasing their annual investment in military preparedness. The ROK National Assembly passed a reform bill aimed at reducing total force levels, overhauling the command and control structure, and fielding high-tech weaponry. The force reductions will take place over the next 13 years and will reduce overall (active and reserve) forces from about 3.7 million to about 2 million – a cut of 46%. In this, the total Army (active and reserve) ground force reduction will be about 45%. Additionally, the ROK Government has initiated a reduction in the length of service for its conscript
Army, from 2 years to 1 1/2 years. Successful ROK execution of Defense Reform Plan 2020 will require long term legislative and budgetary support from the ROK government. Additionally and as long as the Alliance has the responsibility to deter and if necessary defeat the substantial north Korean threat, close coordination of the ROK Defense Reform Plan 2020 with the United States through Alliance consultative processes will be necessary. As the ROK-US Combined Forces Command Commander, it is my assessment that ROK troop reductions and changes in conscription laws must not negatively impact the Command's deterrence and warfighting capability on the Korean Peninsula against the postured threat.

**Transfer of Wartime Operational Control**

Given the advanced military and economic capability of the Republic of Korea, the next logical phase in the maturation of the ROK–U.S. Alliance is for the Republic of Korea to assume the primary responsibility for their own defense. The United States views this effort as an affirmation of the tremendous success of the Alliance since the end of the Korean War, and fully supports this change. U.S. and ROK civilian and military leaders have been discussing wartime OPCON transfer for nearly two decades as part of the normal progression of the Alliance. This is a natural evolution – one whose time has come both militarily and politically. Transitioning the Alliance to a new ROK-led military command and control structure in 2012 with U.S. and UN forces in doctrinally supporting roles will establish relationships that best serve both nations’ interests and are well suited for the long-term. The United States desires that our future force
contributions leverage our extremely quick reacting and readily available potent air and naval capability, while supporting the superb ROK Army ground forces to counter north Korean aggression. In transitioning to a doctrinally “supporting to supported” military relationship, the Commander of United States Forces Korea will maintain uninterrupted national command over all U.S. Forces.

The United States and the Republic of Korea have also reached agreement on the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. This was achieved during the January 2006 inaugural session of the Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership ministerial-level talks between the United States Secretary of State and the Republic of Korea Foreign Minister on bilateral, regional, and global issues of mutual interest. The agreement has two basic tenets: the Republic of Korea supports the strategic flexibility of United States forces in Korea, and the United States respects the Republic of Korea’s position that it shall not be involved in a regional conflict against the Korean people’s will. The transfer of wartime OPCON reinforces these principles as the Republic of Korea assumes the lead responsibility for its defense, and the United States, in a supporting role, becomes more agile and flexible.

Allied Burden Sharing

With the Republic of Korea’s tremendous economic capacity and prominence in the international community, a balanced defense burden sharing arrangement in support of United States forces in Korea is fundamental to the strength of the Alliance. Today, the Republic of Korea contributes approximately 2.6% of its GDP to its national defense, while the United States expends around
3.9% for our defense. At the end of 2006, the Republic of Korea and the United States concluded talks on a new Special Measures Agreement (SMA) regarding ROK cost sharing support of United States forces in Korea for 2007-2008.

In principle, both sides agreed to the goal of reaching an equitable level of cost sharing. The United States believes that to achieve equitable levels, the two allied nations should contribute approximately 50% each of the non-personnel stationing costs (NPSC) for U.S. forces in Korea. To date, the Korean Government burden sharing contribution to assist the U.S. in military stationing costs has been below this 50-50 ratio; the 2006 SMA contribution represented only 38% of the NPSC. For 2007, the ROK agreed to provide 725.5 Billion Won ($770M) as a direct contribution and to increase its level in 2008 with the rise in the 2006 Consumer Price Index (CPI). The ROK 2007 SMA contribution represents 41% of our NPSC, still short of the principle of equitable 50-50 cost sharing. As a result of SMA burden sharing shortfalls, we are forced to stretch limited funding. I cannot allow readiness to suffer, and I will not allow the quality of life of my Servicemembers or families to suffer. Without more equitable allied SMA funding, we may be forced to recommend a range of fiscal measures to the U.S. government, including a review of base relocation and consolidation plans.

Clearly, defense burden sharing is advantageous to both Alliance partners. For the United States, the Republic of Korea’s willingness to equitably share appropriate defense costs is a clear indicator that United States forces in Korea are welcome, wanted, and held necessary by our host. For the Republic of Korea, an appropriate SMA investment gives them the presence and
capabilities of the U.S. military. Additionally, 100 percent of ROK SMA burden sharing contributions are returned directly into the Korean economy by paying the salaries of Korean USFK local national employees, Korean contractors and service agents, and Korean construction firms. ROK contributions for the past four years represent shortfalls that USFK has struggled to absorb by reducing expenditures while maintaining readiness.

**Republic of Korea’s Support to Global and Regional Security**

The Republic of Korea continues to superbly assist United States’ efforts to promote global and regional security as an active partner in the Global War on Terrorism; to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and to participate in United Nations’ peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief missions. Since 2002, for example, the Republic of Korea has contributed millions of dollars in aid for reconstruction and deployed contingents of troops to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In December 2006, the Republic of Korea’s National Assembly approved a third, one-year extension of its force commitment to Iraq through 2007, although their force will reduce to 1200 troops. Support to Afghanistan includes providing a 58-person medical unit, a 147-person engineer construction unit, and other military assistance worth millions of dollars. Last, the ROK is deploying an important 350 Soldier contingent to the UN peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. The Republic of Korea has been a steadfast and committed Ally in supporting U.S. and UN operations worldwide. We applaud our ally’s efforts in this regard, and thank them.
In May 2003, the President of the United States introduced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a measure to enhance international efforts to prevent the flow of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air, and at sea. To date, over 75 countries have expressed support for this initiative and the U.S. has requested that the Republic of Korea fully adopt the provisions of the PSI. The Roh administration announced that it supports the principles of the PSI and would cooperate on a case-by-case basis. With north Korea posing such a significant proliferation threat, it is the United States’ desire that the Republic of Korea fully participate in this initiative.

IV. Ensuring Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula

Executing the transfer of wartime OPCON of ROK forces to the ROK military in 2012 will result in the U.S. shifting its command and control structure from the Combined Forces Command framework to a new structure. North Korean aggression on the peninsula will be met by a fierce ROK military supported by American “life-of-the Alliance” air and naval centric combat power, and “bridging” capabilities including; command, control, communication, computers (C4), intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), logistics, theater missile defense (TMD), and other capabilities, including appropriate ground power. This evolution provides a stronger and more complementary Alliance that is better organized to meet ROK security needs and our mutual interests in the region.
Readiness

As Commander of Combined Forces Command, readiness is my first priority. It is achieved through a robust training, exercise, and evaluation program, adequate funding for sustainment, maintenance and logistics, and the modernization of our capabilities. In order to be ready and continue to deter aggression on the peninsula, our training must evolve and keep pace with the transformation of our military structure. USFK faces challenges in training range and airspace access. Facilities for our air and naval forces exist but scheduling and allocation must be improved to fully support combat readiness requirements. We need access to a modern and instrumented air to ground bombing range. The ROK military is working hard to provide such a range and we appreciate their efforts. Current ground maneuver training facilities are impacted by expanding civilian encroachment. These issues must be resolved in order to meet current and future training requirements.

Continued support for our capabilities enhancements is also critical to our readiness. We have made meaningful progress with several of our key focus areas for modernization: joint C4, ISR, TMD, prepositioned equipment, logistics, and counter-fire and precision munitions.

Training / Exercises

Today, the theater-level exercises – ULCHI-FOCUS LENS (UFL); Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI); and FOAL EAGLE collectively train over 400,000 Republic of Korea and United States active and reserve component personnel in the critical tasks essential to
deterring, and if necessary, defeating north Korean aggression. These command post and field training exercises use battle simulation technologies to train senior leaders in 21st Century battle command. Combat enablers, such as C4 and Intelligence (C4I), provide the Collaborative Information Environment to plan, execute, and assess effects from distributed locations, allowing the Combined Forces Command to see, understand, assess and act to dominate the battlespace.

UFL focuses on effects based operations, C4I, and dominant maneuver theater of war skills. The goal of RSOI is to improve our ability to rapidly reinforce and sustain operations in the Korean theater. FOAL EAGLE is a tactical-level exercise that hones warfighting and interoperability skills. These exercises, supplemented by subordinate command training programs, ensure that the Alliance remains ready and capable to deter north Korean aggression.

**C4 and ISR**

Continued modernization of C4 and ISR capabilities is crucial for the future of the Alliance. An advance in these areas greatly improves our ability to gather, integrate, apply and share information, optimizing the way we fight. Timely and accurate information is a decisive element of combat power. United States and ROK forces have implemented programs to improve their C4 capabilities. These upgrades will enable parallel planning for all Combined Forces Command and United States Forces Korea units as well as other friendly forces. In order to leverage these advances, full coordination and implementation is required to ensure interoperability and survivability at all
command levels. Current initiatives in coalition interoperability seek to extend a seamless command and control capability throughout the theater that will greatly improve multi-national information sharing capability, yet maintain a viable U.S.-only capability link with our command authorities.

Synchronized intelligence operations are critical to any Alliance / Coalition effort. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center in Korea (JIOC-K) is conducting a comprehensive review of roles, missions and functions including national, joint, and coalition responsibilities for collection, exploitation and dissemination. The transformational objective for JIOC-K is focused with a purpose to fully integrate and enhance the means to quickly detect, identify and report on provocative acts, combat preparations, and indicators of potential north Korean regime instability. Long standing ISR requirements exist for Global Hawk, Predator and the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). USFK also faces shortfalls in signals and human intelligence collection capabilities. Fulfilling these requirements will improve situational awareness and warning time which is critical to our defense posture and force protection.

In September 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence validated the theater’s National Intelligence Support Plan which clearly identified the shortfalls and agency requirements to address them. Congressional support to address and eliminate these shortfalls is essential to ensure the theater is well positioned to execute its national responsibilities for strategic warning, to support our ROK and U.S. warfighters, and support regional stability operations. I view
this commitment essential to the effective transfer of wartime OPCON to the ROK.

The Republic of Korea is planning to acquire important C4 and ISR capabilities for its assumption of wartime OPCON. Once operational, these capabilities will improve the Republic of Korea’s ability to make critical crisis and combat decisions.

**Theater Missile Defense**

North Korea’s missile tests of July 2006 highlighted the importance of an active theater missile defense system. It is both prudent and necessary for the Republic of Korea and the United States to enter into discussions regarding appropriate commitments and enhancements that each nation should pursue regarding ballistic missile defense on the peninsula. The U.S. will continue to protect its capability to conduct reception, staging, onward movement, and integration in support of the Alliance under our contingency plans. The Republic of Korea must purchase and field its own TMD system, capable of full integration with the U.S. system. The regional missile threat from north Korea requires an active ROK missile defense capability to protect its critical command capabilities and personnel.

PAC-3 Patriot Missile System upgrades and improved munitions have significantly enhanced our posture. To protect critical United States facilities in Korea, we must complete upgrading the remainder of our systems with advanced TMD capabilities. Continued production of PAC-3 missiles in the near-term, followed by continued development of the Theater High Altitude Air Defense,
Airborne Laser, and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense will provide the layered missile defense capability we require for the future. Your continued support remains essential to these and other Service component programs that protect our forces on peninsula and sustain our ability to reinforce South Korea in the event of a crisis.

**War Reserve Materiel**

Logistically supporting United States Forces Korea is a complex, multi-faceted undertaking. The proximity of the north Korean threat coupled with the long distances from United States sustainment bases requires a robust and responsive logistics system. The capability enhancements currently programmed will significantly improve our core logistics functions through modern pre-positioned equipment, responsive strategic transportation, and logistics tracking systems.

Our Joint Force Support Component Command (JFSCC) is an initiative to achieve unity of effort in U.S. logistics. It is a single, unified logistics command that directs and integrates our logistics efforts across the joint community. The JFSCC demonstrated its value during UFL 2006 and RSOI 2006 and 2007. We are on track to reach full operational capability following UFL 2007. My ultimate goal is to achieve the ability to bridge gaps between U.S. and ROK logistics capabilities and unify allied logistics, particularly once wartime OPCON is transferred.

Pre-positioned equipment sets, which include critical weapons systems, preferred munitions, repair parts, and essential supplies, are vital to rapid power
projection to reinforce the Korean theater. Of note, USFK leadership took an aggressive approach in 2005 to improve the readiness of Army Pre-positioned Stocks in Korea. The Army Materiel Command significantly increased their workforce for these stocks and ensured all equipment in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team met readiness standards. Headquarters, Department of the Army expects to reach 100 percent Equipment On Hand – up from 78 percent – for our Heavy Brigade Combat Team by June 2007. However, sustainment shortages still exist and can only be overcome through increasing the priority of fill for Army Pre-positioned Stocks and the commitment of additional funding.

**Strategic Lift**

Responsive strategic transportation – fast sealift ships and cargo aircraft – remains crucial to rapidly reinforce the Korean theater and sustain United States forces. Equally important is the ability to maintain in-transit visibility of supplies and equipment with a modernized joint logistics C4 and information system. Lessons from Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM have highlighted several areas where relatively small investments in asset tracking systems and theater distribution yield significant efficiencies and improve the overall effectiveness of our logistics systems.

**Preferred Munitions**

Counterfire and precision strike are core requirements for all of our contingency plans. These enablers allow us to change the dynamics of a conflict and rapidly achieve campaign objectives. Increasing the forward stocks of
preferred munitions is vital to operational success in the Korean theater. Our priority ordnance requirements include: the GPS-guided Multiple Launch Rocket System with extended range capability; a ground-launched, extended range, all weather capability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs); precision guided munitions; and air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. Your continued support to these programs provides the overmatching capabilities to buttress our deterrence.

**War Reserve Stocks Allies – Korea**

We anticipate beginning negotiations on the War Reserve Stocks Allies – Korea (WRSA-K) program in 2007. Recent legislation permits the U.S. to offer, for sale or concession, surplus ammunition and military equipment to the ROK. The sale of these munitions will reduce the U.S. stockpile maintenance burden and encourages the ROK to continue toward its stated goal of a self-reliant defense posture.

V. United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and United States Forces Korea

The United Nations Command, the Combined Forces Command, and the United States Forces Korea provide dominant military capabilities to maintain the 1953 Armistice Agreement, deter any provocation and deter escalation that could destabilize the region. The forces of these commands provide a potent, integrated team that is trained and ready.
United Nations Command

As the longest standing peace enforcement coalition in the history of the United Nations, the United Nations Command represents the international community's enduring commitment to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula. With fifteen current member nations and the ROK, the United Nations Command actively supervises compliance with the terms of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement fulfilling the members’ mutual pledge to “fully and faithfully carry out the terms” of the Armistice. UNC will provide a unified and prompt response to preserve the security of the ROK if there is a north Korean attack. With exclusive authority south of the Military Demarcation Line for the maintenance of the Armistice, the UNC meets with the north Korean People’s Army representatives, inspects South Korean units positioned along the DMZ, and conducts investigations into alleged Armistice violations to prevent minor incidents from escalating into destabilizing crises.

As we move towards transfer of wartime OPCON to the ROK military, there is one UNC issue that we must address. In the current arrangement, the UNC Commander is ultimately responsible for Armistice maintenance, crisis management and resolving Armistice violations. However, the ROK military already provides security and surveillance over the entire Demilitarized Zone. As the UNC Commander, I do not have “peacetime” OPCON – no command authority – over the ROK military. This creates a mismatch between military authority and responsibility. This mismatch is currently mitigated through my dual-hat status as CFC Commander. However, this mismatch cannot be
mitigated once the transfer of wartime OPCON is completed, as the U.S. commander will have no ability to command and control ROK forces – the very forces that are arrayed along the DMZ – in peacetime, crisis escalation, or war.

As the executive agent for the United Nations Command, the United States will continue to work with the Republic of Korea and the UN Sending States to ensure that the future arrangement – after wartime OPCON transfer – takes into account the realities of the new command structure. It is our goal to transfer or delegate appropriate armistice authorities and responsibilities to the Republic of Korea, while ensuring that the United Nations Command remains a critical command in deterring aggression, and supporting combat operations should war break out on the peninsula. We must also maintain the United Nations - Japan Status of Forces Agreement, which provides throughput access to critical Japanese air and naval bases for U.S. and UN forces, should crisis escalate and war break out.

**Combined Forces Command**

Since its inception nearly 30 years ago in 1978, the Combined Forces Command has been the warfighting command of the Republic of Korea - United States Alliance. Through authority based on the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, the CFC provides the cornerstone of deterrence against north Korean aggression, and if deterrence fails, stands ready to win decisively. Vigilant and well trained, the Combined Forces Command is the most powerful combined warfighting alliance in the world today. As the commander of CFC, I respond equally to both Alliance partners, the United States and the Republic of Korea.
There are an array of effective Alliance mechanisms which allow the two allies to coordinate and consult on military matters during peace or wartime.

We are committed to achieving the goal of a ROK-led defense structure. Doing so requires a reshaping of the ROK–U.S. military partnership in a manner that will strengthen our nations’ relationship while facilitating the Republic of Korea’s predominant role in its own defense. We have agreed to transition our relationship in 2012 from a shared operational control system under our combined headquarters (CFC), to independent, parallel national command systems where the U.S. assumes a doctrinally supporting role to the Republic of Korea military. CFC will be disestablished. Our Combined Implementation Working Group has been charged with developing the construct under which the Alliance will function after wartime OPCON of ROK forces has transferred to the ROK.

We are confident that the overall U.S. security posture in the Asia Pacific region, coupled with the improvements in ROK capabilities as well as significant U.S. capabilities on the peninsula, will enable OPCON transfer to occur with no degradation to the Alliance deterrence mission. The Republic of Korea is also enhancing its military capabilities as it continues to field and upgrade its fleet of K1A1 tanks and multiple launch rocket systems. Additionally, it plans to purchase upgraded Guided Missile Destroyers with enhanced communications and surface to air capabilities; four Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft; and enhance its own theater missile defense posture with the Patriot missile system. The Republic of Korea’s new naval base for their 3rd Fleet is also
operational and includes a recently completed pier capable of handling U.S. nuclear powered aircraft carriers.

The transformation of the Alliance makes it essential that we continue to expand our capabilities and revise operational concepts. Simultaneous maneuvers, parallel planning, effective coordination, effects-based operations, and asymmetrical maneuvers all conducted in a dynamic battlespace will improve the lethality of our future Alliance military operations.

**United States Forces Korea**

We are focused on maintaining proper capabilities on the peninsula. Our assessment is that ROK forces are capable of defending the Republic of Korea, but that U.S. support is a critical enabler to that defense.

In 2004, the United States and Republic of Korea governments agreed to the reduction of 12,500 personnel from United States Forces Korea over a five-year period beginning in 2004. Between 2004 and 2005 we reduced 8,000 troops, including the deployment of the 2d Infantry Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Iraq which was subsequently relocated to Fort Carson, Colorado.

We continue to make progress in re-aligning U.S. forces in Korea. In late 2004, the Yongsan Relocation Plan was signed and ratified. Under that agreement, U.S. force elements assigned to the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul will relocate to Camp Humphreys, near Pyongtaek, over 60 kilometers southwest of Seoul. The relocation of the Second Infantry Division is also part of the realignment plan which, when complete, will allow United States forces to assume a more efficient and less intrusive footprint within two hubs of enduring
installations. Relocation will significantly improve the quality of life of our Servicemembers, while returning valuable land to the citizens of the Republic of Korea.

To date, we have closed 36 installations encompassing over 16,700 acres with a tax assessed value of over $500 million and returned 30 installations to the Republic of Korea. Along with these camps and in accordance with our SOFA agreement, we have transferred free to the Republic of Korea the full range of buildings, capital assets, and improvements found on these camps, many built with U.S. appropriated funds. It remains our goal to close a total of 59 facilities and areas – two thirds of all land granted us under the SOFA Agreement, totaling more than 38,000 acres.

In exchange for the return of the majority of our dispersed camps, the Republic of Korea, per our agreements, has purchased 2,800 acres of land required to expand the Army's Camp Humphreys and the Air Force's Osan Air Base. It is also in the process of purchasing more than 250 acres at the Air Force's Kunsan Air Base to accommodate relocation efforts there. We have awarded a contract to develop the first 205 acres at Camp Humphreys for the Army's FY07 construction program. Sustained funding for our military construction projects, particularly Army construction, coupled with sufficient host nation-funded construction by the Republic of Korea, is crucial for this plan to remain on track.

As a vital component of our construction programs, the Army is pursuing a range of build-to-lease family and senior officer / NCO quarters to be sited at the
Camp Humphreys facility. Army forces cannot displace to Camp Humphreys until these units are completed. To begin build-to-lease construction, the Army needs to gain legislative approval for lease authority that provides for the appropriate level of purchasing power that is essential to the success of the Army build-to-lease program.

**Achieving Normalcy for United States Forces Korea**

We are approaching 54 years since the signing of the Armistice Agreement in Korea. In 54 years, South Korea has transformed from a war ravaged country to one of the most modern, progressive, democratic and free countries in the world. South Korea is a top flight first world country, and highly competitive with the most advanced economies in the world. Their medical system is world class, their universities renowned, and their industries / businesses are credited with superb worldwide innovation and reliability. Historically, the United States was willing and anxious to face down the Soviet Union in Europe with full family accompanied tours authorized. We willingly took this risk in the face of over a hundred divisions of enemy forces equipped with hundreds of tactical and theater nuclear weapons. My son was born 12 kilometers across an inter-zonal border from several Soviet divisions. Unfortunately in a modern and vibrant Republic of Korea, we still rotate Servicemembers in and out annually as though this remained an active combat zone. We only authorize 2,900 of our current 29,000 Servicemember force (10%) to bring their families to Korea. We need to initially double this, then over time provide the facilities and infrastructure to authorize full accompanied tours
for the entire force. Korea is one theater where rotational forces and individual short tour rotational Servicemembers do not serve our national interests as effectively as we need.

By continuing to execute a one year rotational force policy in Korea, we are contributing to several debilitating realities. First, we are needlessly separating our families from their Servicemembers – Servicemembers who are already relentlessly rotating from their bases in the United States and Europe to repeated combat tours. Given the nature of the Global War on Terrorism, most political - military analysts predict that the U.S. military will continue rotational commitments to combat zones for years to come. We are needlessly contributing to increased rotational turbulence by continuing short tour rotations in a modern Korea.

Next, we are complicating the opportunity to develop deep and lasting cultural ties with our ally, the South Koreans. While strong and enduring, our Alliance with South Korea has been under some level of stress for the past several years. Some analysts attribute this to individual unaccompanied U.S. Servicemembers coming and going annually, never having a real opportunity to engage at the family level with their Korean counterpart citizenry. As individuals, we are pretty much isolated on our base camps. Last, we negatively impact readiness and spend too much permanent change of station (PCS) money rotating our troops each year. The annual rotation ensures that we have a less ready force than we should have. We need to keep troops, leaders, and
commanders in position as long as reasonable – three years, and we can decidedly save money by extending tours and lessening PCS costs for the force.

With about 2% of the active military force committed to service in Korea, the United States can easily afford to do what is right and endorse normal three year accompanied tours in Korea, much like we endorse in Japan. I strongly and indeed passionately seek Congressional support for transitioning to normal three year command sponsored family accompanied tours for our American force in Korea. While there will be some expense which we will amortize over time, our Korean ally will shoulder a significant amount of the required investment in capital assets, through the Special Measures Burden Sharing Agreement and Yongsan Relocation Plan.

Having spent 14 years of my military service overseas in Korea, Europe, and the Middle East, living and working in both accompanied and unaccompanied environments, it is my best judgment and recommendation that for the health of our alliances and the nation's engagement strategy, a commitment to a reasonable level of normal accompanied tours overseas is decidedly in the best interests of the United States. I will soon submit formal proposals to the Department of Defense in pursuit of this policy. If and when the budget proposals to resource this policy formally arrive in front of Congress, our Servicemembers and their families would deeply appreciate your favorable consideration and support. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will measurably benefit.
Ensuring Equitable Pay

Major improvements have been made in pay disparity in the Republic of Korea. For the first time in over 50 years of the Alliance, a Cost of Living Allowance was authorized in 2003. Additionally, the Army and the Air Force implemented the Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) Program, authorizing a cash incentive for Servicemembers who are willing to extend their tours in Korea. So far, over 16,000 Soldiers and Airmen have volunteered for AIP, saving the Department of Defense over $78 million in permanent change of station costs. Following the great success of the Army and Air Force AIP programs, in January 2006, the Navy implemented this program for its sailors. The combined effect of reduced permanent change of station costs and increased stabilization is a win-win situation. However, while AIP has been a major success, for our unaccompanied Servicemembers (90% of the force), accepting AIP means longer separations from family back in the States. Nonetheless, the AIP program is a superb success and your continued support will help improve the stability, predictability, and operational readiness of our force.

Upgrading and Building New Infrastructure

The relocation of United States Forces Korea to two enduring hubs will provide the long-term infrastructure that is required to maintain a persistent presence on the peninsula. As we move forward with our overall construction master plan we must also continue to maintain our existing facilities until construction is completed. Your support of our Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization Program requirements, supplemented by host nation
contributions, will allow us to complete our infrastructure renewal program to enhance our force protection posture and the quality of life for our personnel. The President’s Fiscal Year 2008 budget request includes Service military construction projects that are essential to our forces in Korea, and critical to the execution of our overall theater master plan.

The challenge the Services face in recapitalizing their infrastructure in Korea is substantial and we continue to work with them to prioritize this requirement. Our facilities and infrastructure are old, particularly Army facilities: over one-third of the buildings in the command are between 25 and 50 years old and another one-third are classified as temporary structures. Due to historically insufficient Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization by the Services, many buildings have deferred maintenance, contributing to their continual deterioration. Our annual allocations for sustainment funding have been about 50 percent of requirements, while restoration and modernization funding has been much less. A robust Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization profile for each of the Services is absolutely essential if we are to maximize the appropriated military construction dollars we receive. Without the investment to sustain, restore, and modernize our facilities, our Servicemembers, especially Army Soldiers, will be perpetually relegated to live and work in run-down, dilapidated, patched-up facilities.

Many of our Servicemembers continue to live in extremely substandard housing, whether in military facilities or in crowded urban areas outside our installations. Our realignment to two enduring hubs will allow us to focus on
improving living and working conditions. To this end, sustained access to several different funding programs will be essential, including United States military construction, host nation-funded construction, and commercial build-to-lease programs.

The Services are working towards achieving the Department of Defense’s goal to house all unaccompanied USFK Servicemembers in adequate installation housing as soon as possible. The Army and Air Force are using military construction to build unaccompanied housing facilities at the Army's Camp Humphreys, and the Air Force’s Osan and Kunsan Air Bases. In addition, we recently completed two host nation-funded construction projects in our southeast hub to provide adequate barracks space for our Marines and Sailors assigned to Camp Mu Juk in Pohang. To improve the unaccompanied senior enlisted and officer quarters, the Army has contracted a commercial build-to-lease project at K-16 Air Base and plans similar projects at Camp Humphreys.

For FY08, the Army is requesting $57 million in military construction funds to build two additional barracks complexes at Camp Humphreys. I strongly support these projects as essential and request your support.

I am particularly supportive of the Army's requirement to meet our national commitments in realigning Army forces from Seoul and north of Seoul. For example, the Army is pursuing build-to-lease opportunities to meet housing requirements at Camp Humphreys. Build-to-lease provides a quality, cost effective housing option and I strongly support the Army’s pursuit of this effort to leverage private capital. Our current lease cap authority does not allow us to
keep pace with the high cost housing market in Korea. The Army is aggressively seeking your support to ensure that our lease cap authority delivers the appropriate purchasing power to enable the build-to-lease program to succeed. I strongly support the Army's efforts to meet our housing requirements, and also ask for your favorable and expeditious approval of our legislative proposal to establish the necessary lease cap authority for build-to-lease. Continued support for family housing construction in Korea through commercial build-to-lease projects will help ensure quality housing for all our Servicemembers’ families. Again, this program is essential to the Army's efforts to relocate Army forces from north of and in Seoul to south of Seoul, and supports national agreements the U.S government has concluded with the Republic of Korea. Unless we receive timely approval for lease cap authority adjustments, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to synchronize its construction program in Korea with ongoing burden sharing building efforts by the Korean Government on our behalf.

**Good Neighbor Program and Mandatory Theater Specific Required Training**

The Good Neighbor Program is a USFK hallmark for fostering harmonious relations between our Servicemembers and the Republic of Korea citizenry. The key pillars include community relations programs, Korean cultural awareness programs and ROK–U.S. military-to-military activities. Some examples include: Servicemembers and their families teaching English to Korean children, volunteering in orphanages, and assisting with humanitarian projects and conservation efforts; Korean families inviting Servicemembers to their homes to
experience Korean hospitality and participate in cultural tours; and commanders hosting local government officials to orient them to the military mission. It is our hope that the Good Neighbor Program will improve the understanding and support of the Korean community for the strategic mission of USFK and effectively demonstrate the respect of USFK Servicemembers for the laws, history, culture, and customs of the Republic of Korea. If we are authorized to increase our family accompanied tours, the effectiveness of the Good Neighbor Program will increase dramatically.

In addition to the Good Neighbor Program, USFK instituted a Mandatory Theater Specific Required Training program for all arriving personnel to the ROK. This training – for example in personnel safety, prostitution and human trafficking, and sexual assault – not only facilitates accomplishment of our assigned missions, but also ensures that Servicemembers conduct themselves in a manner that is compatible with and respectful of ROK culture and law. Commanders are responsible for validating the completion of all required theater specific training.

**Safety**

Our well-being is a function of safe training and personal conduct. While we recognize that we operate in a hazardous military environment, units that aggressively embrace risk management and personal intervention with their Servicemembers routinely have superb safety records. The majority of our serious accidents, incidents and deaths occur during off-duty periods. This fact requires the chain of command to aggressively engage with its individual
Servicemembers, and positively impact their personal behavior. At USFK, we call this process “Under the Oak Tree Counseling” through which first line supervisors gain a verbal behavior contract with their subordinates before each lengthy off-duty period. Through the combined efforts of our men and women, we employ appropriate safety measures to ensure that all members stationed in the Republic of Korea can go about their daily lives knowing that we have done everything possible to safeguard and protect them. I expect commanders to empower subordinates while holding them accountable for the safety of their Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines.

**Prostitution, Human Trafficking, and Sexual Assault**

United States Forces Korea has zero tolerance for prostitution and human trafficking (P&HT). To ensure members are fully aware of our policies regarding P&HT, the command has initiated a four-pronged approach focusing on awareness, identification, reduction and enforcement. This initiative has had a positive effect for the command. In January 2006, a Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (IG) team visited USFK as part of an Evaluation of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP). In their report, the inspection team praised USFK for aggressively attacking the problem of TIP at the “strategic, operational, and tactical levels,” and further stated that “the USFK anti-TIP program continues to set the standard for DoD efforts to combat TIP.” In addition to DoD’s USFK visit, the USFK IG completed several comprehensive inspections of command policies and climate relevant to prostitution and its links
to human trafficking. Recommendations from both DoD and USFK IG inspections continue to be incorporated into the command’s strategy.

The Command’s initiatives are equally important in combating sexual assault. United States Forces Korea has developed and implemented education programs for training our leaders and Servicemembers on awareness and prevention of sexual assault. The foundation of our USFK program is a 40-hour, centralized and certified Victim Advocate and Sexual Assault Response Coordinator training program. This training stresses sexual assault risk factors and victim care. To date, our program has focused primarily on awareness and response. We are currently developing a Sexual Assault Prevention Program that meets research based criteria for addressing individual attitudes, behaviors and perceptions that place Servicemembers at risk for victimization and perpetrating sexual assault.

I will continue to be vigilant in enforcing the sexual assault prevention programs and zero tolerance approach adopted by the command. Promoting dignity and respect are of the utmost importance and a mandate we fully embrace within United States Forces Korea.

VI. Strengthening the Alliance and Investing for the Future

The Republic of Korea and the United States have stood side by side on the Korean Peninsula nearly 57 years. We have shed blood together in freedom’s cause. This relationship, first forged on the battlefields and sustained through the years by the courage and efforts of Korean and American Servicemembers, stands as a testament to the principles of freedom and
friendship. If we are going to continue to assist in securing peace and stability in Northeast Asia in the future, it must continue. In pursuit of this, we must recognize that the Republic of Korea is prosperous, democratic and largely self-reliant. As such, our relationship must evolve. Both sides are committed to this transformation which will enable future generations to continue to enjoy the benefits of our Alliance.

Your continued support is greatly appreciated and will ensure that we achieve our transformation objectives by providing our forces with the resources needed to deter aggression and foster peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the region. I am proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and civilians serving in the Republic of Korea. I know you are too. Through their daily dedication and performance, they continue to earn the trust and confidence that you have placed in them, while serving upwards of 8,000 miles from home. We owe them and their families the very best working, living, and training environment, and we should do everything feasible to give it to them. Thank you.