



**STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD**

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON

WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

MARCH 31, 2011

## Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, and other distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify about counternarcotics-related issues in the Americas.

The title of this hearing, *A Shared Responsibility – Counternarcotics and Citizen Security in the Americas*, frames the issue perfectly. Controlling drug-related and other criminal activities, and thereby enhancing citizen security, requires responsibilities to be shared among every country in the Americas as well as among a variety of institutions in each country. My remarks are organized to address the five topics the Subcommittee listed for this hearing:

- Regional trends in the spread of narcotics-related activity;
- The effectiveness and adequacy of current programs and funding;
- Addressing citizen security within and beyond existing law enforcement efforts;
- The issues of demand reduction and gun control as aspects of shared responsibility; and
- The need for greater coordination between our domestic and international efforts.

## Trends

I will address three major, interrelated trends in illegal drug activities: globalization, networked threats and criminal diversification. Globalization refers to the reality that almost every country in the world now suffers to some degree from illegal drug consumption, production, or drug-related corruption and violence. Certain parts of the Americas suffer

particularly acute challenges, which in some circumstances are severe enough to undermine effective governance. Even in less-afflicted areas, law enforcement and judicial institutions may need support from national defense and other instruments of government to build whole-of-government campaigns to cope with powerful transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and/or gangs with international links. United States Department of Defense (DoD) counternarcotics (CN) programs, which were originally oriented primarily toward the Andes, the Caribbean and, within our own country, are likewise now globalizing. The DoD CN program globalization is most pronounced with regard to Afghanistan, where opium and cannabis profits help fuel insurgency, but DoD CN efforts also now reach areas as diverse as Western Africa and Eastern Asia.

The second major trend is toward threat networking. This refers to a tendency for drug trafficking and other TCOs to network with each other and at times to enable, support, or facilitate insurgency or terrorism, as well as to corrupt legitimate government, finance, and trade. The depth and intensity of such networked relationships vary widely, from tactical, episodic transactions up through strategic alliances, but their defining characteristic is flexibility. While DoD and other parts of the U.S. national security community tend to focus on violent threats, the counternarcotics community has long understood the power of money, which is often the main thread binding threat networks together. In fact, the corrupting influence of hundreds of millions of illicit dollars may so badly erode governance in some places that it creates an enabling environment for other threats, whether or not a more direct nexus exists. In such circumstances, TCOs' money can be more powerful than violence. At the low end of the spectrum, an extremist group may use drug-related or other crime to finance arms purchases. At the high end of the

spectrum, profit-oriented crime can become so intertwined with political/ideological terrorism or insurgency that the distinctions blur. This narcoterrorism phenomenon continues to be most pronounced in Colombia, although that country has made enormous strides in recent years toward defeating such threats and expanding the rule of law. Colombia, in fact, is now helping other countries with some of the lessons it has learned.

Globalization and threat association are often linked to criminal diversification. Some TCOs may specialize in trafficking drugs, weapons, false identity documents or other contraband, but the overall trend is toward diversifying criminal activities to spread risk and maximize profit potential. In some parts of the Americas, for example, some TCOs that primarily concentrate on drug trafficking also engage in kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, petroleum diversion, and/or financial crime. In some countries, this criminal diversification is driven in part by governmental success in disrupting the illegal drug industry. Just as DoD CN efforts are globalizing, they are also extending into closely associated areas to enhance their effectiveness against drug trafficking and associated TCOs. For example, DoD is currently increasing its capabilities to support other U.S. Government and foreign authorities with Counter Threat Finance (CTF) efforts.

#### Effectiveness and Adequacy of Programs and Funding

In discussing the effectiveness and adequacy of programs and funding, it is important to note that DoD CN and associated activities are carried out at the request of U.S. or foreign law enforcement officials, or other officials with CN responsibilities. Such DoD support includes training, equipment, engineering, information sharing, communications, intelligence analysis,

radar and other sensor, information technology, transportation and other cooperation with U.S. and foreign authorities. DoD also supports others' efforts as it fulfills its statutory responsibility as the lead U.S. Federal agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs toward the United States, working with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence partners, as well as with foreign military, law enforcement, and other security forces. The point throughout is that DoD supports, and does not drive, CN and related efforts.

In fiscal year 2010, the *Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities, Defense* appropriation included slightly more than one and one half billion dollars, including \$346.6 million appropriated for overseas contingency operations (OCO) in Afghanistan and for support elsewhere in Central Asia. When OCO appropriations are subtracted from the total, this funding tracks closely with the levels provided during most of the last decade. So, although TCOs are nimbly globalizing, diversifying, associating with other threat actors, and reaping rapidly-growing profits, DoD CN efforts are likewise globalizing, expanding and networking with other U.S. Government and international partners, but without a proportional increase in resources.

DoD CN and related activities employ two principal "force multipliers" to mitigate the effects of these fiscal constraints. First, we stress partnership and networking, both with other countries and among U.S. institutions. Secondly, we stress ever-more sophisticated intelligence and information-driven operations. To illustrate partnership and networking, consider an example in which DoD works with the Department of State to provide radios, boats, training, and docks to a Central American country's navy. DoD would do so not only to help that country address its drug trafficking challenges, but also to enhance that country's capacity to work with

U.S. and other regional efforts. Those U.S. efforts increasingly combine military activities with law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and even economic, governance development, and public-private partnership initiatives led by the State Department and other U.S. Government departments and agencies. The point is that in the long run – and these things take time – building flexibly-networked international and interagency partnerships is more cost-effective than trying to rely on our own capabilities.

Information-sharing represents a particularly important sub-set of building networked partnerships. Although there are many complexities to sharing and exploiting information among U.S. agencies and foreign partners, we view these programs as crucial to “working smarter.” To illustrate the point, DoD is moving toward conducting CN detection, monitoring, surveillance, reconnaissance, law enforcement “end game” support, and associated missions based on “cued” intelligence or other information from many sources, including foreign liaison. Such targeting is more cost-effective than trying to patrol vast areas with limited air, maritime, or other assets. The CN Tactical Analysis Team (TAT) program provides an example. The U.S. Southern Command places TAT analysts at U.S. diplomatic missions and international law enforcement operations centers in 21 countries to coordinate and synchronize intelligence analysis and reporting to support operations against TCOs. DoD also works with other U.S. agencies to exchange CN-related information and expertise with other countries as enabled with efforts such as the Cooperating Nations Information and Exchange System (CNIES) program. CNIES provides near real-time air and maritime radar and other sensor track data to 24 countries in the Americas, enhancing cooperation with the U.S. Joint Interagency Task Force – South.

## Citizen Security

President Obama's visit to El Salvador on March 22-23 highlighted the theme of citizen security in one of the American countries that has suffered from loosely-structured, but transnationally networked criminal gangs. The idea is actually simple. Most people in almost any country do not care very much about criminal organizations in the abstract, but care deeply about whether their children can go to school without fear of being kidnapped or being pressured to join gangs. Specifically, the President announced the launch of the Central American Citizen Security Partnership, under which the United States will increase efforts to help "address the social and economic forces that drive young people toward criminality." He added: "We'll help strengthen courts, civil society groups, and institutions that uphold the rule of law," and that the United States will work closely with regional and international partners "to confront the narcotics traffickers and gangs that have caused so much violence in all our countries." The President's initiative thus embodies the principle of networked, whole-of-government partnership a key focus of this hearing. The implication for DoD is that we will work even harder to broaden and deepen our interagency and international partnership approach and take a holistic view of security. As always, DoD will provide supporting efforts and complementary programs to overall strategic approaches led for the U.S. Government by the White House and the State Department, avoiding any over-emphasis on military approaches.

While we are on the topic of El Salvador, I would like to note with deep appreciation that El Salvador hosts a DoD CN forward operating location at its airport in Comalapa, which is critically important to regional CN detection and monitoring efforts.

### Illegal Drug Demand Reduction and Weapons Smuggling

The United States bears a special responsibility to improve its own illegal drug demand reduction efforts and to reduce weapons smuggling, as well as illegal financial flows, to other countries. Although illegal drug, weapons, financial, and other markets are global in scope, countries in our Hemisphere are especially harmed by illegal supply and demand forces in the United States which blight so many of our own citizens' lives. Reducing illegal drug demand, gunrunning and money laundering are clearly among the three most prominent specific needs for increased coordination between domestic and international activities, which is one of the themes of this hearing.

The DoD role in illegal drug demand reduction concentrates principally on eliminating drug abuse in the U.S. Armed Forces and Defense civilian workforce as well as reaching out to DoD families and their communities to reduce drug abuse. To address rising prescription drug rates, DoD plans to implement recommendations from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for its Drug Demand Reduction Program to expand testing to include commonly abused prescription drugs, establish random unannounced drug testing in-theater, establish mobile collection teams, complete the prescription drug verification portal, and make drug prosecution statistics part of readiness reporting. The National Guard, acting under the authority of the State and territorial governors, also plays an especially important role through community outreach and helping at-



risk youth resist drug-related temptation. This is in keeping with the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*, which points out:

The demand for drugs can be further decreased by comprehensive, evidence-based prevention programs focused on the adolescent years, which science confirms is the peak period for substance use initiation and escalation into addiction. We have a shared responsibility to educate our young people about the risks of drug use, and we must do so not only at home, but also in schools, sports leagues, faith communities, places of work, and other settings and activities that attract youth.

The DoD role in reducing weapons smuggling from the United States to other countries concentrates on analytical support to law enforcement authorities with regard to weapons captured by foreign authorities. DoD likewise provides analytical support to U.S. law enforcement agencies in counter-threat finance efforts.

#### Coordination Between Domestic and International Efforts

The primary implication for the U.S. government, and particularly for DoD, of TCOs' globalization, networking and diversification is that we have to build our own global, flexible, multi-faceted networks to defeat threatening networks. Governments traditionally organized their functions in categories such as military, law enforcement, trade and financial regulation, courts, diplomatic, and economic development functions. Governments also tend to separate domestic and international activities even within such functions. There are many valid reasons for specialization, but governments are increasingly finding that we have to use all these tools and others in well-planned, long-term, integrated campaigns to be effective. For DoD, these lessons were powerfully reinforced by our difficult experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, where

counterinsurgency and stabilization require integrating all aspects of state activity to deprive the adversary of support, as well as to defeat his combat capabilities. For the U.S. Government, this has required drawing on parts of the government and cooperating with non-governmental actors which have not traditionally participated so directly in our country's conflicts. DoD has also become more sophisticated, working with other U.S., foreign and multilateral agencies and organizations, in conducting counter-network efforts in areas such as defeating organizations that traffic in weapons of mass destruction materials, improvised explosive device materials and other threats. In another context, the critical factor in Colombia's impressive security progress has been strengthening governance and extending the effective reach of the state to previously under-served areas, including building the security forces' unity of effort with judicial, health, education, and other state functions.

Cooperation within and among governments and other institutions has been the central theme of my remarks -- and cooperation depends on coordination. In my opinion, the U.S. Government has made important improvements in recent years in coordinating on issues such as countering transnational crime, as exemplified by the President's Citizen Security Partnership with Central America. The DoD CN program plays an important set of supporting roles in such efforts, such as through the U.S. Northern Command's component Joint Task Force –North, in El Paso, Texas. JTF-North coordinates much of the military training, engineering, communications, analytical and other support that DoD provides to U.S. law enforcement partners within our country. For example, JTF-North is coordinating DoD intelligence analysis and training support to the DEA-led interagency El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), including for the DHS-led Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS). In the United States, we often find that coordinating

domestic policy and activities with international efforts is especially challenging with our decentralized, federal system. Such coordination is, however, also increasingly important in an age when criminal globalization, threat association, and diversification are making distance and borders less important. JTF-North and EPIC, however, exemplify how federal task forces can partner with U.S. state and local officials to achieve effects that ripple well past our own country's borders.

In dealing with sovereign foreign countries, the United States must be very careful to bear in mind our partners' sometimes very different legal, cultural, and political realities. The shared responsibility that is the theme of this hearing extends to a responsibility to understand and respect one another.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome your questions and comments.