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Statement of Mr. Andrew Weber
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Defense Programs

On

Counterproliferation Strategy and the Fiscal
Year 2012 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request for the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and Chemical and
Biological Defense Program

Before

Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

11 March 2011

1 **Introduction**

2 Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and members of the
3 Subcommittee, thank you for giving me this opportunity to discuss
4 with you several Department of Defense efforts to counter Weapons of
5 Mass Destruction (WMD). I serve as the principal advisor to the
6 Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Under
7 Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics for
8 matters concerning Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense
9 Programs.

10

11 I oversee the implementation of the Department's Cooperative Threat
12 Reduction program and manage the Department's treaty
13 implementation activities to ensure compliance with nuclear
14 nonproliferation agreements, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
15 the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. I provide programmatic
16 advice and recommendations on the safety, security, and effectiveness
17 of the nuclear stockpile, and am also responsible for oversight,
18 integration, and coordination of the Department's Chemical and
19 Biological Defense Program. This program delivers systems for the
20 detection and identification of chemical and biological agents and
21 provides protection and decontamination capabilities for personnel and
22 equipment. These activities combine requirements, science and
23 technology execution, and acquisition efforts.

24

25 In addition, I oversee the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA),
26 headed by Mr. Ken Myers, who is here with me today. The DTRA
27 mission is to safeguard the U.S. and its allies from weapons of mass
28 destruction (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) by
29 providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter these threats

1 and mitigate their effects. The agency is the Department of Defense's
2 Combat Support Agency for the countering-WMD mission that includes
3 nonproliferation, counterproliferation, consequence management, and
4 the development of improved countering-WMD capabilities for the
5 Warfighter.

6

7 Also appearing before you is Brigadier General Jess Scarbrough, who
8 supports me as the Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and
9 Biological Defense. General Scarbrough is responsible for the
10 advanced development and acquisition of equipment and capabilities
11 for the Warfighter to counter chemical and biological threats.

12

13 **Countering WMD Vision and Mission**

14 The vision for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs is to
15 ensure the Department of Defense is postured to counter 21st century
16 WMD threats to our Warfighters and citizens at anytime and anywhere
17 in the world. Our mission is to lead the Department in the
18 development and integration of defense capabilities to prevent, protect
19 against, and respond to WMD threats. The overarching goal is to
20 prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends
21 with WMDs. It is imperative that we provide the capabilities to enable
22 the Department to accomplish the countering-WMD military strategic
23 objectives to: prevent, dissuade, or deny WMD proliferation or
24 possession; reduce, destroy, or reverse WMD possession; defeat and
25 deter WMD use and subsequent use; and defend, respond, and recover
26 from WMD use.

27

28 DTRA's Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) Strategic Plan, released last
29 November, builds on these objectives. The goals of the plan provide

1 for: a synchronized effort among the Department of Defense, the
2 other executive agencies and departments, and our international
3 partners; facilitate a swift adaptation to the evolving trends and future
4 security threats; and serve as a foundation for the DTRA FY12 budget
5 request.

6
7 The Chemical and Biological Defense Program is a key part of a
8 comprehensive national strategy to prevent, protect against, and
9 respond to the constantly evolving spectrum of chemical and biological
10 threats. The President's FY12 budget request for this program
11 includes \$254 million for procurement, \$771 million for advanced
12 development, and \$502 million for science and technology efforts, for
13 a total of \$1.526 billion.

14
15 These efforts have been hindered recently due to the constraints of
16 operating under a Continuing Resolution. As Under Secretary of
17 Defense Ashton Carter said, "Each and every program manager in the
18 Department is having to upset carefully calibrated plans, stop or slow
19 activities only to restart them later, defer the commencement of
20 important new programs, and so on... It is not only inefficient, it is
21 anti-efficient."

22
23 In light of these current restraints, I ask that you strongly support a
24 responsible FY11 appropriations bill and the President's FY12 budget
25 request so that we can move forward with these programs to provide
26 the Warfighters and the nation with the capabilities we need to counter
27 WMD.

28
29 **Chemical and Biological Defense Program**

1 As stated in the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats,
2 "...fanatics have expressed interest in developing and using biological
3 weapons against us and our allies." The rapid advancements in
4 biotechnology and manufacturing capabilities make it easier for an
5 adversary, whether state or non-state, to develop modified pathogens
6 or chemical agents. The challenge posed by biological threats is the
7 hardest to understand and the most daunting.

8

9 There are no simple solutions to countering biological threats. One of
10 the complicating factors is that they lie at the nexus of security and
11 health, and regardless of man-made or natural origin, threaten our
12 Warfighters and citizens. The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic showed
13 us that our efforts must account for the full spectrum of biological
14 threats, including emerging infectious diseases.

15

16 The Chemical and Biological Defense Program provides the capabilities
17 needed for a safe, reliable, and multi-layered set of defensive
18 measures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
19 incidents. It also aids rapid restoration of affected areas with less
20 impact on essential operations. These integrated capabilities improve
21 our ability to sense chemical and biological warfare agents, shield our
22 service members, shape our operations, and sustain our forces. Many
23 programs were created to enable our Warfighter to identify threats and
24 continue operations in a WMD environment.

25

26 One product that is fielded now with our military in over 300 locations
27 worldwide, is the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic
28 System. This is a portable instrument capable of identifying multiple
29 biological agents. Currently Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia, and Avian

1 Influenza tests are cleared by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
2 for use on the JBAIDS. Furthermore, the Department has submitted to
3 FDA over 70 requests for consideration of emergency use
4 authorizations for assays to be used with the instrument.

5 This system is part of a unified set of capabilities built to respond
6 swiftly and effectively to the threats facing the Warfighter. Our
7 primary goal is to prevent a biological or chemical attack. Should a
8 crisis occur, we must be prepared to protect and respond.

9 Our ability to obtain early warning about the emergence and
10 progression of new and particularly dangerous biological agents hinges
11 upon the development of a global biosurveillance network and next
12 generation detection and diagnostics systems. These enablers will
13 provide the capability for quick and reliable early warning,
14 identification, and notification. To achieve these goals, we must
15 increase the focus on science and technology; an emphasis reflected
16 within the FY12 Chemical and Biological Defense Program budget.

17

18 Biosurveillance is critically important to the Department. A
19 surveillance weakness in any one country is a threat to all. I envision
20 a day that any country in the world can identify a biological attack
21 within hours, not days, by using simple, affordable diagnostic devices
22 linked up with a comprehensive global surveillance network.

23

24 The Department of Defense has been coordinating with the
25 Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services to
26 improve our biological threat detection capability as well as
27 strengthening our international ties by integrating reporting
28 laboratories and other networks.

29

1 We are also investing in a detection and diagnostics program that is a
2 critical component to protect our Warfighters and nation against a
3 biological attack or outbreak. We are working with our partners at
4 Health and Human Services, in particular the FDA, to develop a clear,
5 efficient, and safe regulatory pathway to clearance or approval. Again,
6 the overarching goal of our efforts is the reliable and timely fielding of
7 affordable medical diagnostic and agent detection equipment capable
8 of supporting military operations in a WMD environment.

9

10 In the 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama directed the
11 enhancement of the nation's ability to develop, license, and procure
12 countermeasures against both bioterrorist attacks and naturally-
13 occurring infectious disease. In response, we are preparing to execute
14 a Medical Countermeasures Initiative that will provide agile and
15 flexible advanced development and manufacturing capabilities. This
16 will enhance the Department's ability to protect against known agents
17 and emerging threats for which countermeasures do not yet exist.
18 This will reduce the impact of an attack on the Warfighter and help
19 protect the nation against novel agents.

20

21 The 2009 H1N1 pandemic, along with the ongoing challenges with
22 development of WMD medical countermeasures, revealed major gaps
23 in advanced development and domestic manufacturing capacity. One
24 gap was particularly evident; the lack of partnership between the
25 United States Government and large pharmaceutical companies. This
26 initiative will work to strengthen the government's relationship with
27 those companies, who are the foremost leaders in advanced
28 development of medical countermeasures.

29

1 We are leveraging work from several sources, including the Defense
2 Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Transformational Medical
3 Technologies program, which focuses on the rapid discovery and
4 refinement of medical countermeasures. In 2009 these efforts
5 culminated in a successful test in which a hemorrhagic fever virus
6 therapeutic platform showed flexibility when it was adapted for the
7 H1N1 virus.

8

9 The ability to scale-up production when needed or switch
10 manufacturing from one product to another is critical. To achieve this
11 ability and to evaluate new manufacturing methods, a strong
12 partnership with the FDA is essential. The ongoing efforts to reach our
13 goals include the FDA and other interagency partners.

14

15 **Countering Nuclear Threats**

16 When addressing nuclear threats, President Obama has made it clear
17 that one of today's greatest dangers is nuclear terrorism. We believe
18 Al-Qaeda and their associated forces are seeking nuclear weapons.
19 They would have no compunction at using such weapons if they
20 managed to obtain them.

21

22 In 2009, the President gave a speech in Prague where he presented
23 his vision of a world without nuclear weapons. This is, of course, a
24 long-term goal, and one that he has said may not be achieved in his
25 lifetime. The President also stated that unilateral disarmament will not
26 result in improved security and that we must maintain a safe, secure,
27 and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist.

28

1 Just last month, I visited the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air
2 Force Base in Montana. I witnessed first-hand the execution of this
3 critical deterrence mission and thanked the men and women
4 responsible for providing the United States with this essential
5 capability.

6
7 My office is a focal point within the Department of Defense for
8 maintaining the nuclear deterrent and countering nuclear threats. The
9 expertise needed to maintain the nuclear stockpile is also relevant and
10 necessary to address nuclear threats to the nation. As such, the
11 mission to counter threats may be affected by any reduction in support
12 or funding for stockpile-related work.

13
14 In order to reduce the risk of emerging nuclear-armed adversaries, the
15 Department of Defense is working with the Departments of Energy and
16 State to implement the President's Global Nuclear Lockdown initiative
17 to secure vulnerable fissile material worldwide. This effort is
18 supported by the DTRA-executed Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
19 Reduction (CTR) program, which has recently expanded in scope and
20 geographical reach.

21
22 We are also working to improve the nation's capabilities in nuclear
23 forensics, which is the thorough analysis and characterization of pre-
24 and post-detonation radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and
25 debris, as well as effects from a nuclear detonation. In an interception
26 or post-detonation event, nuclear forensics will help determine
27 material type and origin, potential pathways, and design information.
28 It is an integral component of the broader goal of attribution, which
29 merges forensics results with traditional law enforcement and

1 intelligence information to identify those responsible for the planned or
2 actual attack.

3

4 To keep Congress fully informed on the development and fielding of
5 countering-WMD capabilities, the Counterproliferation Program Review
6 Committee (CPRC) will release an updated report in May 2011. A
7 report released by the Government Accountability Office on Sept. 28,
8 2010, recommended that the CPRC include additional financial
9 information besides the President's Budget. One of the findings was
10 that information on the programs detailed in the CPRC report should
11 include appropriations and expenditures. We have requested this
12 information for the upcoming report. Another recommendation was to
13 more clearly relate prioritized capability gaps to programs and
14 resources. We are gathering information to be able to address this in
15 the May 2011 CPRC report as well.

16

17 **Conclusion**

18 The threat of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack on our troops or
19 nation's population is very real and constantly evolving as we move
20 into the 21st century. This means the Department of Defense must
21 develop nimble, agile programs to respond. In support of the vision of
22 President Obama and Secretary Gates, my organization is working to
23 strengthen our capabilities to effectively prevent, deter, defeat, and
24 respond to these threats. I ask for your support of a responsible FY11
25 appropriations bill and the President's FY12 budget request so that we
26 can achieve these goals. I appreciate the opportunity you have given
27 me to testify today and would be pleased to answer your questions.