

**Statement for the Record**  
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Chairman Hagan, Senator Portman, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify today about the global programs and capabilities Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations (PSO) brings to the Department of Defense and the United States Government.

I'll begin by giving you a brief overview of our policy responsibilities, including both those that focus on supporting US military operations as well as those designed to mitigate or prevent conflict that might otherwise draw in US forces. I'll then turn to one of the key capabilities we would like to have, the joint proposal by the Secretaries of Defense and State for a Global Security Contingency Fund, and another opportunity to enhance our capabilities.

#### I. SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

Like my colleagues, a key priority for my office is supporting ongoing military operations. Our work supports both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, including coalition support for US operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and noncombatant evacuation operations, international peacekeeping operations, explosive ordnance disposal, and ministerial development in Afghanistan.

In the area of coalition support to US operations, my office oversees and implements specialized authorities and appropriations to allow willing and capable international partners to deploy and operate with us, strengthening both our forces and our international legitimacy. For example, over 26 nations received lift and sustainment

support as they served alongside the US military in Afghanistan. Needless to say, the prospect of operating with 26 fewer partners would change the complexion of the Afghanistan effort. It also has meant that the US military has deeper ties with 26 militaries that are now much more capable. Most recently, we are also providing logistical support using Global Lift and Sustain authority to eligible partners operating with us under the rubric of OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR, NATO's Libya-focused operation.

The ability to build coalitions is essential to spreading the burden of global security. Our expertise not only ensures that funds are optimized to assist the needs of our partners, it also allows us to rationalize the provision of that assistance. For example, at one point, we had no agreed-upon system for saying "yes" or "no" to partners offering to join the coalition. So, we sometimes had officials accepting a partner's offer without understanding the costs and benefits of a given partner's participation. Our office created a system to ensure proper review of such offers so that we could get the maximum return on our investment in coalition partners while also avoiding excessive commitments to partners whose capabilities did not match the combatant commander's needs.

We have primary responsibility for the oversight of our military's humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions. As you know, USAID leads the government's response, so we are always in a supporting role. What that means in real terms is that when an earthquake hits Haiti or a tsunami hits Japan, my office makes sure that military assets are used appropriately and with proper authorization. We make sure that the U.S. military is prepared to be a "responder of last resort" when foreign disasters overwhelm the capacity of the host nation and international first-responders to manage. Because we work on disasters in every region, we are able to ensure that the right people from DOD are involved in the interagency process, that our Combatant Commanders are appropriately linked with USAID, they know what sort of support is permissible, and they have sufficient funding and authority to carry out their mission. And, while every

disaster is different, our knowledge of what military assets have been helpful in various scenarios can be critical to quickly providing effective assistance.

To give you a better idea of our work in this critical area, let me give you some examples. When a typhoon hit the Philippines last October, we were able to transport USAID's assessment team in PACOM helicopters to survey hard-to-reach areas. This was critical to determining what the total US government response should be and what unique military assets should be provided. In Japan, we quickly worked with ADM Willard's team to get Secretary Gates' approval to use OHDACA (Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid) funds for assistance operations, including getting both Fairfax and Los Angeles civilian urban search and rescue teams' heavy equipment on the ground within 72 hours. In Libya, in order to address stabilization concerns associated with democratizing governments in Egypt and Tunisia, we have assisted with the airlift of third country nationals.

In addition to supporting on-going operations, we also do the steady-state work with partners so that their militaries are better prepared to support their governments' disaster response needs. Not only does this create real and lasting capabilities in partners, it also is an area where we can build relationships in some countries where other types of military engagement are not welcome. My team also is integrated into crisis action planning meetings to ensure lessons from previous disasters are learned and applied across the government.

The same team that does this work also plans for and ensures the proper execution of military evacuations of Americans overseas. At the request of the Department of State, DoD assists in the evacuation of American citizens, allies, and third-country partners from unstable and unsafe environments. Working with Crisis Operations at State, the Joint Staff, and regional desks, PSO maintains resident expertise DoD leadership requires, and PSO provides the crucial link between the two Departments.

My office also provides policy advice on DoD support to UN and multinational peacekeeping operations, oversees the execution of peacekeeping support, and works with interagency partners to coordinate overall USG support for peacekeeping. For example, we work closely with the State Department as the joint manager of their Global Peace Operations Initiative to train and equip more foreign peacekeepers. Our Geographic Combatant Commanders are the implementers for 50% of the program. We work with the State Department on providing US officers to key positions at UN headquarters and in UN missions. We also provide critical expertise on realistic mandate goals so that UN missions can succeed.

Another critical area of support to on-going operations is our oversight and coordination of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) policy and capacity across DoD. In addition, we provide policy and subject-matter expertise in support of DoD efforts to support civilian authorities preventing and disrupting attacks using explosives in the homeland. Recently, we worked with the FBI and Army (and General Counsel) to provide EOD expertise and to loan specialized equipment to FBI agents investigating a suspect in connection with a failed bomb attempt at a Martin Luther King, Jr. parade in Spokane, Washington. This support to local authorities allowed federal agents to safely secure the suspect in an otherwise unpredictable and extremely dangerous situation.

Last, I want to point out a tool that we developed and fielded to Afghanistan. Like both of my colleagues here today, we are constantly trying to adapt to the urgent needs of our commanders in the field. In our case, we help address the need to build functioning Afghan security institutions so that the security forces we train can be sustained and remain effective. It became clear in Iraq and Afghanistan that we needed better tools to train these nascent security institutions. For that reason, we created the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MoDA) program. It is a way of generating high-quality, effective civilian advisors who establish lasting links to partner ministries. Some of the key

features of the program are the seven weeks of pre-deployment training, the ability to stay in Afghanistan from one-to-two years, the ability to provide backfill personnel to home organizations when someone is deployed as an advisor, and the enduring ministry-to-ministry partnerships that are created because the program draws primarily from senior civil servants. Prior to MoDA, untrained military personnel or contractors did all of the US government's advisory work at the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior. MoDA is the first program to provide realistic and useful training for ministerial advisors. It has been so successful that after the first 17 advisors served in Kabul for a couple of months, LTG Caldwell, head of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, asked to send some of his military advisors to the training and GEN Petraeus requested at least 100 advisors before the end of the year.

In all of our support to current operations there is a recurring theme of unique expertise and interagency collaboration. We support our warfighters with real tools, with expertise on how to use those tools, and by ensuring interagency agreement and alignment so that they and the US government can be most effective.

## II. SUPPORT TO PREVENTION

So far, I've discussed the work we do in support of on-going operations. Our other main focus is on providing capabilities to prevent or recover from conflict. We do this both through our focus on stability operations capabilities across the Department and targeted programs and policies to build partner capacity.

When it comes to Stability Operations, we are future oriented. It isn't just Operation Iraqi Freedom redux - it's broad "stabilization" in the sense of supporting civilian-led programs, targeting assistance that stimulates local economies, marginalizing violent extremists, preventing future conflict, and laying a foundation for longer term governance and capacity building. A critical enabler to this effort is the civilian-military working relationship across the interagency. While every office works on interagency

collaboration, we focus on its necessity for successful stability operations from the strategic to the tactical level. We are focused on moving beyond coordination meetings, to coordinated interagency pre-deployment training and ensuring that our doctrine and concepts prepare our military personnel to be effective in interagency and multi-partner environments. For us, stability operations are both a part of preventing escalating conflict and a part of post-conflict recovery. In many cases, it also is critical to building a successful exit strategy for current conflicts. PSO's stability operations experts worked closely with and advised Department of State counterparts who built the USG Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, which will usher in transition in its broadest sense, from military to civilian governance across all sectors.

PSO also is incubating the DoD capability to sustain our train and equip investments through ministerial level capacity-building programs, specifically the relatively new Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) and the MoDA program I mentioned earlier. DIRI supports the development of partner defense ministries through regular engagements with partner defense ministries that are aimed at identifying their capability gaps and then working to fill them. DIRI provides teams of subject matter experts to work with a partner nation on a periodic, sustained basis. For example, we will meet with a partner to identify the needs and establish a work plan. In one country we might be helping them with their first realistic strategic defense plan and in another it may be an effort to help them create a personnel system that tracks the specialties and training of personnel so they can be used to best effect. In all of these cases, both the goal of the work plan and the process of achieving it create new capabilities in partners which often have a multiplying effect on their overall military capacity.

By contrast, MoDA supplies dedicated and experienced DoD civilians who can forge long-term professional relationships with their international defense-ministry counterparts in similar specialties. Again, MoDA sends senior defense civilians who are trained to be advisors. For example, when the Afghans were struggling with how best to

feed their troops and how to run and organize a slaughter house, we were able to send out an advisor from the Defense Commissary Agency. With his extensive background and skills together with the advisor training, he was effective immediately in country.

We're a "solution provider" in other ways. Secretary Gates rightfully makes developing the capabilities of our partners a high priority for the Department. As he stated in our most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, "US security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help partners and allies build their own security capacity." That said, DoD is attempting to execute the security cooperation mission with what the Secretary terms a "patchwork" of specialized legislative authorities and funding sources that evolved in a very different security environment. For the security cooperation planner at a geographic Combatant Command who will serve for one to two years and then go back to more traditional military work, it is very challenging to understand the tools and funding available to work with our partners. Even once they have a good sense of the tools and funding, actually accessing those tools and funding for a given partner can take years.

My office assists the Combatant Commanders and our regional office colleagues to navigate this patchwork. We also work on improving our planning efforts and strategies so that they include realistic requirements or clearly identified gaps in our ability to build dependable and effective partner militaries. To give you an example, under different leadership, this office identified a critical gap in our counter terrorism strategies and pursued what is now called the "1206" legislation. As you know, 1206 has been a vital tool in our counter terrorism and building partnership efforts. After working with Congress to establish the tool and its operations, it is now overseen by DASD Reid, in coordination with the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State, as part of our broader counter terrorism work. Today, we are working with the Joint Staff to create network-based information tools to track security cooperation activities in countries from the bottom-up. We have already implemented an online information

repository about security cooperation tools that is used DoD-wide. We also are working to create an office to better evaluate the impact of our security cooperation tools. We are trying to fill new gaps that have emerged by creating new tools or improving existing tools.

### III. OPPORTUNITIES

This leads me to my final points, the opportunities we have today to enhance our capabilities. Let me mention one relatively simple fix and then discuss a more overarching tool we'd like to create.

The simple fix I'd like to bring to your attention regards Humanitarian Mine Action. The goal of the DOD Humanitarian Mine Action program is to relieve human suffering and the adverse effects of landmines and explosive remnants of war on noncombatants while advancing the combatant commanders' security cooperation strategies and U.S. national security objectives. Through the Humanitarian Mine Action Training Program, DoD executes "train-the-trainer" programs of instruction designed to develop international partners' capabilities for a wide range of HMA activities including demining training. Over the past decade, we have seen a number of casualties and deaths linked to the improper storage of munitions. This is particularly distressing when it occurs in densely populated areas as we saw recently in Tanzania and Albania. Rather than use our programs solely to help clean up the ordnance once it has exploded and harmed innocent civilians, we would like to modestly include training on how to safely stockpile conventional munitions so we can work to prevent those disasters. To do this, no new funding is required as we can accomplish this mission within existing ODHACA funding.

One of the key challenges we face is reacting to threats and opportunities that emerge within the budget cycle and recalibrating assistance as situations change on the ground. We are challenged not only by the lengthy budget cycle but also by an interagency structure that does not incentivize whole-of-government approaches, even though we



know they are usually the most effective. The fact is that many of the security challenges we see today can most effectively be addressed if we improve partner governance, justice sector capacity, border security, and basic functioning. This requires civilians at DoD and the interagency working with the military as seamlessly as possible.

We all recognize how important this is in Afghanistan to ultimately reaching our objectives and withdrawing from that war-torn nation leaving behind a government that can secure its borders, enforce the law, and serve the population. The concept transfers to other circumstances where a security situation may be ambiguous and an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

To address these needs and gaps, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates developed a pilot program called the Global Security Contingency Fund. If enacted by Congress, the two Departments would have three years to demonstrate a new business model and provide a much-needed tool for responding to emergent challenges and opportunities.

Under the Fund, the Departments of State and Defense would literally work side-by-side to provide security assistance to partner governments, including military, interior, border, maritime, and counterterrorism security forces, and their governing institutions. This new Fund also could provide assistance for the justice sector, rule of law, and stabilization when the capacity of civilian agencies is challenged by conflict or instability. A key feature of the Fund is that it would be operated by a small staff of State Department, USAID, and Defense Department employees working in the same office and would be accountable to both Departments. That staff would be supplemented by other interagency experts depending on the requirements that need to be met. The Fund would be used to meet requirements both Secretaries identify as critical and allow both Departments to provide funding for the work agreed upon. Perhaps most critical, the Fund would give the US government a tool to be more effective in its assistance by

allowing for within budget cycle commitments that are responsive to fluid real-world situations.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The United States is constantly striving to become more agile and smarter about how we create stronger partners and lasting security. This means having tools that are better adapted to today's security environment and having a strong partner in Congress to ensure that the tools meet America's needs. We hope that you will support the Fund and look forward to continuing to work with you to address today's new security challenges and opportunities. Thank you, again for this opportunity to testify about the capabilities we provide, including those that focus on supporting US operations and those designed to prevent the obligation of US military forces and some of the key capabilities we would like to have. I look forward to your questions.