

**Statement for the Record**  
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**House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations & Management**  
**Hearing on “Denying Safe Havens: Homeland Security’s Efforts to**  
**Counter Threats from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia”**  
**June 3, 2011**

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today and for the opportunity to share with you the Department of Defense’s efforts to decrease under- or un-governed territories, thereby striving to preclude their use by terrorists as safe havens.

Eliminating terrorist safe havens is a core element of the Department’s counterterrorism efforts. As the Secretary of Defense has written and said on numerous occasions, in the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with these fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. Your focus today on Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia highlights the challenges such states can present.

What has been called the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign -- a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military refers to as kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. In short, we recognize that the elimination of safe havens is a prerequisite to winning the current conflict and inherently requires an interagency, whole-of-government approach. To that end, Secretary Gates has repeatedly called for increased resources for the Department of State to enable the important work our friends across the river do in advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy, foreign assistance, and development.

The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation, and recruits within the chaos of social breakdown. The most likely

catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland are more likely to emanate from these zones of instability than from aggressor states.

This strategic calculus demands that the U.S. government focus on building partner capacity: helping other countries develop the tools for their security and governance, to defend themselves and us by extension. We do this by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches -- primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces -- to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct U.S. military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as our own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.

Given these realities, the Department of Defense has sought to enhance the tools at its disposal for dealing with the threats from terrorist groups that currently exploit opportunities provided by weak, fractured or failing states. Notably, new train and equip programs allow for quicker improvements in the security capacity of partner nations. Training and education programs allow us to make contact with, and enhance the capabilities of, counterterrorism professionals in key states.

We refer to these training, equipping, advising, and assisting activities collectively as security force assistance (SFA). SFA supports the professionalization and the sustainable development of the capacity and capability of the foreign security forces and supporting institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations and spectrum of conflict as well as during all phases of military operations. These efforts shall be conducted with, through, and by foreign security forces.

SFA activities are conducted primarily to assist host countries to defend against internal and transnational threats to stability. However, the Department of Defense may also conduct SFA to assist host countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country's security forces or supporting institutions. The objective of all SFA activities is to directly increase the capacity or capability of a foreign security force or their supporting institutions.

This indirect approach, working by, through, and with our partners also reduces the risk to – and burdens on – U.S. military personnel. We train partners so that they – not US forces – can patrol their waterways and territories, take on terrorists, or undertake stability operations. More capable partners in these missions will lessen the pressure on US forces. By engaging early in building a nation's capacity we may be able to avoid committing troops in the future. We are better off helping our partners handle their own security than “calling in the Marines” when a long-simmering problem ultimately blossoms into conflict. Furthermore, when a partner executes an

operation it confirms its sovereignty – when we conduct an operation on their behalf, our mutual enemies will claim that partner has ceded its sovereignty to the U.S.

## **DoD Activities to Deny Safe Havens**

A subset of the Department of Defense’s capacity building activities are directly focused on combating terrorist safe havens around the world in places such as Yemen and the Philippines. Two primary tools in this regard are our Global Train and Equip authority (otherwise known as “Section 1206”) and the Combating Terrorism (CbT) Fellowship Program. Section 1206 is one of our most important tools in the counterterrorism fight. This authority gives the Department the ability – with the concurrence of the Secretary of State – to quickly respond to build our partners’ capabilities to confront urgent and emerging terrorism threats and support those fighting alongside us in Coalition operations. Using Section 1206 authority, the Department can provide training, equipment, and supplies to partner nation military counterterrorism forces. Both of these programs adhere to the requirements to accomplish “Leahy vetting” for human rights in accordance with relevant statutes on security assistance and related activities.

The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was established to meet emergent defense requirements to build partnerships and partner knowledge about the struggle against terror. The program provides targeted, non-lethal, CbT education and training. CTFP directly supports DoD efforts by providing CbT education and training for mid- to senior-level international military officers, ministry of defense civilians and security officials. Education and training is a mixture of existing, traditional classroom and mobile programs, and innovative activities designed to strengthen individual, country, and regional combating terrorism capabilities and capacities. CTFP provides education and training at U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, or as part of other education and training programs.

I should note that this indirect approach is not without challenges. We focus our efforts and resources on places where the terrorist threat profile is high and partner nation capability – for whatever reason – is insufficient to meet that threat. Of course, the political will of the partner nation is also a crucial determinant. In this complex environment, our ability to conduct and sustain effective capacity-building programs can be challenged by many factors, including political instability and competing security concerns in the host nation. For example, in addition to terrorism, Yemeni forces have historically dealt with the Huthi rebellion in the north and the secessionist movement in the south. Although the Yemenis clearly recognize the threat AQAP poses to their internal security, CT is but one of several security concerns. Even in cases where instability or other security concerns do not distract our partners, factors such as education levels,

literacy rates, technological know-how, or appreciation of the value of maintenance can make absorption and sustainment of both the equipment and the training problematic.

We recognize the need to assess our building partner capacity efforts across the board, to include those targeted at eliminating terrorist safe havens. For example, DoD is initiating a more formal assessment effort to better evaluate Section 1206 train and equip programs. This effort will be built on information collected in the program proposal process, which includes baseline information, expected program milestones, and quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure the program's effectiveness. We are designing a system with the intent of measuring outcomes, not just outputs.

I'll outline below how we use both Section 1206 and CTFP along with other authorities to build the capacity of our partners to counter terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines, by way of example.

### In Pakistan

The core objective of the United States in Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida and its affiliates, and to prevent their use of safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To this end, our "train and equip" programs with the Pakistan military and paramilitary forces are central to pursuing our near-term objective of eliminating terrorist sanctuary and disrupting and defeating the al-Qaida network.

The Department of Defense's train and equip programs in Pakistan have helped the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces address terrorist threats in ungoverned spaces along its borders and particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Section 1206 programs for the Pakistan Army Aviation helped improve its airlift capability to support counterterrorism operations in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan against enemies common to both Pakistan and the United States.

We also provided training and equipment to the Pakistan forces to help improve maritime counter terrorism capabilities and counterterrorism efforts focused on the western border area and coast. More recently, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund has focused training and equipping programs on building Pakistan's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4/ISR) capability and its ability to conduct intelligence-driven operations; expanding its air-mobility capacity; and improving close air support capabilities, night operations, and its counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capability.

The Department has also used CTFP in Pakistan to fund confidence-building seminars with Afghanistan on border issues with the aim of preventing al Qaida from establishing safe havens. Since 2009, CTFP has funded a four-day Bilateral Seminar that has engaged senior-level Pakistani officials focusing on the benefits of a whole of government approach to denying al Qaida safe havens, controlling the volatile border with Afghanistan and strengthening civil-military relations in a larger national security strategy. In 2010, the CTFP funded 10 Pakistani Members of Parliament to spend three days in Washington to meet with representatives from the Departments of Defense, State, Transportation, and Justice. The goal was to strengthen their understanding and ability to provide good governance in Pakistan. In 2011, CTFP funded a Pakistani Brigadier General to serve as a visiting professor and fellow at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) at the National Defense University. He will provide firsthand knowledge of dealing with a terrorist organization embedded in a society as well as lessons learned from Pakistani efforts to execute counterterrorism operations.

We find ourselves at a critical juncture in our relationship with Pakistan. Despite inevitable setbacks, our train and equip efforts paired with persistent diplomatic engagement have tangibly enhanced the Pakistani military's efforts against militants. The operations conducted by their forces today would have been unthinkable two years ago. Because of our enduring interests, and the fragile nature of the gains made by the Pakistani military, we must continue to assist Pakistan in dismantling militant safe havens and extending the reach of its government into the remote tribal areas of Pakistan.

U.S. personnel have worked with select Pakistani military units to provide them with an enhanced understanding of counterinsurgency and counter terrorism fundamentals, inherent in which is the significance of adopting a population-centric approach designed to turn the populace away from supporting terrorists and thus, deny them established or prospective safe haven. However, counterinsurgency is a methodical process, and if the Pakistani government continues to lack adequate capacity to conduct all facets – clear, hold, and build – of COIN operations, it will be less able to transition to the follow-on phases. Our efforts have bolstered Pakistani capabilities and capacity, but much more remains to be done.

### In Yemen

In FY11 our Combating Terrorism Fellowship Fund supported seminars and workshops in Sana'a, Yemen. Seminar speakers included Yemen's Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief of the Defense Staff, a representative from the President's Office, the Director for the National Security Bureau (the Yemeni security, intelligence, and counterterrorism service), the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, and U.S. Congresswoman McCollum. The events focused on the benefits of a whole-of-government approach to national security strategy. Attendees included 650 Yemeni military and civilian officials to include: members of the Council of Ministers, Al-

Shura Council (U.S. Senate equivalent), House of Representatives, members of civil society, Embassy representatives and students from the host High Military Academy, and Yemeni CTFP alumni. The program specifically discussed al Qaida safe havens in the south, the spread of al Qaida's extremist ideology and influence, and how to counter it.

Our Section 1206 train and equip programs in Yemen have focused on improving the Yemenis ability to control its own territory and territorial waters to combat terrorists currently exploiting ungoverned and under-governed spaces. Programs have focused on improving border security and increasing mobility, and have provided equipment to the Yemeni Special Operations Forces, Air Force, Border Security Force, and Coast Guard to help them deter, detect, and detain terrorists along land borders, and at sea, though the security environment has been challenging of late. The programs in FY10 centered on improving the operational reach and reaction time of counterterrorism forces so that they could confront terrorists in previously unreachable areas.

### In Somalia

Because Somalia lacks an internationally-recognized permanent government, many of our capacity-building programs are limited in their ability to address safe haven there. As such Somalia has not directly benefited from either Section 1206 funding or CTFP funding. However, we are working closely with the Department of State to enhance the capabilities of the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces and the National Security Force of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). These forces are currently operating in Somalia to stabilize the security situation and create a safe and secure environment in support of the Djibouti Peace Process and in which the TFG can function in the midst of current threats.

Further, Somalia's lack of governance and sparse population make it appealing as a potential safe haven for al Qaida. The U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization al-Shabaab currently operates freely throughout much of south/central Somalia. While al-Shabaab is not a monolithic structure, its leadership has strong and increasing connections to al Qaida. As al Qaida undergoes changes in its central leadership and regroups from counterterrorism operations in Pakistan, we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to Somalia.

It is critical that we view Somalia from a regional Horn of Africa perspective, not least because so many of the USG's traditional security cooperation tools are restricted from being used in Somalia. The Department of Defense is reviewing the status of its Joint Task Forces to determine if any should be considered for transition to a more permanent status, such as Joint Interagency Task Force. This review includes the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, whose mission is to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests.

U.S. Africa Command is concurrently undertaking a review of East Africa to determine how our military efforts in the region can be most efficiently applied to work in concert with those of our interagency partners to achieve our collective regional goals. This review of our East Africa strategy will also inform the Department's recommendations on basing and funding for CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonnier. Our ultimate goal is a fully integrated DoD strategy under which security assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional partners, and counter terrorism actions are synchronized to provide the regional security and stability that is in the interests of the United States, our regional partners, and the appropriate international organizations.

### In the Philippines

I will include some comments about DoD's capacity building programs in the Philippines, as they have enjoyed a degree of quiet success in helping the central government in its efforts to expand governance. Our education, equipping and training programs there have helped deny safe haven to a variety of malign actors. Some examples follow.

The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program has funded Philippine counterterrorism professionals to attend the Master's degree granting program at both the National Defense University's College of International Security Affairs and the Naval Postgraduate School's College of International Security Affairs. Both degree programs address strategic security to include courses on countering the ideological support for terrorism and countering violent extremism. Senior level CTFP-funded Filipino leadership have led efforts mainly in the south against groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Moro National Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf, Rajah Sulaiman Movement and Jemaah Islamiyah.

Section 1206 train and equip programs in the Philippines have focused on increasing maritime border security and decreasing land and maritime ungoverned spaces. Although still in the stages of development, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) believes 1206 programs will be one of the highlights of the command's bilateral counterterrorism effort. These efforts have expanded and broadened into a growing maritime domain awareness network with links to command and control centers in Manila that are capable of guiding air- and sea-borne interdiction assets.

Importantly, we also have provided maritime domain awareness assets to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in an effort to build *regional* capacity to monitor waters that have historically been areas of "safe transit" for terrorist and criminal elements alike. Section 1206 programs have also supported the development of naval special operations forces and key air units who engage day to day with the most acute terrorist threats in previously unreachable areas.

Civil Military Operations: Since 2002, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) has engaged the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in a Foreign Internal Defense mission with one of its primary objectives being to neutralize the safe haven that Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago afford to Jemaah Islamiyah, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and potentially to other regional and transnational terrorist groups. As part of this mission, the JSOTF's advisers have continued to mentor their Philippine counterparts in the utility and planning of targeted Civil Military Operations (CMO) as part of a larger counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy, and have worked shoulder-to-shoulder with them in the execution of these activities.

Over the 2010 calendar year, U.S. and Filipino civilian and uniform personnel have worked together to plan and execute over \$5.2 million in CMO activities, amounting to 44 civic action projects, 38 km of road construction, over 19,000 medical treatments, and close to 6,000 veterinary services performed. All of this has been part of the larger U.S. effort to assist the Government of the Philippines in establishing a stable environment in the Southern Philippines, garnering local popular support, and increasing the legitimacy and governance of the Government of the Philippines in these remote areas. The goal, of course, is to separate terrorist group members from their local support base and deny access to this prospective safe haven.

### **Building DoD's SFA Toolkit for the Future**

Recognizing the important role that assisting our partners plays in furthering our U.S. national security, and the enduring nature of this requirement, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review laid out a series of initiatives to support this mission area. Key themes were:

*Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance.* Conducting missions to train, advise, and assist partner forces has long been the domain of U.S. Special Operations Forces. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the irregular nature of today's conflict, have taught us that we need all our forces to have these skill sets.

*Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability.* Operating in partnership with host-nation security forces and among local populations puts a premium on foreign language skills and regional and cultural knowledge.

*Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation forces.* Providing training to partner aviation forces is an area that QDR analysis suggests will continue to grow.



*Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training.* The Department recognizes that in order to ensure that enhancements developed among security forces are sustained, the supporting institutions in partner nations must also function effectively.

*Create mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel.* We are exploring and beginning to implement options for expediting the acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to partner forces.

*Strengthen the capacities for training regional and international security organizations.* The Department will improve its capacity for enabling the United Nations and other multinational peacekeeping efforts.

## **Conclusion**

Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and under-governed areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied interests. Where appropriate, U.S. forces will work with the military forces of partner nations to strengthen their capacity and capabilities for internal security. We will coordinate those activities with those of other U.S. government agencies as they work to strengthen civilian capacities, thus denying terrorists the time, space, and resources they require. For reasons of political legitimacy, as well as sheer economic necessity, there is no substitute for professional, motivated local security forces protecting populations threatened by terrorists operating in their midst.

Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale military campaigns. We have seen this approach work in the Philippines where, over the past eight years, U.S. forces and their Philippine counterparts have trained together and worked to understand the organization and *modus operandi* of the adversary. As their equipment and skills have improved, Philippine forces have patrolled more widely and more frequently, bringing security to previously contested areas.

As we place greater emphasis on building the capacity of our partners, our efforts will continue to be informed by our long-term determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is manifested in human rights vetting and other controls that shape our efforts to educate, train, equip, advise, and assist foreign forces and partner security institutions. America's efforts to build the capacity of our partners will always be defined by support for healthy civil-military relations, respect for human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of international humanitarian law, and the professionalization of partner military forces.