



**STATEMENT OF**

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COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

**PRESERVING AND DEVELOPING THE FUTURE JOINT FORCE**

**HASC READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE**

**MARCH 31, 2011**

## **Statement of**

**General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army  
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command**

**Before the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee**

**March 31, 2011**

**Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to describe how we will preserve the current gains and momentum in jointness, maintain joint readiness, and develop the future joint force given the decision to disestablish US Joint Forces Command.**

**On 9 August 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced a recommendation to disestablish US Joint Forces Command. Using the Secretary's initial guidance, US Joint Forces Command collaborated with the Joint Staff to prepare a proposal to disestablish the four-star headquarters, eliminate redundant or unnecessary functions, and transfer unique joint capabilities to other DoD entities in order to preserve joint readiness. This proposal was part of a broader effort to make the defense enterprise a more cost conscious, efficient, and effective organization. The Secretary of Defense's recommendation to disestablish US Joint Forces Command was approved by the President on 6 January 2011 and the overarching plan to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense on 9 February 2011.**

**We have made significant strides in developing the joint force since the Department entered a new era just over ten years ago and established a separate four-star command, US Joint Forces Command, to advocate and infuse jointness into a variety of Department activities. The Services have made remarkable gains in terms of executing joint operations at varying levels of intensity, and of employing complementary capabilities in the battle space. We have codified joint training, planning,**

and execution in policy documents and doctrine and have years of combat experience that validate the way we execute joint operations. Based on my best military judgment I believe it is the right time to disestablish US Joint Forces Command and I fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to do so. As we move forward I will provide you with details on how I intend to implement the plan to preserve the momentum the Department has gained in joint operations, maintain joint readiness in the future, and ensure the joint force continues to develop new and relevant capabilities for the future operating environment.

In its initial state, US Joint Forces Command was comprised of nine functional organizations plus a headquarters focused on three critical functions – joint force provider, joint trainer, and joint integrator. At the time, the commander of US Joint Forces Command was dual-hatted as a NATO commander, initially for Supreme Allied Command Atlantic and then for Supreme Allied Command Transformation. Over the years, in addition to its NATO role, US Joint Forces Command acquired responsibility and resources for 18 additional functional missions, with multiple resources sponsors. Some of these additions, such as experimentation, were complementary to the Command's original charter. Others were unique joint capabilities added so that US Joint Forces Command could provide leadership, advocacy and oversight. As the responsibilities for joint operational improvements and activities fell to US Joint Forces Command, the Command's joint task workload continued to grow with a four-fold increase in budget from the original \$200M budget to approximately \$900M. Each directorate, command and activity contributed to improving the joint force in their own way. However, the overall organizational structure as a whole was never optimized to maximize organizational agility and operational responsiveness in order to generate enhanced joint operational capability.

**Working in close coordination with the Joint Staff, we applied detailed analysis to assess the functional construct of US Joint Forces Command and tighten focus on core joint capabilities. Informed by that analysis I offered my best military judgment to innovatively satisfy our part of the broader efficiencies initiative.**

**Underlying this analysis are my experiences as a joint force commander in Iraq. We have seized a rare opportunity to capitalize on the achievements and momentum we have made inculcating jointness throughout the force, and provide more efficient and effective support to the joint warfighter. When US Joint Forces Command was established, we did not enjoy the advantage of this momentum, therefore the Chairman needed a dedicated four star command to lead the effort. The steady advance of the joint force however, allows us to leverage the expertise of other combatant commands, the Services and some agencies to take up the mantle of the unique and necessary joint capabilities in the US Joint Forces Command portfolio.**

**The centerpiece of the transition is reorganization centered on the Joint Staff J7 Directorate that better interacts and synchronizes adaptive joint training, doctrine, concept development and lessons learned supported by modeling, simulation and experimentation. Under this new construct, key functions and missions will now be linked together in a more efficient and effective manner under the Deputy Director Joint Staff J7 for Joint and Coalition Warfare – an organization that provides a one-stop-shop for preserving jointness and developing the joint force. This Joint Staff Directorate retains connections with Allied Command Transformation as well as multinational partners. To optimize synergy and prevent internally focused execution of individual functional tasking, this new organization provides direction, guidance, and internal and external coordination to ensure appropriate level of effort is dedicated toward desired outcomes in the form of cross-cutting Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,**

**Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendations.**

**For several reasons this new organization enjoys advantages its predecessor did not. This new integrated Joint Staff organization is optimized to be more responsive to the warfighter's demand signal than ever before. It will maintain engagements with combatant commanders and will holistically involve current operations to ensure lessons learned in the field are captured in doctrine and transferred rapidly into training. It will fulfill the warfighter's near term needs through adaptive training and product delivery. It will also address mid and far term warfighter needs through concept and doctrine development supported by modeling, simulation and lessons learned inputs. By leveraging modeling and simulation across the training and experimentation enterprises, we are better able to rapidly introduce new capabilities for the warfighter's mid and far term needs. In addition, a new synchronization and integration group provides an unprecedented capability for the Director Joint Staff J7 to align priorities, support DOTMLPF integration, rapidly transition concepts and lessons learned, leverage resources for a shared support environment, enhance engagement with our coalition and multinational partners, and increase situational awareness across the enterprise.**

**Other elements of US Joint Forces Command's Unified Command Plan responsibilities will similarly be restructured and executed within the Joint Staff. US Joint Forces Command's role in the Joint Force Provider will now be accomplished in the Director Joint Staff for Operations (J-3). Similarly, the US Joint Forces Command Director Joint Capability Development and Integration (J-8) will merge essential elements of the Joint Systems Integration Center and Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team into the organization to provide a comprehensive systems requirements identification and assessment capability, and will be reassigned to the Director Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8). Under the restructured Joint**

**Staff J-8, these functional capabilities will lead joint integration efforts for joint command, control, communications and computers capability development, integration and assessments in order to balance joint warfighter priorities with available resources. It will also have a clear linkage with the Director Joint Staff J7 to enable broad, comprehensive joint requirements definition and resultant solution sets. This relationship fosters a frame-work for current operations and training experiences to inform future capability development, ensuring we strike the appropriate balance between current warfighters' needs and preparing the future joint force to operate in an uncertain future environment.**

**We will also transfer uniquely joint operational capabilities currently providing services to the combatant commanders. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center is focused on joint targeting analysis and solutions, and the Joint Communications Support Element is focused on providing communications solutions that link service command and control systems together in a joint environment. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency provides personnel recovery expertise and training to the combatant commanders. A new command, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), supports the establishment and operations of new joint headquarters. Under JECC, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and Joint Public Affairs Support Element combination was expanded to include the Joint Communications Support Element in 2008 to provide a short duration capability to establish and operate joint task force headquarters. These organizations continue to provide unique joint capabilities not available in any of the services, and will be realigned to other combatant commands or defense organizations to provide complementary capabilities.**

**Finally, this overall efficiency effort and more direct integration with the Joint Staff reduces layers of oversight and additional support, allowing the organization to focus its attention on key joint areas, vital to meeting the needs of the combatant commander. As**

**the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for ensuring jointness in the force, restructuring and realigning former US Joint Forces Command functional capabilities with appropriate Joint Staff Directors increases the Chairman's ability to ensure joint capabilities and readiness are maintained and promoted.**

**In summary, the time is right for the Department of Defense to focus on those critical functions that truly preserve and develop the future joint force. I have begun the process of transferring key functions to the Joint Staff and other appropriate Department entities. It is my intent that all remaining functions be transferred prior to disestablishment later this summer. Based on a more efficient, effective and streamlined approach to delivering joint operational capability, the restructured functional capabilities will be better able to establish priorities that support current efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and all around the world. Equally important, through focused concept development, experimentations, lessons learned and doctrine, the Joint Staff will continue to maintain a forward-looking posture, avoid stagnation, and retain the ability to adapt to complex, ill-defined future adversaries. We will be poised to preserve joint readiness now and maintain it for future generations of joint warfighters.**

**On behalf of the men and women of United States Joint Forces Command, I thank you for this opportunity to report. I look forward to working with you to ensure the continuity of the joint force and the continued security of the United States.**