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Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

on

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

before the

Emerging Threats and Capabilities
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Committee on Armed Services
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Introduction

Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member Portman, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) mission performed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and United States Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD).

The threat posed by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons is immediate, growing in scope, and evolving in its potential applications. Those who wish to harm us understand that the use of such weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic, political, and social damage on a global scale. They have stated and demonstrated their intent to acquire and use WMD against us. For example, the Fall 2010 issue of the magazine "Inspire…and Inspire the Believers," published by al-Qaeda, contains the following passage: "For those mujahid brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry lays the greatest opportunity and responsibility. For such brothers we encourage them to develop a weapon of mass destruction, i.e., an effective poison with the proper method of delivery… Due to the extreme importance of moving the war with America over to the next stage, the state of weapons of mass destruction, we shall In Shā´Allāh cover such topics in more detail in our upcoming issues."

The United States has a national strategy that harnesses the Counter WMD (CWMD) expertise and capabilities across the U.S. Government (USG) and the international community. The President has challenged us to secure vulnerable nuclear materials across the globe and reduce the likelihood and consequences of biological attacks. In addition, focused efforts by the USG and other parties to the Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC) are destroying their chemical weapons. The Department of Defense (DoD) in recent years has better organized itself to perform the CWMD mission to include more streamlined policy development, mission oversight, requirements identification, WMD intelligence fusion, investment prioritization, planning and exercising, and CWMD mission execution. Additionally, DoD is working more closely with partners across the USG and overseas to counter WMD threats.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Mission

The mission of DTRA is to safeguard America and its allies from WMD (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons) and from high-yield explosives by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter these threats and mitigate their effects.

DTRA is the DoD's center of expertise for the CWMD mission and is a national asset in terms of its unique CWMD knowledge and capabilities. The agency's programs and activities span the scope of the full national response: nonproliferation – reduction of WMD threats at their source; counterproliferation – the deterrence, interdiction, and defeat of WMD threats; and consequence management – the minimization of the effects of WMD attacks and the mitigation of their consequences. DTRA provides CWMD subject matter expertise at global, national, regional, local, and battlefield levels; performs CWMD-related technology development and integrates that technology with operational needs; provides planning assistance for the warfighters; and helps maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. Today, more than ever, DTRA is working closely with our

DoD, interagency, and international partners to build more effective barriers between WMD threats and the American people and our allies.

The agency has approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel located primarily in Virginia, New Mexico, and Florida, but also at 17 more locations across the globe. Our budget request for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) is $1.487 billion and comprises Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $504.747 million Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the funds manager for the remainder of that program's funding, $1.021 billion. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $3 billion.

DTRA performs its programs in response to direction provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). As the Director of DTRA, I report through Mr. Andrew Weber, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because DTRA conducts CWMD-related S&T development, we also work in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In addition, as we are executing programs that implement DoD and national security policy, DTRA has a close partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Our close relationship to the Intelligence Community is also vital in terms of assisting that community in better assessing WMD

threats and, thereby, better informing our planning and mission support.

DTRA is also the DoD Combat Support Agency charged with providing CWMD expertise and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commanders. While we serve all Combatant Commanders, we work most closely with the six Geographic Combatant Commanders, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and USSTRATCOM.

U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD

DTRA's roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when it provided technical and operational nuclear weapons effects expertise to the Military Services. This assistance was and continues to be provided to the Services and also USSTRATCOM.

In late 2005, the Secretary of Defense assigned the Commander, USSTRATCOM, the responsibilities for integrating and synchronizing DoD CWMD efforts in support of USG objectives. The Commander, USSTRATCOM turned to DTRA for its CWMD expertise and established the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD). On 31 January 2006, the Secretary of Defense assigned the DTRA Director to serve in the additional capacity as the Director, SCC-WMD under the authority, direction, and control of the Commander, USSTRATCOM. The SCC-WMD is co-located with DTRA at the Defense Threat Reduction Center on Fort Belvoir to leverage the agency's technical expertise and to provide a seamless partnership between the two organizations.

The mission of the SCC-WMD is to synchronize planning for the counter-WMD mission across the Department of Defense in conjunction with the entire United States Government's effort in the field. The SCC-WMD is responsible for establishing technical support and providing analysis of the global CWMD mission to the Combatant Commanders, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff. The Center's approximately 70 military and civilian personnel coordinate global CWMD operations support; plan against designated WMD threats; develop and maintain a global CWMD concept of operations; provide military representation to U.S. national agencies, commercial entities, and international agencies for matters related to CWMD efforts; advocate for CWMD capabilities; integrate theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns to combat WMD; and execute CWMD operations, as directed.

Twice each year, the SCC-WMD hosts the Global Synchronization Conference, a series of planning sessions that bring together hundreds of CWMD leaders from across the USG and several partner nations. Participants work on specific issues in focus groups, develop desired outcomes and solution paths, and make meaningful progress on solution implementation between conferences. Achievements across recent conferences include development of a DoD-wide CWMD Campaign plan from a framework document to a detailed plan with goals, tasks, and performance standards that will enable us to assess CWMD mission progress; the drafting of health-based chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) decontamination clearance standards for unrestricted operations of US Transportation Command airlifters; and an interagency biosurveillance indications and warning

exercise that clarified for CWMD planners the roles of the intelligence and medical communities in responding to a biological event.

The SCC-WMD also supports WMD Elimination operations undertaken in a hostile or uncertain environment to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and disable or destroy WMD programs and related capabilities. Its Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) provides joint expertise and support in the development, training, and exercising of WMD Elimination related plans, operations, and forces. The SCC-WMD and DTRA are providing assistance to the Commander, USSTRATCOM, who was tasked to establish and maintain Standing Joint Force Headquarters for WMD Elimination as called for by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Additionally, the Center is a key facilitator of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an international effort by 98 countries to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The PSI Support Cell assists combatant command staffs in developing, planning, and executing PSI exercises; assists OSD and the Joint Staff in planning and executing international PSI exercises involving other USG departments and agencies; and provides subject matter expertise to international PSI meetings and activities.

Recent DTRA/SCC-WMD Accomplishments

I am pleased to report that DTRA and the SCC-WMD work together as a fully integrated team. As a team we have assisted the development of more efficient and effective DoD and Combatant Commander CWMD plans; advanced the means for assessing and exercising CWMD

capabilities; shaped and advocated for CWMD requirements; and provided improved PSI planning support.

Other recent accomplishments include:

- DTRA successfully transitioned the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to the United States Air Force. The MOP is a 30,000-pound conventional penetrating weapon designed to provide substantial improvements in accuracy and lethality over current weapons in the arsenal to defeat hardened, deeply buried targets.
- DTRA responded this past year to over 1,600 "reach back" requests for CWMD expertise and WMD effects analysis from OSD, the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders, National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs), and other DoD and interagency customers. This is an over four-fold increase in numbers of requests from when we began providing this expertise several years ago. In addition, our reach back customers are asking for more detailed information and analysis, and expecting faster turn around times. We have provided expertise and supported events ranging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Gulf Oil spill to the Super Bowl and the State of the Union Address.
- Without missing a beat in executing our daily mission, we concurrently responded to events in Libya, supporting Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR, as well as the consequences of the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, by supporting Operation TOMODACHI. At the peak level of activity, over 200 DTRA and SCC-WMD personnel daily supported 33 liaisons, CWMD planners, JECE personnel, and consequence management experts deployed to the U.S. Africa Command in Germany, as well as the U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Forces Japan

(USFJ) and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. We responded to well over 500 requests for information in support of both operations. In addition, we recommended consequence management technologies for consideration by the Commanders, U.S. Pacific Command and USFJ. Our ability to support these events at opposite ends of the earth, on short notice, and on a continuing basis while still meeting other mission requirements demonstrates the agility and professionalism of the DTRA/SCC-WMD team.

DTRA's New Strategic Plan

Many organizations within DoD and across the USG contribute in some way to countering WMD threats. With a fulltime focus on CWMD, DTRA provides the core of the DoD expertise for countering WMD threats. Rather than duplicating capabilities and expertise that exist elsewhere inside and outside the department, DTRA partners with these organizations, leveraging their expertise and efforts and making the full scope of our knowledge and capabilities available to them. As threats evolve and budgets tighten, we must deepen existing relationships and build new partnerships across the department and throughout the USG and with our friends and allies overseas. We also understand that we need to be more effective and efficient in how we perform our mission. Two examples of this are our ongoing effort with the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on opportunities for (a) collaborative R&D on nuclear-related threats and (b) joint offices that will reduce required space in U.S. embassies or the need to rent commercial office space abroad. Both departments and the U.S. will benefit.

The new DTRA Strategic Plan, released last November, recognizes today's realities. It will provide for forward movement in concert with our DoD, interagency, and international partners; facilitate more efficient and effective mission execution; and underpin our Fiscal Year 2012 budget request. At the heart of this plan are three goals.

Goal 1 – Adapt to and shape the dynamic Global Security Environment

DTRA cultivates interconnected, mutually supportive partnerships to counter WMD threats. We must focus on developing new and expanding existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships to promote broader international cooperation on nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management; support the cooperative elimination of WMD threats abroad; improve the security and accountability of vulnerable nuclear, biological, and chemical material globally; and improve strategic global situational awareness to respond to emerging threats.

As the revolution in the life sciences advances enabling technologies and the ability to exploit these technologies becomes increasingly available, there is the urgent need to provide improved protection against naturally occurring extremely dangerous pathogens or newly created biological materials. As American troops are called upon to operate around the world, disease surveillance becomes an even more important aspect of force protection.

Guiding these efforts is a strategy built upon our success with the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, which is expanding to include new partnerships beyond the former Soviet Union (FSU) and greater focus

on reducing the threat of biological weapons. This innovative cooperative program for reducing WMD threats has an impressive history of success. In the FSU, the Nunn-Lugar program has deactivated 7,599 nuclear warheads; and destroyed 2,367 ballistic missiles and strategic air-to-surface missiles, 155 strategic bombers; 32 ballistic missile submarines, and 678 silo and mobile missile launchers. In addition, 24 Russian nuclear weapons storage sites have received security upgrades as have 19 former biological weapons and health facilities. Four former Soviet biological weapon production facilities have been eliminated or converted. Twenty-three disease surveillance labs across the FSU have been built and equipped to enhance early detection of biological incidents. In addition, over 17,000 tons of chemical weapon agents and 819,000 chemical weapon rounds have been destroyed either in Russia or Albania.

While Nunn-Lugar activities will continue in the FSU, the program is expanding to new regions and increasingly focused on cooperative efforts to reduce biological threats. The Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) Program is working with new partner countries to build capacity that improves safe and secure diagnosis of dangerous disease outbreaks and to gain an understanding of their indigenous pathogens. These Nunn-Lugar efforts will directly contribute to improved force protection for our military personnel – a top priority for the Services and the Combatant Commands as expressed by the Commander, U.S. Africa Command, in a 4 January 2011 letter to Senator Richard Lugar, who had visited diagnostic and research laboratories in East Africa in November 2010. In this letter, General Kip Ward stated: "Your call for the U.S. to work together with African partners and provide financial support to mitigate potential bio-

terrorism threats was very timely and highlights a key area for intensified engagement now. I share your concern that bio-security should be enhanced, and quickly, so that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region are denied access to deadly pathogens that may cause large-scale human suffering, death, and economic chaos."

To accomplish this, we rely on the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and, in some cases, existing relationships with these nations that our partners across the USG – including the Departments of State, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture – already possess. Our efforts simultaneously aid the regional strategic objectives of the Combatant Commands by increasing biosafety for partner nation populations.

Objectives under this goal include:

- In collaboration with the NNSA, support President Obama's four-year nuclear lockdown goal, both with existing partners in the FSU and with new partners like China and India.
- Initiate and strengthen strategic relationships in conjunction with our interagency partners to explore collaborative efforts to prevent, reduce, and respond to WMD threats.
- Initiate and expand CBE programs and relationships with, among others, Kenya, Uganda, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India to secure and consolidate collections of extremely dangerous pathogens and their research in the minimum number of secure laboratories and build capacity to quickly diagnose and report natural occurring or deliberate bio-threats.
- In concert with the CBDP develop and expand biosurveillance technologies that encompass early detection, early information

sharing, and the ability to make informed decisions in near-real time.

- Develop bilateral and regional-level capacity to counter WMD proliferation through collaborative workshops, training, equipment enhancements, and regionally integrated counterproliferation efforts to include the International Counterproliferation Program, the Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation Prevention Program, and various counter-trafficking programs.
- Support Department of State Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement efforts to assess, reduce, and secure stockpiles of small arms and light weapons (SALW) worldwide. These efforts help foreign governments ensure that man-portable air defense systems, other SALW, and related ordnance are properly secured and managed and that excess stockpiles are destroyed. DTRA performs assessments, provides technical advice, and presents best practices through training seminars. Although these weapons and munitions are not WMD, DTRA's on-site weapons inspection and accountability expertise has been applied to reduce the proliferation risks and advice countries on how to avoid accidental explosions in their munitions depots.
- In concert with the Department of State, develop and execute a "whole-of-government" supported program to build consequence management capacity with international partners.

Goal 2 – Provide Counter WMD Capabilities to Meet Current Threats and Challenges

DTRA enables warfighters and allies to counter WMD threats swiftly, effectively, and as far from our borders as possible.

Counterproliferation and consequence management activities account for the largest part of this second goal. Related objectives include:

- Expansion of near-real time technical "reach back" support to meet the increased number and sophistication of WMD related requests from a growing list of customers including OSD, the Combatant Commanders, and the WMD-CSTs.
- Priority attention on the safety, security, and accounting of the nation's nuclear weapons under DoD's responsibility.
- Expanded development of WMD active and passive detection technologies and accelerated integration into operational concepts to measurably increase standoff detection capabilities and improve means for interdicting WMD on the move.
- Improved non-nuclear means of defeating underground facilities, particularly those associated with WMD. We have particularly close partnerships with the Services, USSOCOM, and the Intelligence Community in this area.
- Accelerated development and transition of nuclear forensics and weapons effects capabilities that will increase the understanding of tomorrow's WMD threat environment and ensure the survivability and operability of systems and key infrastructure following WMD attacks.
- Enhanced Combatant Commanders' capability to eliminate and respond to WMD threats and vulnerabilities, including the improvement of the Combatant Commanders' ability to plan and execute CWMD responsibilities.
- Improved WMD technical analysis efforts with particular emphasis on modeling, simulation, wargaming, and tool development across the WMD spectrum.

- Better integrated intelligence data and WMD technical expertise to provide improved understanding of the characteristics, risks, and vulnerabilities of WMD threats.
- Develop a collaborative approach to CWMD education and training better focused on the needs of the Combatant Commanders, the Military Services, and our interagency partners.
- Improved capabilities to defeat WMD agents with minimal collateral damage.
- Accelerated development and transition of technologies to improve the protection of the warfighters through passive means and decontamination.
- In cooperation with the CBDP, develop medical technologies to protect the warfighter and the populace from emerging and genetically engineered biological threats by linking the identification of pathogens to the development of medical countermeasures and placing higher priority on vaccine development and production to counter disease pandemics.

Goal 3 – Institutionalize a "whole-of-DTRA" approach to enhance the agency's mission performance

The third goal calls for the improvement and integration of strategic planning, management, and business processes; improved information technology infrastructure and knowledge management; and the development of increased intellectual capital to meet the future WMD threats and provide the required CWMD expertise.

FY12 Budget Request

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for fully authorizing DTRA's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request. I request your support for our FY12

budget request of $1.487 billion as follows: $432.133 million in Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide funding; $13.006 million in Procurement, Defense-wide; $533.652 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-wide funding; and $508.219 million for Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. I also urge your support for the request for the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Science and Technology (CBDP S&T) program, which DTRA executes. These budget requests include efficiencies implemented as part of developing the President's budget submission. Highlights of the DTRA FY12 budget request follow.

Operations and Maintenance Funding

Most DTRA Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding directly supports the warfighters and national missions. The requested $432.133 million would be applied as follows:

- $71.731 million for Nonproliferation Activities including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Open Skies missions; Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program; International Counterproliferation Program; and Secretary of Defense Support.
- $147.113 million for WMD Combat Support and Operations including combat support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and Services; operational and analytical support for nuclear weapons and WMD matters; direct technical support to the Combatant Commands for planning, exercises, and real-world operations; deployable subject matter expertise; targeting support and combat assessments; Balanced Survivability Assessments that provide mission survivability evaluations; Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments to improve force protection at home and

abroad; support to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and support to Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation planning and activities.

- $25.253 million for DTRA's support to the SCC-WMD including development and maintenance of a WMD common operating picture; synchronization of CWMD planning across DoD and with interagency partners to include the Global Synchronization Conference; access and continuity to national WMD expertise; DTRA Operations Center; and 24/7 technical reach back.
- $10.093 million for the Defense Threat Reduction University that provides unique training for students from all levels of DoD, federal and state agencies, and allied countries in nuclear weapons; nuclear and radiological incident command, control, and response; counterproliferation with emphasis on operational support; and maintenance of the DoD source of information and analysis of CWMD and nuclear knowledge.
- $177.943 million for Core Mission Sustainment that provides for all agency mission essential functions including resource management, security and asset protection, information and knowledge management, and acquisition and logistics management. Special care was taken in preparing this request to ensure that much-needed information technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA's global mission execution were funded to the fullest extent possible.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding

DTRA research and development programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-off nuclear detection; modeling and simulation; support to Special Operations Forces; WMD

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; support to the Intelligence Community; hard target defeat; and system survivability against WMD effects.

The requested $533.652 million would be applied as follows:

- $47.737 million for Basic Research to discover and develop CWMD-related fundamental knowledge and understanding by DoD and other USG laboratories, industry, and academia – to include partnerships with foreign universities. This program manages over 200 active basic research awards on a three-to-five year cycle. Since 2007, DTRA has made 205 basic research awards worth $97.2 million in 36 states, thereby funding the CWMD-related research projects performed by more than 500 students and 100 post-doctoral researchers and resulting in more than 500 publications and 25 patents.
- $196.954 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research including systems engineering and innovation; counter-terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; nuclear and radiological effects; WMD battle management; test infrastructure; and CWMD fundamental research.
- $283.073 million for Counterproliferation Initiatives Advanced Technologies Development including systems engineering and innovation; counter-terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; WMD battle management; and target assessment technologies.
- $5.888 million for WMD Defeat Capabilities Development and Demonstration on nuclear and radiological effects.

CBDP S&T Budget Request

Defending the homeland and improving CBRN defense capabilities are top national and DoD priorities because it is not possible in a practical sense to distinguish between public health and warfighter protection. The CBDP is a key part of a comprehensive, national strategy to prevent, protect, and respond to emerging 21st century threats posed by an ever-evolving spectrum of chemical and biological threats. Directed by the National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the White House Initiative on Reinventing the Medical Countermeasures Enterprise, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Defense Planning and Program Guidance, the CBDP supports comprehensive DoD efforts to: research, develop, and acquire capabilities for a layered, integrated defense against CBRN agents; better understand potential threats; secure and reduce dangerous materials whenever possible; and prevent potential attacks. Although the funding for the CBDP is not part of the DTRA budget request, the agency does execute the S&T portion of this program, for which the department has requested $504.747 million in FY12.

This S&T funding provides for technology development to advance CBRN detection, decontamination, medical treatments and diagnostics, battle analysis and management, modeling and simulation, integrated early warning and medical surveillance, individual and collective protection, and medical prophylaxes. I will highlight four significant programs and initiatives:

- The Medical Countermeasures Initiative (MCMI) will address unique operational medical countermeasures (MCM) requirements; establish a Public-Private Partnership for advanced development of MCM candidates to achieve Food and

Drug Administration (FDA) licensure, priority manufacture of FDA-licensed products, and surge production capacity to respond to a national emergency. This program is vital to staying ahead of WMD threats and I urge your strong support for it.

- The Transformational Medical Technologies (TMT) Program represents a paradigm shift for biodefense through the rapid identification of known and unknown pathogens and the corresponding rapid discovery of effective countermeasures. The TMT has demonstrated an "end-to-end" capability to respond to emerging infectious diseases and genetically engineered threats. This highly successful effort has demonstrated abilities to: perform threat identification, characterization, and evaluation within 24 hours; manufacture and test materials in 72 hours; and initiate animal efficacy testing within two weeks, to be completed within one year.
- Since time is the key critical factor in responding to biological threats, enhancing global biosurveillance capabilities is a priority for DoD. Biosurveillance activities performed by the department include research, development, and acquisition of medical diagnostics, data fusion and management, and environmental biodetection capabilities. DoD biosurveillance activities are enhanced by establishing strategic partnerships and scientific cooperative efforts with partner Federal departments and agencies as well as nations across the globe.
- Non-Traditional Agents (NTAs) are chemicals and biochemicals reportedly researched or developed with potential application or intent as chemical warfare agents, but which do not fall in the category of traditional chemical warfare agents or Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Materials. NTAs pose unique risks and challenges for our

chemical defense capabilities and the NTA Countering Advanced Threats initiative addresses emerging and future capabilities.

It is important to emphasize that DoD CBDP programs are conducted in partnership with, and leverage the expertise and capabilities of, departments and agencies across the USG.

Procurement Funding

The DTRA Procurement, Defense-wide request replaces mission essential vehicles and equipment and procures new investment items required to perform agency missions. The FY12 request is for $13.006 million, $0.949 million higher than the FY11 estimate. As with the DTRA O&M account, special care was taken in preparing this request to ensure that critically essential information technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA's global mission execution were funded to the fullest extent possible.

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Funding

The Nunn-Lugar program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat of WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise. This program has expanded its activities beyond the Former Soviet Union (FSU) as authorized in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. For FY12, the Nunn-Lugar program has been restructured to clearly link efforts to established national security strategies, gain efficiencies among related project efforts, and enable and promote the expansion of the program beyond the FSU.

The $508.219 million, a 3-year appropriation, requested for this program in FY12 would be applied for three years as follows:

- $63.221 million for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination in Russia to include 20 SS-19 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 11 SS-19 silos and launch control centers, 36 SS-25 ICBMs, 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers, and 20 SS-N-18 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). This request is a $10.311 million less than the FY11 estimate. In addition the funding would decommission one SS-25 ICBM regiment; complete the dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of one DELTA III Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers; and complete the dismantlement of the nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of one TYPHOON SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers.
- $9.804 million for Chemical Weapons Destruction technical support to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia. This is $6.204 million more than the FY11 estimate. To date, this effort has resulted in the destruction of 1,680.4 metric tons of declared chemical weapon agents.
- $121.143 million for Global Nuclear Security. This is $43.136 million less than the FY11 estimate. This program area renames and consolidates all activities related to nuclear warhead and weapons-grade nuclear material security within selected countries. These efforts provide enhanced physical security, including associated inventory management and security training support, for strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The program also improves security for nuclear material that meets specific criteria for enrichment and quantity and is judged to be vulnerable. In addition, it assists in the secure transport of nuclear

warheads and other qualifying material to dismantlement facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition. This program also assists with the establishment of Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capabilities for nuclear security, material control, and inventory management that is consistent with best international practices, and installs additional security measures in Kazakhstan.

- $259.470 million for Cooperative Biological Engagement. This is $50.436 million more than the FY11 estimate. This program was formerly titled Biological Threat Reduction (BTR). The CBE program counters the threat posed by pathogens (as delineated in the U.S. Select Agent List); related materials and expertise; and other emerging infectious disease risks. It helps prevent these pathogens from reaching any foreign state or non-state actors who may use them against the United States and its allies. The CBE program focuses on delivering tailored approaches that recognize and build upon partner countries' indigenous capacities. The CBE program builds capacity and advocates best practices for the safe and secure handling of extremely dangerous pathogens. It supports transparent responsible research to understand indigenous dangerous pathogens in partnership with the whole of USG and international partners. These collaborative partnerships enhance global capacity to detect, diagnose, and mitigate biological risks of concern. These partnerships also facilitate an ability to initiate timely and effective disease control measures to contain trans-border global disease threats. The program is engaged with Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, and Uganda. In FY12, it will partner with Iraq, Tanzania, Djibouti, South Africa, and India.

- $28.080 million for Proliferation Prevention by building partner capacity in Armenia and Moldova, in collaboration with counter-proliferation capacity building programs across the USG, and expanding on-going efforts within the FSU, to include additional land border assistance and bolstered regional training capacities in Ukraine; land border assistance in Armenia; and possible land border training and equipment assistance in Moldova. This is $1.919 million more than the FY11 estimate Additionally, it is envisioned that this will support project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that enhance CWMD command, control, communications, surveillance, and detection and interdiction capabilities.
- $2.5 million for Threat Reduction Engagement opportunities in new geographical areas. This is $2.500 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $24.001 million for Other Assessments/Administrative Support including audits and examinations of provided assistance, contractor advisory and assistance services, and U.S. Embassy support in partner countries. This is $0.961 million more than the FY11 estimate.

Conclusion

Madame Chairwoman, Senator Portman, and members of the subcommittee, the DTRA/SCC-WMD team has an impressive record of reducing, deterring, defeating and countering WMD threats. We have strong partnerships with the Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, across the USG, and with allies and friends overseas. DTRA has made and continues to make the world safer - whether we are performing on-site inspections as part of the U.S. arms control treaty obligations; overseeing the destruction of former Soviet Union (FSU) WMD

weaponry; conducting imaginative and unprecedented threat reduction activities; developing new capabilities for defeating WMD in place or on the move; protecting people, systems, and infrastructure; improving CWMD planning; enabling CWMD operations; and supporting the U.S nuclear deterrent.

In the years ahead we will be expanding cooperative threat reduction and engagement on a worldwide scale with new partners. We will enable the warfighters and our allies to more effectively and efficiently counter WMD threats by providing the intellectual, technical, and operational expertise that will permit far more effective decision making and mission execution.

I hope that we continue to earn your trust and support. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.