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Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

on

Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request for the
Counterproliferation and Consequence
Management Programs of the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency

before

Emerging Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives

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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and Members of the Subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to address the counterproliferation and consequence management programs performed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). I will summarize my remarks and request that my complete statement be made part of the record.

The threat posed by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is immediate, growing in scope, and evolving in its potential applications. Those who wish to harm us understand that the use of such weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic, political, and social damage on a global scale. They are determined to acquire WMD and, if successful, will use them. For example, the Fall 2010 issue of "Inspire…and Inspire the Believers," published by al-Qaeda, contains the following passage: "For those mujahid brothers with degrees in microbiology or chemistry lays the greatest opportunity and responsibility. For such brothers we encourage them to develop a weapon of mass destruction, i.e., an effective poison with the proper method of delivery… Due to the extreme importance of moving the war with America over to the next stage, the state of weapons of mass destruction, we shall In Shā´Allāh cover such topics in more detail in our upcoming issues."

The United States has a national strategy that harnesses the Counter WMD (CWMD) expertise and capabilities across the U.S. Government (USG) and the international community. The President has challenged us to secure vulnerable nuclear materials across the globe and reduce the likelihood and consequences of biological attacks. In addition,

focused efforts by the USG and other parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are destroying their declared chemical weapons. DoD in recent years has better organized itself to perform the CWMD mission to include more streamlined policy development, mission oversight, requirements identification, WMD intelligence fusion, investment prioritization, planning and exercising, and CWMD mission execution. Additionally, the Department of Defense (DoD) is working more closely than ever with partners across the U.S. Government and the international community to counter WMD threats.

DTRA is the DoD's center of expertise for countering WMD (CWMD) and is a national asset in terms of its unique CWMD knowledge and capabilities. Our programs and activities span nonproliferation – reduction of WMD threats at their source; counterproliferation – the deterrence, interdiction, and defeat of WMD threats; and consequence management – the minimization of the effects of WMD attacks and the mitigation of their consequences. Our contributions range from the global and regional levels to the battlefield. Guided by a new Strategic Plan, DTRA has a defined role and clear path ahead. Today, more than ever, we are working closely with our DoD, interagency, and international partners in building new and more effective barriers between WMD threats and the American people and our allies.

DTRA has an impressive record of reducing, deterring, defeating and countering the effects of WMD. As the DoD CWMD Combat Support Agency, we have solid relationships with the Combatant Commanders and assist them in the areas of CWMD research, planning, training, exercises, and mission execution. Whether we are performing on-site inspections as part of the U.S. arms control treaty obligations;

overseeing the destruction of former Soviet Union (FSU) WMD weaponry; conducting imaginative and unprecedented threat reduction activities; developing new capabilities for defeating WMD in place or on the move; protecting people, systems, and infrastructure; or supporting the U.S nuclear deterrent, DTRA has made and continues to make the world safer.

I will highlight just three of our many recent accomplishments in WMD threat reduction:

- We successfully transitioned the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to the United States Air Force. The MOP is a 30,000-pound conventional penetrating weapon designed to provide substantial improvements in accuracy and lethality over current weapons in the inventory to defeat hardened, deeply buried targets.
- DTRA responded this past year to nearly 1,500 "reach back" requests for CWMD expertise and analysis from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams, and other DoD and interagency customers. Our reach back teams have been asked to provide expertise and support events ranging from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Gulf oil spill to the Super Bowl and the State of the Union Address.
- We are also supporting the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) with its revision of the DoD CWMD Campaign Plan, to expand it from a framework to a detailed operational plan with milestones, tasks, and assessments that will help measure progress being made in the CWMD mission.

Mission and Background Information

The mission of DTRA is to safeguard America and its allies from WMD (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons) and from high-yield explosives by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter these threats and mitigate their effects.

DTRA is the DoD focal point and center of expertise for countering threats posed by WMD. Our programs and activities span the scipe of the full national response: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. We provide CWMD subject matter expertise at global, national, regional, local, and battlefield levels; perform CWMD related technology development and integrate that technology with operational needs; provide planning assistance for the warfighters; and help maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent

The agency has approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel located primarily in Virginia, New Mexico, and Florida, but also at 17 more locations across the globe. Our budget request for Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) is $1.487 billion and comprises Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Operations and Maintenance, Procurement, and Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) appropriation accounts. In addition, DTRA executes the $504.747 million Science and Technology (S&T) portion of the DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) and serves as the financial manager for the remainder of that program's funding, $1.021 billion. Therefore, the total DTRA resource portfolio is approximately $3 billion.

DTRA performs its programs in response to direction provided by OSD. As the Director of DTRA, I report through Mr. Andrew Weber, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Because DTRA conducts CWMD-related S&T development, we also work in partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. In addition, as we are executing programs that implement DoD and national security policy, DTRA has a close partnership with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

DTRA is also the DoD Combat Support Agency charged with providing CWMD expertise and support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commanders. While we serve all Combatant Commanders, we work most closely with the six Geographic Combatant Commanders, the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and USSTRATCOM.

U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD

DTRA's roots reach to the early days of the Cold War when it provided technical and operational nuclear weapons effects expertise to the Military Services. Similar assistance was and continues to be provided to USSTRATCOM.

In late 2005, the Secretary of Defense assigned the Commander, USSTRATCOM, the responsibilities for synchronizing the CWMD planning activities of the Combatant Commanders and advocating for related capabilities. The Commander, USSTRATCOM turned to DTRA

for its CWMD expertise and established the U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating WMD (SCC-WMD) at DTRA. On 31 January 2006, the Secretary of Defense assigned the DTRA Director to serve in the additional capacity as the Director, SCC-WMD under the authority, direction, and control of the Commander, USSTRATCOM.

I am particularly pleased to report to you that DTRA and the SCC-WMD work together as a fully integrated team. As a team we have assisted the development of more efficient and effective DoD and Combatant Commander CWMD plans; advanced the means for assessing and exercising CWMD capabilities; shaped and advocated for CWMD requirements; and provided improved planning support for the Proliferation Security Initiative – a global partnership of nations that aims to stop trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials.

DTRA's New Strategic Plan

Many organizations within DoD and across the USG contribute in some way to countering WMD threats. With a fulltime focus on CWMD, DTRA provides the core of the DoD expertise for countering WMD threats. Rather than duplicating capabilities and expertise that exist elsewhere inside and outside the department, DTRA partners with these organizations, leveraging their expertise and efforts and making the full scope of our knowledge and capabilities available to them. As threats evolve and budgets tighten, we must deepen existing relationships and build new partnerships across the department and throughout the USG and with our friends and allies overseas. We also understand that we need to be more effective and efficient in how we perform our mission. One example of this is our ongoing effort with

the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on opportunities for joint offices that will reduce required space in U.S. embassies or the need to rent commercial office space. Presuming we will be successful at this, both Departments will benefit.

The new DTRA Strategic Plan, released last November, recognizes today's realities. It will provide for forward movement in concert with our DoD, interagency, and international partners; facilitate more efficient and effective mission execution; and underpins our Fiscal Year 2012 budget request. At the heart of this plan are three goals.

Goal 1 – Adapt to and shape the dynamic Global Security Environment

DTRA cultivates interconnected, mutually supportive partnerships to counter WMD threats. We must focus on developing new and expanding existing bilateral and multilateral partnerships to promote broader international cooperation on nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management; support the cooperative elimination of WMD threats abroad; improve the security and accountability of vulnerable nuclear, biological, and chemical material globally; and improve strategic global situational awareness in order to respond to emerging threats.

As the revolution in the life sciences advances enabling technologies and the ability to exploit these technologies becomes increasingly available, there is the urgent need to provide improved protection against naturally occurring extremely dangerous pathogens or newly created biological materials. As American troops are called upon to

operate around the world, disease surveillance becomes an even more important aspect of force protection.

Guiding these efforts is a strategy built upon our success with the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program which is expanding to include new partnerships beyond the former Soviet Union and greater focus on reducing the threat posed by biological weapons. The Nunn-Lugar Program made possible the de-nuclearization of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan following the collapse of the Soviet Union; deactivated 7,599 nuclear warheads and eliminated 3,713 missiles, missile launchers, bombers, and missile submarines; eliminated massive stocks of chemical and biological weapons; enhanced the security of Russian nuclear warheads in storage and in transit; provided improved safety and security of extremely dangerous pathogens in medical facilities across the former Soviet Union; and made it far more difficult for rogue states or terrorists to gain access to WMD knowledge, weapons, delivery systems, and infrastructure.

The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Biological Engagement (CBE) Program is working with Partner countries to build capacity that improves safe and secure diagnosis of dangerous disease outbreaks and to gain an understanding of their indigenous pathogens. These Nunn-Lugar efforts will directly contribute to improved force protection for our military personnel – a top priority for the Services and the Combatant Commands. This was expressed by the Commander, U.S. Africa Command, in a 4 January 2011 letter to Senator Richard Lugar, who had visited diagnostic and research laboratories in East Africa in November 2010. In several of these laboratories a need for additional safety and security upgrades were identified based on the indigenous

dangerous pathogens they handle while performing their mission. In this letter, General Kip Ward stated: "Your call for the U.S. to work together with African partners and provide financial support to mitigate potential bio-terrorism threats was very timely and highlights a key area for intensified engagement now. I share your concern that bio-security should be enhanced, and quickly, so that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in the region are denied access to deadly pathogens that may cause large-scale human suffering, death, and economic chaos."

To accomplish this, we rely on the knowledge, skills, capabilities, and, in some cases, existing relationships with these nations that our partners across the USG – including the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture – already possess. Our efforts simultaneously aid the regional strategic objectives of the Combatant Commands by increasing biosafety for the partner nation populations.

Objectives under this goal include:

- In collaboration with the NNSA, support President Obama's four-year nuclear lockdown goal, both with existing partners in the FSU and with new partners like China and India.
- Initiate and strengthen strategic relationships in conjunction with our interagency partners to explore collaborative efforts to prevent, reduce, and respond to WMD threats.
- Initiate and expand CBE programs and relationships with Kenya, Uganda, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to secure and consolidate collections of extremely dangerous pathogens and their research in the minimum number of secure laboratories and build capacity to

quickly diagnose and report natural occurring or deliberate bio-threats.

- In concert with the CBDP develop and expand biosurveillance technologies that encompass early detection, early information sharing, and the ability to make informed decisions in near-real time.
- Develop bilateral and regional-level capacity to counter WMD proliferation through collaborative workshops, training, equipment enhancements, and regionally integrated counterproliferation efforts to include the International Counterproliferation Program, the Nunn-Lugar WMD Proliferation Prevention Program, and various counter-trafficking programs.
- Support Department of State Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement efforts to assess, reduce, and secure stockpiles of small arms and light weapons (SALW) worldwide. This program helps foreign governments ensure that man-portable air defense systems, other SALW, and related ordnance are properly secured and managed and that excess stockpiles are destroyed. DTRA performs assessments, provides technical advice, and presents best practices through training seminars. Although these weapons and munitions are not WMD, DTRA's on-site weapons inspection and accountability expertise has been applied to reduce the proliferation risks and advice countries on how to avoid accidental explosions in their munitions depots.
- Develop and execute a "whole-of-government" supported program to build consequence management capacity with international partners.

Goal 2 – Provide Counter WMD Capabilities to Meet Current Threats and Challenges

DTRA enables warfighters and allies to counter WMD threats swiftly, effectively, and as far from our borders as possible. Counterproliferation and consequence management activities account for the largest part of this second goal. Related objectives include:

- Expansion of near-real time technical "reach back" support to meet the increased number and sophistication of WMD related requests from a growing list of customers including OSD, the Combatant Commanders, and the National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams.
- Priority attention on the safety, security, and accounting of the nation's nuclear weapons under DoD's responsibility.
- Expanded development of WMD active and passive detection technologies and accelerated integration into operational concepts to measurably increase standoff detection capabilities and improve means for interdicting WMD on the move.
- Improved non-nuclear means for defeating underground facilities, particularly those associated with WMD.
- Accelerated development and transition of nuclear forensics and weapons effects capabilities that will increase the understanding of tomorrow's WMD threat environment and ensure the survivability and operability of systems and key infrastructure following WMD attacks.
- Enhanced Combatant Commanders' capability to eliminate and respond to WMD threats and vulnerabilities, including the improvement of the Combatant Commanders' ability to plan and execute CWMD related responsibilities.

- Improved WMD technical analysis efforts with particular emphasis on modeling, simulation, wargaming, and tool development across the WMD spectrum.
- Better integrated intelligence data and WMD technical expertise to provide improved understanding of the characteristics, risks, and vulnerabilities of WMD threats.
- Develop a collaborative approach to CWMD education and training better focused on the needs of the Combatant Commanders, the Military Services, and our interagency partners.
- Improved capabilities to defeat WMD agents with minimal collateral damage.
- Accelerated development and transition of technologies that will improve the protection of the warfighters through passive means and decontamination.
- In cooperation with the CBDP develop medical technologies to protect the warfighter and the populace from emerging and genetically engineered biological threats by linking the identification of pathogens to the development of medical countermeasures and placing higher priority on vaccine development and production to counter disease pandemics.

Goal 3 – Institutionalize a "whole-of-DTRA" approach to enhance the agency's mission performand

The third goal calls for the improvement and integration of strategic planning, management, and business processes; improved information technology infrastructure and knowledge management; and the development of increased intellectual capital to meet the future WMD threats and provide the required CWMD expertise.

FY11 Budget Outcome and Adjustments

I would like to thank this subcommittee for its strong support of the DTRA FY11 budget request that included 17.5% growth over the FY10 appropriation. This large single year increase was requested by the Department as DTRA's budget had remained relatively flat since the 1998 establishment of the agency. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committees on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives on H.R.6523, Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 fully authorized this request. The Senate Appropriations Committee fully supported our request. The House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee recommended appropriation of 99% of this amount, which was also the level included in H.R.1, the House-passed FY11 Appropriations Bill. Thank you for your support.

FY12 Budget Request

DTRA is requesting your support for its FY12 budget request of $1.487 billion as follows: $432.133 million in Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide funding ($31.399 million less than the FY11 estimate); $13.006 million in Procurement, Defense-wide ($0.949 million more than the FY11 estimate); $533.652 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-wide funding ($28.972 million less than the FY11 estimate); $0 for FY2005 Base Realignment and Closure, Defense-wide (FY11 estimate is $2.097 million); and $508.219 million for Nunn-Lugar CTR Program ($14.293 million less than the FY11 estimate). This budget includes efficiencies implemented as part of developing the President's budget submission. Highlights of the FY12 budget request follow.

Operations and Maintenance Funding

Most DTRA Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding directly supports the warfighters and national missions. The requested $432.133 million would be applied as follows:

- $71.731 million for Nonproliferation Activities including the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Chemical Weapons Convention, and Open Skies missions; Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program; International Counterproliferation Program; and Secretary of Defense Support. This is $4.725 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $147.113 million for WMD Combat Support and Operations including combat support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, and Services; operational and analytical support for nuclear weapons and WMD matters; direct technical support to the Combatant Commands for planning, exercises, and real world operations; deployable subject matter expertise; targeting support and combat assessments; Balanced Survivability Assessments that provide mission survivability evaluations as previously noted; Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments to improve force protection at home and abroad; support to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism; and support to Combatant Command Theater Security Cooperation planning and activities. The FY12 request is $16.306 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $25.253 million for DTRA's support to the SCC-WMD including development and maintenance of a WMD common operating picture; integration and synchronization of CWMD planning across DoD and with interagency partners; access and continuity to national WMD expertise; DTRA Operations Center; and 24/7 technical reach back. This is $6.583 less than the FY11 estimate.

- $10.093 million for the Defense Threat Reduction University including unique training for students from all levels of DoD, federal and state agencies, and allied countries in nuclear weapons; nuclear and radiological incident command, control, and response; counterproliferation with emphasis on operational support; and maintenance of the DoD source of information and analysis of CWMD and nuclear knowledge. This is $0.578 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $177.943 million for Core Mission Sustainment that provides for all agency mission essential functions including resource management, security and asset protection, information and knowledge management, and acquisition and logistics management. Special care was taken in preparing this request to ensure that much needed information technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA's global mission execution were funded to the fullest extent possible. This is $3.197 million less than the FY11 estimate.

Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Funding

DTRA research and development programs respond to the most pressing CWMD challenges including stand-off nuclear detection; modeling and simulation; support to Special Operations Forces; WMD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; support to the Intelligence Community; hard target defeat; and system survivability against WMD effects.

The requested $533.652 million would be applied as follows:

- $47.737 million for Basic Research to discover and develop CWMD-related fundamental knowledge and understanding by DoD and

other USG laboratories, industry, and academia – to include partnerships with foreign universities. This program manages over 200 active basic research awards on a three-year cycle. Since 2007, DTRA has made 205 basic research awards worth $97.2 million in 36 states, thereby funding the CWMD-related research projects performed by more than 500 students and 100 post-doctoral researchers and resulting in more than 500 publications and 17 patents. This is $0.325 million more than the FY11 estimate.

- $196.954 million for WMD Defeat Technologies Applied Research including systems engineering and innovation; counter-terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; nuclear and radiological effects; WMD battle management; test infrastructure; and CWMD fundamental research. This is $15.788 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $283.073 million for Counterproliferation Initiatives Advanced Technologies Development including systems engineering and innovation; counter-terrorism technologies; detection technology; advanced energetics and CWMD weapons; nuclear survivability; WMD battle management; and target assessment technologies. This is $12.090 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $5.888 million for WMD Defeat Capabilities Development and Demonstration on nuclear and radiological effects. This is $1.419 million less than the FY11 estimate.

As previously noted DTRA also manages the S&T portion of the CBDP and integrates it within the broader CWMD research and development

effort. The FY12 budget request for the CBDP is $1,526.485 billion. This is $51.212 million less than the FY11 estimate.

Procurement Funding

The DTRA Procurement, Defense-wide request replaces mission essential vehicles; replaces leased equipment; and procures new investment items required to perform agency missions. The FY12 request is for $13.006 million, $0.949 million higher than the FY11 estimate. As with the DTRA O&M account, special care was taken in preparing this request to ensure that critically essential information technology and knowledge management upgrades essential to DTRA's global mission execution were funded to the fullest extent possible.

Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Funding

The Nunn-Lugar program's overarching mission is to partner with willing countries to reduce the threat from WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise. This program has expanded its activities beyond the FSU as authorized in the FY08 National Defense Authorization Act. For FY12, the Nunn-Lugar program has been restructured to clearly link efforts to established national security strategies, gain efficiencies among related project efforts, and enable and promote the expansion of the program beyond the FSU.

The $508.219 million, a 3-year appropriation, requested for this program in FY12 would be applied for three years as follows:

- $63.221 million for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination in Russia to include 20 SS-19 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), 11 SS-19 silos and launch control centers, 36 SS-25 ICBMs, 27 SS-25 road-mobile launchers, and 20 SS-N-18 Submarine-launched

Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). In addition the funding would decommission one SS-25 ICBM regiment; complete the dismantlement of nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of one DELTA III Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) and eliminate 16 SLBM launchers; and complete the dismantlement of the nuclear reactor cores and launcher sections of one TYPHOON SSBN and eliminate 20 SLBM launchers. This request is a $10.311 million less than the FY11 estimate.

- $9.804 million for Chemical Weapons Destruction technical support to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia. This is $6.204 million more than the FY11 estimate. To date, this effort has resulted in the destruction of 1,680.4 metric tons of declared chemical weapon agents.
- $121.143 million for Global Nuclear Security. This program area renames and consolidates all activities related to nuclear warhead and weapons-grade nuclear material security within selected countries. These efforts provide enhanced physical security, including associated inventory management and security training support, for strategic and non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons and fissile materials. The program also improves security for nuclear material that meets specific criteria for enrichment and quantity and is judged to be vulnerable. In addition, it assists in the secure transport of nuclear warheads and other qualifying material to dismantlement facilities, consolidated secure storage areas, or processing facilities for disposition. This program also assists with the establishment of Centers of Excellence with partner countries to enhance training capability for nuclear security, material control, and inventory management that is consistent with best international practices, and installs additional security

measures in Kazakhstan. This is $43.136 million less than the FY11 estimate.

- $259.470 million for Cooperative Biological Engagement. This program was formerly titled Biological Threat Reduction (BTR). The CBE program counters the threat posed by pathogens (as delineated in the U.S. Select Agent List); related materials and expertise; and other emerging infectious disease risks. It helps prevent these pathogens from reaching any foreign state or non-state actors who may use them against the United States and its allies. The CBE program focuses on delivering tailored approaches that recognize and build upon partner countries' indigenous capacities. The CBE program builds capacity and advocates best practices for the safe and secure handling of extremely dangerous pathogens. It supports transparent responsible research to understand indigenous dangerous pathogens in partnership with the whole of U.S. Government and international partners. These collaborative partnerships enhance global capacity to detect, diagnose, and mitigate biological risks of concern. These partnerships also facilitate an ability to initiate timely and effective disease control measures to contain trans-border global disease threats. The program is engaged with Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya, and Uganda. In FY12, it will partner with Iraq, Tanzania, Djibouti, South Africa, and India. This is $50.436 million more than the FY11 estimate.
- $28.080 million for Proliferation Prevention by building partner capacity in Armenia and Moldova and expanding on-going efforts within the FSU, to include additional land border assistance and bolstered regional training capacities in Ukraine; land border

assistance in Armenia; and possible land border training and equipment assistance in Moldova. Additionally, it is envisioned that this will support project assessments for future land border and maritime efforts that enhance CWMD command, control, communications, surveillance, and detection and interdiction capabilities. This is $1.919 million more than the FY11 estimate.

- $2.5 million for Threat Reduction Engagement opportunities in new geographical areas. This is $2.500 million less than the FY11 estimate.
- $24.001 million for Other Assessments/Administrative Support including audits and examinations of provided assistance, contractor advisory and assistance services, and U.S. Embassy support in partner countries. This is $0.961 million more than the FY11 estimate.

Conclusion

Our path ahead builds on our expertise and accomplishments. As we adapt to and shape the Global Security Environment, we will be guided by the institutional foundation and program experience of the Nunn-Lugar program that safely brought us from the Cold War to the present. In the years ahead we will be expanding cooperative threat reduction and engagement on a worldwide scale with new partners. We will enable the warfighters and our allies to more effectively and efficiently counter WMD threats by providing the intellectual, technical, and operational expertise that will permit far more effective decision making and mission execution.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for your interest in and past support of the

DTRA counterproliferation and consequence management programs. I hope that we continue to earn your trust and support in the year ahead. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.