

STATEMENT OF
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Chairman Nelson, Senator Sessions, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present my views on United States Strategic Command's (USSTRATCOM) missions and priorities. I am especially pleased to have this hearing here in Nebraska, just down the road from USSTRATCOM's headquarters and Offutt Air Force Base. We have a great team here and throughout our distributed command. Today is an important opportunity to showcase USSTRATCOM's active duty, reserve, National Guard, and civilian members, who are standing watch this very minute at locations across the country and around the globe. They truly exemplify the best of today's joint force. I look forward to discussing the command's missions with you today, especially our role in the nation's nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) architecture and essential NC3 capability requirements.

America's strategic forces proudly continue their long-standing role as the foundation of our national security posture. The President of the United States has assigned USSTRATCOM the responsibility to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and to employ appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail. The Command's specific mission responsibilities include planning, synchronizing, advocating, and employing capabilities to meet the nation's strategic deterrence, space operations, cyberspace operations, information operations (IO), global strike, missile defense, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) objectives. We conduct these activities in close coordination with other combatant commands around the world. Today, I would like to describe the strategic context in which we operate and USSTRATCOM's priorities for addressing our many challenges.

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The national security landscape continues to be marked by protracted conflict, constant change, and enormous complexity. While war remains a difficult struggle between human beings, today's operating environment is significantly different than those we experienced in the past. The number and type of actors (state, non-state, terrorist, criminal) are rapidly changing, and the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is less clear. Friend and foe alike can span global distances in seconds through space and cyberspace, and technological advances allow adversaries to cross traditional geographic and military boundaries with ease. Adversaries seek advantages by using asymmetric means to find and exploit our vulnerabilities and to defeat our advanced capabilities in air, sea, space, and cyberspace. At the same time, these adversaries wield hybrid combinations of capabilities, strategies, and tactics and operate in the shadows to present us with ambiguous indications and situations. Rapid technological evolution and the wide civil availability of formerly advanced military capabilities have also reduced "entry costs," making available completely new weapons and enabling actors to access capabilities that would not have been available to them in the past without significant investment. Indeed, surprise may be our deadliest foe, because it can make our plans ineffective, our training irrelevant, and, therefore, our organizations vulnerable.

The need to foster strategic stability and deter strategic conflict, ensure uninterrupted capabilities from and access to space and cyberspace, respond to traditional and non-traditional threats, and deal with surprise in an era of rapid technological advances presents USSTRATCOM with significant challenges. Of the threats we face, weapons of mass destruction clearly represent the greatest threat to the American people, particularly when

pursued or possessed by violent extremists or state proliferators. The potential of nuclear uncertainties in unstable regions adds special significance to this concern.

At the same time, today's fiscal environment will pose additional challenges regarding the means and manner with which we address the difficult global, strategic landscape. Last year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates challenged us to foster an efficient "culture of saving" throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). The resulting review emphasized our responsibility to maximize both mission effectiveness and taxpayer value. USSTRATCOM's exhaustive assessment of our missions identified some functions that we could reduce, consolidate with other DoD organizations, or eliminate in favor of higher priority operational requirements. We are now evaluating these initiatives with the DoD leadership and will realign resources as directed at the conclusion of this assessment.

In summary, the challenges are great, the choices are hard, and there is no textbook solution.

PRIORITIES

The 21st Century security environment demands fast, comprehensive awareness, strategic thinking, flexible planning, decentralized execution, rapid innovation, and an unprecedented emphasis on sharing information. In this environment, USSTRATCOM has been uniquely organized and positioned to shape and employ global capabilities to deter, enable, and, when needed, join with the other combatant commands to fight and win the ever changing joint fight.

First and foremost, we must guarantee a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear deterrent force. As affirmed by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), sustaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, the triad of nuclear forces, the human capital, and key supporting command/control/communications (C3) and intelligence/surveillance/

reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities is essential to retain confidence in the deterrent's long-term credibility, provide tools to combat proliferation, and assure our scientific and innovation edge.

Next, in full partnership with the other combatant commands, we must improve our plans, procedures, and capabilities to address trans-regional problems. Ongoing operations demand our full commitment, and USSTRATCOM's activities both enable and support joint operations around the world. The Command's work to synchronize and advocate for missile defense, ISR, electronic warfare, and combating WMD plans and capabilities helps bring unity of effort and flexible capabilities to trans-regional operations. Whether providing space-based communications or position, navigation, and timing (PNT) information, rapidly transmitting data around the world, or ensuring tested, capable missile defenses or other globally significant capabilities are developed, positioned, and optimally managed, USSTRATCOM is instrumental in winning today's dynamic joint fight.

Finally, we must continue to improve our capabilities and operating concepts in the important civil and national security areas of space and cyberspace. Ensuring uninterrupted access to space and space-based capabilities, improving our awareness of objects and activities in space, integrating their effects with all operational phases, improving space access, protection, and resilience, and expanding our planning and implementation for partnership operations requires that we continue our investment and that we demand acquisition results. For cyberspace, we must enhance network protection and mature our organizations, capabilities, workforce, and partnerships to ensure effective operations.

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

In today's complex security environment, the concept of strategic deterrence must encompass strategies to deter adversaries and dissuade competitors across the full range of their

capabilities. We must consider actors and capabilities in aggregate, not in a vacuum, a need that highlights the importance of a better understanding of adversaries' values, motivators, capabilities, intentions, and decision-making processes. Not every potential adversary has or seeks nuclear weapons, and modern deterrence requires broad coordination, tailored strategies, effective capabilities, international cooperation, and focused capabilities like conventional prompt global strike.

Still, USSTRATCOM's first priority is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and our partners. Last year, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the NPR, and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) discussions produced an important national consensus that affirmed the necessity of the United States' nuclear deterrent and the funding required to sustain it. The president has pledged that the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. USSTRATCOM is now committed to implementing New START and to advocating for planned investment in the deterrent force. The updated "1251 Report" submitted in February of this year outlines both DoD and Department of Energy nuclear funding requirements through Fiscal Year (FY) 2021. While budget estimates will be refined as major program baselines evolve, these important investments must begin immediately. I very much appreciate Congress' strong FY 2011 support and urge you to fully fund the President's request in FY 2012.

Nuclear Enterprise. The FY 2011 and 2012 budget requests reverse several years of downward trend in nuclear enterprise funding. These budgets provide investments in the facilities, equipment, and personnel dedicated to sustaining and managing the nation's nuclear weapons, as well as to dismantling weapons no longer needed. To emphasize the importance of this investment and to better understand the conditions, urgent needs, and impending challenges

across the complex. I made visiting each lab and production facility a high priority upon taking command, and to date I have visited all three nuclear weapons laboratories and most other related facilities—with plans to complete these visits soon.

The men and women of America's nuclear weapons complex perform uniquely difficult, highly technical, and demanding work. As our stockpile ages well beyond each weapon's originally designed lifespan, robust stockpile surveillance and assessment programs will enable strategic deterrence and stability at New START force levels. Weapon safety, reliability, and performance may change in ways we cannot fully predict, and surveillance activities permit confidence and continued stockpile certification without nuclear testing. Dedicated surveillance and life extension studies constitute the best means of informing the President and the Congress of our nuclear weapons' health, status, and requirements. The NPR's case-by-case approach to studying and selecting from the full range of life extension options (refurbishment, reuse, and, if needed, replacement) ensures the best future for our stockpile.

Today, a narrow window is available to synchronize weapon sustainment efforts for the W76-1 and B61 (full scope) life extension activities—cost-effectively introducing improved safety and security features, avoiding a second B61 nuclear refurbishment in the 2020s, and potentially reducing the stockpile by consolidating four legacy B61 variants into a single weapon. In addition, a Nuclear Weapons Council study of W78 ICBM and W88 SLBM life extension program options will examine opportunities to use modular fuze components and develop a possible common warhead, potentially reducing costs and supporting long-term capability sustainment. These and future actions that evaluate ways to reduce warhead numbers and types through stockpile commonality and flexibility offer the opportunity to continue

accomplishing our strategic deterrence mission while also achieving the goal of a smaller, more efficient stockpile.

Strategic Delivery Vehicles. The NPR also affirmed the continuing need for the nuclear triad, which provides the President with multiple options for a variety of scenarios. The value of the triad lies in its flexibility and responsiveness to the changing world environment and in its ability to hedge against technical failure, geopolitical change, or a breakthrough in another nation's capabilities. America's strategic forces require continued investment to ensure their future capability, and USSTRATCOM is actively engaged with our Service partners to define and advocate for necessary nuclear force modernization and recapitalization programs.

ICBMs. The widely dispersed and responsive Minuteman III ICBM force provides high readiness, low operating costs, and sovereign basing with multiple aim points that complicate adversary targeting. The Air Force is successfully concluding decade-long efforts to enhance safety and security and to sustain the Minuteman force through 2020. The Air Force is also evaluating requirements to sustain the force through 2030. USSTRATCOM supports these programs and is working with the Air Force on a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) and pre-Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) activities that begin to define options for a follow-on land-based strategic deterrent beyond 2030.

SLBMs. Ohio-class SSBNs provide an assured and highly survivable response capability, and the highly accurate Trident II D5 strategic weapon system continues to exceed the demanding operational reliability standards established almost thirty years ago. By the time they begin to retire in 2027, the Ohio-class SSBNs will have served for more than 40 years. The Navy completed an Ohio-class follow on platform AoA and, with USSTRATCOM, continues to refine specific replacement requirements. USSTRATCOM fully supports Navy efforts to

maintain the current fleet, fund the necessary research and development for its replacement, and sustain the Trident II D5 ballistic missile and associated infrastructure to satisfy future deterrent requirements. For example, current infrastructure at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA lacks sufficient Explosive Handling Wharf (EHW) capacity to meet growing missile handling requirements. A second Pacific EHW wharf at Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor, WA is essential to long-term SSBN readiness.

Bombers. America's B-2s and B-52s ensure that the President has visible and flexible conventional and nuclear global strike and deterrence options. Affirming their critical deterrent role, the nuclear-capable bomber force transitioned to USSTRATCOM's day-to-day operational control in 2010. USSTRATCOM now has a far stronger voice in balancing this unique, dual-capable nuclear and conventional bomber force's day-to-day readiness, training, and operational employment. While the Air Force continues to sustain mission-critical systems, it will also soon begin developing a new long-range, dual-capable penetrating bomber. Coupled with the development of a new bomber, two additional capabilities will ensure the viability of the air-breathing leg of the Triad for decades to come. Air Force investments will sustain the Air Launched Cruise Missile through 2030 (or until a suitable replacement is fielded), ensuring standoff capability for the long term. Further, the bomber force must be supported by a fleet of new aerial refueling tankers to extend their range and assure the bombers' strategic and extended deterrence roles. USSTRATCOM supports Air Force progress toward ensuring the long term health of the airborne component of our strategic capability.

Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications. A reliable, assured C3 capability from the President to the nuclear forces is fundamental to an effective strategic deterrent. National leaders, commanders, ISR assets, and strategic forces must share assured linkages to

confidently understand and effectively address nuclear mission demands. Current systems require investments to ensure reliability and address looming capability gaps in our National Leadership Command Capability.

A new Strategic Command and Control Complex and Nuclear C3 node at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska is at the center of our nuclear C3 plans. The FY 2012 Budget seeks a first increment of \$150M to begin replacing the aging and fragile Curtis E. LeMay building and colocated facilities. Today's building, command center, and computer systems took shape long before the IT revolution and now lack the capacity to support current mission demands. The buildings' systems strain to support numerous computer and communication systems, and the spaces occasionally experience serious heating and cooling problems, electrical failures, and other outages. For example, in December 2010 and January 2011, two water pipe ruptures caused significant system outages and dislocated staff for several days, although the Command remained capable of performing its missions due to extraordinary workarounds and the remarkable efforts of the dedicated staff and a small army of outside emergency help.

Prior to defining the current requirement, USSTRATCOM—in consultation with the Army Corps of Engineers and the Air Force—evaluated sustaining the status quo, renovating the existing facility, or engaging in new construction. The evaluation concluded that new construction offered the most operationally efficient solution to support USSTRATCOM's missions, operations, and nuclear C3 needs. The new facility will ensure an EMP-protected, flexible, sustainable, reliable, and collaborative environment with an infrastructure that meets the security challenges of today and tomorrow.

Conventional Prompt Global Strike. A limited, credible, conventional Prompt Global Strike (PGS) capability would provide the President with an important deterrent option in some

strategic scenarios. Today, we still lack the ability to rapidly deliver conventional effects against fleeting or geographically isolated targets, allowing a potential adversary to establish a sanctuary using mobility and strategic depth. Research, development, test, and evaluation projects continue making progress, and I ask you to continue supporting these PGS efforts.

International Engagement: Deterring and dissuading nuclear threats in today's national security environment also requires careful attention to international relationships. While the specter of global nuclear war may be more remote than decades ago, the possibility for miscalculation between nuclear-armed states remains a perilous threat to global security. As noted in the NPR, "Enduring alliances and broad-based political relationships are the foundation of strategic stability and security." Indeed, many nuclear-armed states are important partners in combating proliferation. New START lowers the maximum number of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms, restores an important, confidence-building verification regime, and provides opportunities to continue military-to-military engagement. China's willingness to consider and study Secretary Gates' proposal for a strategic security dialogue represents an important avenue for growth between our two militaries in this area as well. USSTRATCOM will continue to support DoD, Department of State, and geographic combatant command activities to develop stable and cooperative relations with other responsible nuclear powers and will be prepared to provide advice on other arms control measures that could encompass a greater range of weapons.

SPACE

Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. and other countries developed and exploited the space domain's extraordinary potential, including changing how we navigate, communicate, and understand our world. However, the domain is increasingly congested, contested, and

competitive. Guaranteeing mission assurance through adequate Space Situational Awareness (SSA), resilience, and critical-asset protection is essential. The new National Space Policy, signed by the President, and the National Security Space Strategy (NSSS), co-signed by the Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence, emphasize the need to continue developing resilient capabilities which will improve our ability to satisfy combatant commanders' requirements for uninterrupted ISR, expanded military satellite communications, and PNT support. Implementing the NSSS will position the national security space enterprise to shape and strengthen the space domain's safety, stability, and security; to maintain and enhance U.S. advantages in space; to energize the U.S. industrial base by engaging a broad range of partners; to prevent and deter aggression; and to improve sustainability, acquisition, and flexibility of U.S. space capabilities.

Situational Awareness. Space Situational Awareness (SSA) is central to mission assurance and increasingly important. As part of its SSA mission, USSTRATCOM now tracks more than 22,000 orbiting objects. Approximately 1,100 of these objects are active satellites, but the remaining debris litter a variety of orbits and threatens both critical systems and human spaceflight. While space surveillance is improving, we do not yet have robust, assured, and real-time situational awareness of the orbital domain. Current and future investments should expand data integration, sharing, and exploitation; improve object detection, identification, and tracking; and advance our ability to characterize potential collisions (conjunctions). Notably, the proposed Space Fence promises to expand detection capacity more than tenfold from just two or three locations outside the continental United States and to construct a more comprehensive orbital picture. Increasing the number of objects tracked will be largely useless, however, without corresponding improvements in data integration and exploitation technologies. As part of its

SSA mission, the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) must also be prepared to identify and attribute purposeful space system interference and provide timely recommendations to address the interference. Without space situational awareness of the orbital domain, link segment, and supporting ground infrastructure, any plans for resilience, mission assurance, augmentation, and reconstitution will have a weak underpinning. USSTRATCOM fully supports funding for both the JSpOC Mission System (JMS) and planning and design work for a modern JSpOC facility that will facilitate a generational leap from static displays to automated, real-time visual conjunction analyses—improving our ability to protect critical space-based assets and maintain our free access to and use of space. In addition, technology will soon allow us to link multiple sensors together in a single network that will meet the needs of many users.

Cooperation. As a global domain, space and space-based capabilities operate irrespective of geographic or military boundaries. As more nations join the space-faring ranks each year and the number of objects in earth orbit grows, the need to establish norms of behavior and to improve the cooperation and collaboration among responsible space users grows as well. Our objective is to sustain a safe, stable, and secure space domain while maintaining the national security advantages space systems provide. U.S. efforts to share SSA data represent an important step toward greater international space cooperation, which should eventually help to integrate sensors and data from allies and partners worldwide and ultimately move towards a combined space operations center.

Today, the USSTRATCOM SSA sharing community includes more than 41,000 users in 141 countries. Our efforts promote the safe and responsible use of space by providing satellite operators with highly accurate predictions of close approaches between space objects for every satellite operator. Since the Secretary of Defense delegated his authority to enter into

agreements with commercial entities to the USSTRATCOM Commander last September, we have concluded 23 agreements and are processing others. Each partner and each agreement signifies an operational relationship that can yield important exchanges, perhaps someday leading to a broad, international partnership for space situational awareness. USSTRATCOM fully supports expanded planning and implementation for space partnership operations among allies, coalition partners, and commercial interests and will work with our partners in the DoD and elsewhere to help review proposals to establish normalized behavior.

Space-Based Capabilities. Enabling better situational awareness will improve the overall U.S. space posture; however, long-term, uninterrupted capability from space requires equal dedication to protection, resilience, augmentation, and reconstitution of assets in space, supported by timely design and development, cost-effective acquisition, and high-confidence space launch. Today's operating forces rely on space capabilities throughout the kill chain and beyond. Putting already stressed space capabilities that allow the joint force to navigate, communicate, see the battlefield, and strike under all conditions in the kill chain places those same valuable capabilities on any potential adversary's target list. USSTRATCOM fully supports DoD efforts to improve resilience and increase the protection of key space assets.

Launch. Reliable space capabilities also require an assured ride to orbit. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs) are the DoD's primary launch vehicles and the sole U.S. vehicles for much of the national security manifest. USSTRATCOM supports further Air Force investments in this and other programs that will assure our access to space. Additionally, improvements in manifest and scheduling processes and investments designed to sustain and ensure national launch facilities' availability for future demand will maximize synergies between launch management and national priorities.

Industrial Base Concerns. Beneath our national security space requirements lies the need for a stable, responsive, and innovative national industrial base. Since the space age began, we have rarely been so reliant on so few industrial suppliers. Many struggle to remain competitive as demand for highly specialized components and existing export controls reduce their customers to a niche government market. Careful interagency planning that more tightly defines and oversees requirements, supported by stable budgets and production rates will help sustain a national industrial base essential to commercial users, military space, and the strategic deterrent. The retirement of the Space Shuttle and other changes at NASA also injected significant concern into the solid rocket motor industrial base—an industry we cannot afford to lose. Substantial weakening of this capability would impede current strategic system sustainment and follow-on development. While industry adjustments are inevitable, DoD, in consultation with NASA and other agencies, is working to sustain the solid rocket motor industrial base to ensure we retain right-sized, cost-efficient, and viable design, development, and production capabilities. USSTRATCOM supports these important DoD efforts to improve program stability, increase the quantity and quality of the acquisition workforce, strengthen clarity and articulation in the requirements process, and stimulate scientific and technological advancements.

CYBERSPACE

Last fall in *Foreign Affairs*, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn noted that, "Every day, U.S. military and civilian networks are probed thousands of times and scanned millions of times." Like space, cyberspace capabilities have rapidly become critical but also increasingly vulnerable. Cyberspace's pervasive presence, high importance, difficulty of attribution, and low cost of entry highlight some of our challenges. Combined with a growing,

global reliance on cyberspace and its hosted capabilities, this constant evolution challenges mission assurance efforts—particularly as the threat moves from exploitation to disruption. Ensuring reliable, sustainable networks, freedom of access, and freedom of maneuver is not just a DoD problem. This is a national security problem. Assuring access demands sustained, resilient, and flexible approaches to maturing our defense capabilities, our capacity, and our cooperative relationships within and beyond the U.S. government.

Capabilities. The most important asset any commander can have is robust, up-to-date situational awareness. Cyberspace is dynamic, and specific threats require specific countermeasures. The Maginot Line failed because it was static and the defense failed to anticipate and address technological and tactical changes. “After the fact” detection and attribution don’t work in cyberspace today either. The offense always has a strong advantage, overwhelming, subverting, or defeating static defenses. Continued advances in system and organization teamwork, coupled with the development and deployment of information-based capabilities and intelligence-driven sensors that “see” intrusions and can respond at equivalent speed is essential. Driven by strong, capable organizations, dynamic, agile, and informed capabilities that comprehend the network and mitigate threats at the boundary will significantly strengthen defense of DoD networks.

In response to the growing threat, last year the DoD established U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) at Fort Meade, MD as a sub-unified command to USSTRATCOM. USSTRATCOM delegated responsibilities to USCYBERCOM to coordinate, plan, synchronize, and execute cyberspace operations in order to better defend DoD networks and to support other combatant commanders. We must accelerate the acquisition of comprehensive, shared cyber awareness tools to expand opportunities to secure critical information, reduce points of

vulnerability, and develop responses to ensure warfighter access to essential information systems.

Capacity. Today, operators at USCYBERCOM and its subordinate Service components work to defend against and attribute numerous information network intrusion attempts. The cyber workforce is growing, but our organizations and capabilities must also grow to keep pace with ongoing operations. USSTRATCOM is working with USCYBERCOM to improve the cyber awareness of every DoD member with access to an information system, strengthen organizations, resolve roles/responsibilities, expand partnerships, build technological and human capacity for full-spectrum cyberspace operations, and integrate cyber capabilities into every commander's plans and operations. Recruiting adequately trained and equipped cyber warriors is challenging, but fortunately young Americans grow up learning and adapting to new technological platforms from a young age. Service cyber career paths are still being developed, and these critical, technical skills need both time to develop and sustained investment to prevent their atrophy. Sustained force development emphasis and investment is essential. The U.S. is also home to the world's premier educational and commercial information technology entities. We must continue to capitalize on this capacity and partner with these organizations on our requirements and to spur domestic math and science interest. Doing so will help develop, expand, and sustain a base of cyber expertise and adapt DoD personnel processes to attract, develop, and retain the cyber professionals necessary to protect critical DoD infrastructure and preserve U.S. freedom of action in cyberspace.

Cooperation. Cyber defense must include a wide range of partners. After all, this is truly a national security issue, making interagency and allied partner engagement and information sharing essential to a robust defense. Military operations depend on the broader

U.S. information technology infrastructure, and defending military networks will net fewer benefits if the wider civilian infrastructure remains at much greater risk. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is ultimately responsible for coordinating the protection of the “.gov” and domestic “.com” domains, but DoD has much to offer in terms of intelligence and technical support. The DoD – DHS Memorandum of Understanding signed last fall lays important groundwork for enhanced cooperation, mutual support, and synchronized operations.

WINNING TODAY’S FIGHT

In strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace, USSTRATCOM both operates forces and supports the full range of military operations. The broad scope of our responsibilities and trans-regional capabilities is clearly woven into the fabric of today’s operations. Winning the fight, whether we are either a supported command or are supporting the geographic combatant commands, is something our team strives to do each and every day. However, USSTRATCOM also has responsibilities to integrate, synchronize, and advocate for other capabilities with trans-regional impact, and we are dedicated to partnering with other combatant commands to improve the warfighting effectiveness of these capabilities.

Information Operations

Consistent with our mission to improve strategic joint capabilities, USSTRATCOM participated in a 2010 Secretary of Defense directed Strategic Communication (SC) and IO Front-End Assessment, designed to evaluate and recommend improvements for DoD roles, missions, definition, management, and resources for SC and IO. As a result of the assessment, USSTRATCOM will reorganize the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) at Lackland AFB, TX. Existing JIOWC resources and missions not specific to electronic warfare

will be realigned to the Joint Staff, and USSTRATCOM will remain the DoD lead for Electronic Warfare (EW).

Electronic warfare. The electromagnetic spectrum spans almost every modern technological convenience. While operational plans normally assume unfettered spectrum access, this assumption is not assured. Changing industry standards, global growth of civilian devices, military bandwidth requirements, and disruptive or destructive adversary electronic warfare capabilities all threaten to pinch or sever the shrinking electromagnetic links between national security platforms and the operating forces that rely on them.

Recognizing future threats, potential limitations, urgent warfighter needs, and the need for unified DoD advocacy, JIOWC completed several Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) tasks to examine capability gaps and solutions for emerging electromagnetic spectrum threats. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 required DoD to develop an EW strategy, submitted to Congress last year. That EW strategy concluded that we must move beyond the traditional understanding of EW by combining it with other kinetic or non-kinetic capabilities to increase U.S. combat effectiveness and achieve electromagnetic spectrum superiority. USSTRATCOM is planning to establish a Joint Electronic Warfare Center to advocate for and support DoD Joint EW capability requirements, resources, strategy, doctrine, planning, training, and operational support.

Missile Defense

The Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) exists to meet combatant commands' theater defense needs and to provide for the limited defense of the United States. Working with geographic combatant commands and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), our efforts focus on building tailored, regional missile defense architectures using the concept of a Phased Adaptive

Approach (PAA) and on meeting urgent warfighter capability needs. USSTRATCOM's work provides a comprehensive assessment of the fielded BMDS's suitability and effectiveness and combines warfighter needs for air, cruise missile, and ballistic missile defense capabilities to inform programmatic actions and guide future R&D investment priorities.

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO allies affirmed the PAA for missile defense as a means to address the continued qualitative and quantitative growth of global ballistic missile programs. The Allies also invited the Russian Federation to participate in missile defense cooperation. As a strategy, PAA applies to several geographic combatant commands, and USSTRATCOM's current challenge is to make sound, analytically-based recommendations to balance limited BMD assets worldwide. The European PAA's four phases of increasing capability are designed to defend against existing and near-term threats posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and to build up defenses against long-range ballistic threats over time as those threats mature. As stated during the New START debate, the U.S. will not agree to any ballistic missile defense limitations or constraints and indeed intends to continue developing and deploying systems consistent with U.S. interests. The U.S. missile defense program is not designed to counter the strategic forces of Russia or China, but rather to address limited ballistic missile threats such as those posed by Iran and North Korea.

As various regional PAAs develop, USSTRATCOM will continually re-evaluate the standing Global Integrated Missile Defense Concept of Operations and other acquisition, deployment, basing, and employment plans for missile defense capabilities between and across all areas of responsibility. Our analysis will ensure that the joint warfighters' requirements receive deliberate management and readiness structures to ensure timely, flexible deployment, employment and redeployment of tested, understood BMD capabilities during and after crises.

Consistent with the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, new advancements and allied technologies must be made interoperable with existing systems, including required improvements in discrimination capabilities essential to the efficient employment of limited missile defense resources.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

Timely, useable situational awareness and intelligence analysis is essential to all military operations. Airborne, submarine, and space-based ISR capabilities all provide key indications and warning information to commanders facing an array of traditional adversaries, non-traditional threats, and challenging intelligence problems. For the past decade, ISR efforts focused primarily on meeting the expanding demand in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. As overseas contingency operations change, DoD must carefully examine force requirements to ensure we organize, train, and equip a balanced force across the range of requirements, including anti-access environments and New START verification. An objective, multi-domain, capabilities-based architecture that improves the ability to identify requirements across geographic boundaries and the range of potential threats is essential to appropriately balancing risk against necessary programmatic, budgetary, and acquisition decision points.

USSTRATCOM's ISR efforts achieved significant resource efficiencies and shaped ISR capability decisions through initiatives like the ISR Force Sizing Construct project, the High Altitude Transition study, the Synoptic Operational Area Reconnaissance Study, and the Mobile Nuclear Air Sampling Study. USSTRATCOM also successfully advocated for a critical USCENTCOM ISR capability—designed and executed in approximately 30 months and at a lower cost than traditional acquisition processes. The Services and intelligence community must

continue to strive for better integration in order to reach greater efficiencies—not only for the collection platforms themselves but also across the still-limited processing, exploitation, and dissemination architecture needed to transform collections into actionable intelligence.

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction

Another mission area requiring sustained attention is CWMD, since the pursuit of WMD by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states remains the primary threat to the United States, our allies, and our partners. USSTRATCOM received the responsibility to synchronize DoD CWMD activities in 2005 and has made discouraging, detecting, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating these threats a priority for theater operations and strategic deterrence. Some actors seek nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to coerce their neighbors or to deter U.S. intervention in regional conflicts. Others may seek such weapons to use them in terrorist attacks or as weapons of war. Diffuse networks of non-state entities, secretive state sponsors, shell corporations, and terrorist-financed transactions challenge our intelligence organizations to develop comprehensive, accurate, and actionable assessments that enable global CWMD. USSTRATCOM continues to pursue further national CWMD capability improvements with interagency partners to coordinate CWMD objectives, plans, and activities.

Among current and future CWMD enhancements are technological improvements to detect, analyze, and assess WMD developments. The 2010 QDR affirmed the need to enhance National Technical Nuclear Forensics capabilities which, along with accurate intelligence and other information, support nuclear threat attribution and may thereby deter those considering the diversion, transfer, development, or use of nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, radiological dispersal devices, and other nuclear or radiological threats. In the past year, the USSTRATCOM Center for CWMD (SCC WMD) embedded Proliferation Security Initiative

activities within U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Southern Command exercises and supported planning and funding efforts to expand exercise participation and training synchronization across geographic combatant commands. Finally, SCC WMD collaboratively operates the Interagency Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) System with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. INDRAC provides a strategic level information reference resource to inform CWMD operations, planning, advocacy, training, and exercises across the government.

In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense directed DoD to establish a Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters to "better plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations...with increased nuclear disablement, exploitation, intelligence, and coordination capabilities." Last December, Secretary Gates tasked USSTRATCOM to execute this task and stand up a Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination of WMD with "standing exploitation and intelligence cells in order to plan, train for, and execute global WMD elimination operations."

USSTRATCOM is currently analyzing the requirements necessary to implement the Secretary's direction.

CONCLUSION

Great challenges lie ahead of the United States and USSTRATCOM, but so too do great opportunities. The Command is dedicated to being an effective steward of taxpayer resources while maintaining a strategic force structure ready and able to deter aggression, preserve U.S. freedom of action, and defeat adversaries when necessary. The uncertainty inherent in today's complex, multi-domain security environment requires that we summon our best efforts to develop and deploy the plans, systems, and forces needed to sustain America's deterrent, ensure unfettered access to and through space and cyberspace, and win the dynamic joint fight. I look

forward to working with Congress as we pursue these priorities together, and I appreciate your support and counsel in the months and years ahead. Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today, and welcome back to Nebraska and the Bellevue-Offutt community.