

STATEMENT OF
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DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ON
LONG-TERM READINESS CHALLENGES IN THE PACIFIC
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Chairman Forbes, Ms. Bordallo, Members of the Committee. On behalf of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), thank you for the opportunity to discuss the long term readiness challenges we face in the Asia-Pacific region. As you know, the Asia Pacific is vital to our national interests. This region is home to five of our nation's seven mutual defense treaties, three of the world's largest economies, and over one trillion dollars in U.S. two-way trade. For over 60 years, the United States, through USPACOM, has provided a secure environment that has allowed the nations of the Asia-Pacific to focus on developing their economies and building strong institutions of government. This security, which has allowed this region to prosper, is a direct result of the readiness of our forward-deployed forces and the strong relationships we maintain with our allies and partners in the region.

While the region remains relatively secure and stable, the security conditions that have underpinned this unprecedented prosperity for decades remains challenged by both traditional and emerging challenges.

North Korea. For decades, the potential for major conventional conflict between North and South Korea has been a significant concern. Unable to rely on its ageing conventional force, North Korea increasingly relies on its nuclear and missile programs, and special forces to project a credible threat within East Asia. Caring little for its people, the regime stays in power through repression, fear, and limiting access to information about the outside world. Its economic approach of self-reliance has been proven unsuccessful, and its faltering economy is aided by cash generated by an increasing

criminal activity network and proliferation of its weapons technology to other rogue regimes and organizations.

The transition of power within the DPRK also is a source of concern as we watch Kim Jong Il accelerate a timeline that ensures his youngest son continues his family's reign. The speculation that the recent acts of provocation committed against South Korea, such as the sinking of the ROK ship CHEONAN and the killing of innocent civilians in the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong-Do Island are designed to build the legitimacy of his son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor cannot be ignored. The secrecy surrounding the Kim regime makes understanding their intentions and capabilities one of our greatest challenges. This lack of transparency, coupled with the uncertainty associated with the dynastic succession of the Kim family, make North Korea a potential source of regional instability and significant concern to PACOM.

China. Another challenge for Pacific Command is to advance the complex U.S.-China relationship. While our military-to-military relationship with China is episodic, we continue to press for opportunities that provide mutual benefit and positive interactions that support a lasting peace and stability within the region. That being said China's powerful economic engine continues to fund a military modernization program with capabilities that appears to be designed to challenge freedoms of action in the region and enforce China's influence over its neighbors, including our regional allies and partners. China recently overtook Japan as the world's second largest economy, and this month, announced a 12% increase to their defense budget. This new found wealth is being invested to rapidly modernize its military and develop anti-access systems capable of holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from Chinese

shores. As if to underscore this point, the Chinese publicly tested their next generation fighter, the J-20, during Secretary Gates' trip to China in January, 2011. Other Chinese developments include anti-space and cyber capabilities as well as an aircraft carrier and an ever growing missile inventory. These capabilities appear inconsistent with China's stated goals of a defense-oriented military capability and highlight the need for frank conversations and predictable actions within the context of a functional military-to-military framework.

Force Posture. USPACOM embraces a theater strategy that leverages an evolving force posture that maximizes strength, balances and biases disposition, sustains readiness, and includes effective forward forces substantial enough to overcome threats and protect U. S. interests. Current Force Posture throughout the Asia-Pacific remains heavily influenced by post-World War II and Cold War era basing and infrastructure, concentrated primarily in Northeast Asia. While this posture is necessary to address the demands in Northeast Asia, to include reassuring our allies of our continued U.S. commitment to regional security, it is not optimized for shaping and responding to 21st century demands elsewhere. Our Posture in South and Southeast Asia is achieved almost entirely with deployed U.S. forces. As such, posture adjustments are needed to meet current and emerging threats in these areas as well as reinforce budding partnerships and strengthen existing alliances.

DPRI. To transform and realign our forces in Japan, the Government of Japan (GOJ) and the Government of the United States agreed in 2005 to implement changes which would allow our forces to adapt to the changing regional and global security environment. Composed of 19 Agreed Implementation Plans (AIPs), the Defense Policy

Review Initiative (DPRI) remains a key transformation goal of the U.S.-Japan alliance. PACOM remains committed to its implementation. Major realignment elements include relocating two U.S. air bases from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; and improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces. Most of the 19 AIPs are on track due to the significant contributions provided by the Government of Japan (GOJ). The one lacking progress and most familiar to Members of Congress is the development of a Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and the subsequent move of approximately 8000 Marines to Guam. While this lack of progress is disappointing, it does not undermine our ability to maintain trained and ready forces in the region, or our ability to satisfy our treaty commitments to Japan. We will continue to operate from the existing facility at Futenma MCAS while we work with our leadership in DOD and the Japanese to find a solution acceptable to both our nations.

Guam. Progress on construction to support the rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam has been delayed due to progress on the development of the FRF and historic preservation issues. Once complete, Guam-based Marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain on Okinawa, will enhance the flexibility of forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR. Increases to U.S. military capabilities on Guam will fully leverage transformational advancements of the joint force, serve as a central hub for the ISR/Strike force capability within the region, and provide infrastructure to allow for agile and responsive employment of assigned or transient naval forces. Whether deployed to or permanently based in

Guam, forces operating on and in the vicinity of Guam provide regional and global military power to meet our nation's needs.

ROK Transformation. The U.S.–ROK Alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy and posture in Northeast Asia. Like the U.S.-Japan Alliance, this alliance is also transforming to ensure it matures as an effective contributor to Peninsula and regional security. Current initiatives to mature the alliance are underpinned by the transition of military wartime operational control of combined defense forces to the ROK by the end of 2015. Overall, this transformational effort is designed to improve responsiveness to an evolving peninsular, regional, and global security environment. To this end, the transformation must ensure U.S. forces, which are stationed on the Korean Peninsula to deter aggression and respond to DPRK hostility, are also accessible for regional and global employment. Further, the transformation will ultimately support the ROK military's continued development of extra-peninsular capabilities and capacities.

For over 60 years, U. S. Pacific Command has underpinned the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and help set the conditions for increased prosperity. This security is a direct result of the credible combat power we maintain through our forward-deployed forces and the close relationships we have with our allies and partners. Although our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians should be complimented on success, it would not have been possible without the continued bipartisan support we receive from this Subcommittee. On behalf of our Commander, Admiral Willard, and the men and women serving in the Asia-Pacific, please accept our sincere appreciation for your support.

Thank you and I look forward to answering your questions.